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This study basically treats two concerns. The first is the relation 
between the immutability of God and the Incarnation. ä How can God be and 
remain immutable and yet become man? The second is the passibility of 
God as man. - Is there any real meaning in saying that as man God is born, 
suffers, and dies? These, two concerns, are-studied historically and 
speculatively;. i. e. through the study of how these two concerns were 
treated in different periods., throughout, the history of Christology, it 
was hoped that a viable and enriched theological answer to the problems., 
under discussion would be forthcoming.: 
-In Patristic Christology one finds a gradual realization among the 
Fathers-that the immutability of God is not an impediment to the. Incarnation, 
but a prolegomenon to it. The basic problem for them was-. to define the 
incarnational notion of 'become'. The incarnational act must not only 
uphold the immutability of God, but the ontological union and. the full 
humanity as well. This was accomplished by Cyril of Alexandria with his 
personal/existential notion of the Incarnation. .A further development 
was found in. Aquinas. He placed the personal/existential notion of the 
Incarnation in the, philosophical framework of, a mixed relation. This gave 
greater depth and clarity as to. how and why God can, remain immutable in 
becoming man, and, why he-is truly passible as man. - It is Aquinas who 
gives full positive value to God's immutability as it relates to the 
Incarnation. Kenotic Christology saw the immutability of God as a threat 
to the full humanity, but. in the end it undermined its own belief. 
Kenotic Christology sacrificed not only the full divinity of. Chriat, but 
also the full humanity. While Process Christology solves the-problem 
under discussion by making God mutable, it does so at the expense of abandon- 
ing rationality and Christianity. Contemporary, Catholic Christology is 
well aware of. the problems. While Rahner and Galot truly desire to .. 
maintain God's immutability, they find it difficult to reconcile, it with 
God's actual"dynamic presence in time and history as man. They fail to 
see'that the immutability of God is the guarantee and prolegomenon to 
God's actual dynamic presence in time, and history as man. 
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PREFACE 
This, study basically treats two concerns. The, first,, concern is the 
, relation between the immutability, of. God and the, Incarnation. . 
How-can 
God be and remain immutable and yet become man? The, second concern is 
the passibility of God as man. Is there any real. meaning in. saying that 
God, is born, suffers, dies,, loves as. man?,. These two concerns are studied 
historically, i. e., how they. were treated in different periods through- 
out the history of Christology. However,, this is not purely an historical 
study. It is speculative as well for the author wished in and through,. the 
, 
historical study to obtain and formulate a viable and enriched theological 
, answer 
tothe problems. treated.. Thus it was hoped that from and in this 
historical study a real and new development in Christological knowledge 
would be forthcoming both as to the nature of the, questions treated and 
of the answers that must be given. 
Because this study is of a historical/speculative nature what should 
be noted is that the answers proposed in this study are given in the 
historical context of. when and how the questions were asked and, answered 
in the different periods of the history of Christology. Because of this 
the questions studied here, have only been, answered gradually through the 
accumulation and collation of insights that have been obtained from. diffe- 
. rent 
theologians in different historical periods. That should also be 
, noted 
then is that the insights obtained and stressed in each chapter were 
obtained mainly at the time of researching and writing that chapter. There 
was no pre-conceived plan as to_how this study would develop, nor then is 
there any reading into the past the developments that took place in the 
future. For example, the insights that were obtained in researching and 
stressed in writing the chapter on Aquinas were not known at the time when 
the chapter on Nestorius, Cyril, and Chalcedon was written. The author 
then not only tried to write an historical/speculative study of the problem 
, of 
how God can remain immutable in becoming man, 
_and 
how he is passible 
as man, but, actually tried to live the history of the Christological 
speculation as well. The author's own speculative answers grew and 
developed. in and with each historical period treated and are contained 
developmentally in each of the successive chapters. 
While this study is of an historical nature, it is obvious, for 
reasons of space and time, that the whole history of Christology could not 
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be treated. Those periods, movements, and theologians which seemed the 
most relevant to the questions under discussion were chosen for examination. 
Thus the Introduction and first two chapters treat the Patristic Period. 
The Introduction will situate the problems and questions in early Christian 
thought. Chapter 1 will be concerned with the Trinitarian and Christo- 
logical speculation surrounding the Council of Nicea, and Chapter 2 will 
treat the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies in conjunction with the 
Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. The third chapter will take a quick 
glance at Anselm and make a more thorough study of Aquinas' Christology. 
Introduced by way of Luther and Lutheran Christology, Kenoticism will be 
the main concern of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will study Process Christology 
and Chapter 6 will discuss the Christology of a number of contemporary 
Catholic authors. 
As the above reveals there are lacunae in this study. Some of the most 
striking are the post-Chalcedonian Christology surrounding the Monophysite 
Movement, the Medieval Franciscan Christology of such men as Bonaventure 
and Scotus, and the Neo-Orthodox Protestant Christology of Barth and 
Brunner. It is hoped that their absence does not critically harm this 
study. 
It should be noted that the terms 'immutable' and 'impassible' 
retain, for the most part, their usual theological meaning in this'study. 
For God to be immutable means that he does not change. The concepts of 
'impassibility' and 'passibility' are somewhat broadened however. For 
God to be impassible in this study means not only that he does not ex- 
perience suffering, pain, and sorrow, but also that he does not experience 
changing intellectual, psychological, and emotional states as men do. 
Likewise then for God to be passible as man would denote not only that he 
can suffer, etc., but also that he can experience human intellectual, 
psychological and emotional states. 
There is one-overriding presupposition in this study. It may best 
be called 'the principle of faith. ' The author accepted from the very 
beginning that God as God is immutäble and impassible and that he remained 
immutable in the act of becoming man, but that as man he was passible. 
This was accepted not because some theological answer as to how this could 
be the case was already formulated, but because this is what has been 
revealed and what faith has accepted as true. The purpose of this study 
then was to propose how what has been revealed and accepted by faith 
can be theologically and philosophically grounded and understood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SITUATING THE QUESTIONS IN EARLY PATRISTIC CARISTOLOGY 
A. Biblical Basis 
To introduce this study via biblical teaching is difficult. The 
difficulty is not so much that there is no biblical foundation for this 
study, but rather that the Bible, as such, does not explicitly raise or 
treat the problems studied here. The Bible, especially the New Testament, 
is kerygmatic in nature and thus its main purpose is to proclaim God's 
revelation and not to give a systematic, speculative, and theological 
examination of it. Moreover, since God's revelation takes place in a 
Semitic culture, the thought patterns and linguistic expression in which 
God's revelation is couched do not give rise to the concerns of this 
study. The Old Testament does not speak philosophically of God's 
immutability and of his relation to the world. The New Testament does 
not treat the question of how God can remain immutably himself and yet 
become man, nor does it speculate on how the human experiences of Christ 
bear upon his divine Sonship. 
If one were to look for the biblical basis of this study, one would 
have to say that it arises out of the Old Testament's dual conception 
of God. First of all the Old Testament sees God as a 'living God' 
(Jd. 8: 18,1 Kg. 17: 1), who is actively and personally present to his 
people. He is the God who leads the Israelites out of the land of Egypt 
(Ex. 13: 17), who saves them from thirst, famine, and sword (Dt. 28: 1, 
Ex-17: 7 ,2 Sam-3: 18). He is the God who is active in 
time and history 
as their Lord and Master (Dt. 10: 14-18). He is the God who chooses a 
people and unites them to himself (Gn. 12). He is the faithful 'God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob' (Ex. 3: 6). He is the God who makes his presence 
and wishes known through the Judges, Kings, Priests, and especially the 
Prophets. He is the God who is near, who sees and listens to his people 
(Ex. 2: 23-25). He is the God who loves, judges and condemns (Am. 3: 2). 
For the Hebrew people God revealed himself as an active personal being 
in their midst. 
However, it is through God's personal proximity and dynamic activity 
in the world among men that he reveals himself as other than the world 
and man. It is through his acts that he reveals himself to be God and 
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not man, 'the Holy One in your midst' (Hos. 11: 9, Cf. Am-4: 2). While 
active and present in time and history he is above time and history as 
their Lord and King. He is Lord over all creation (Is. 6: 5, Ps. 97: 5, 
45: 3, Jds. 3: 11, Mi. 4: 13). He is the Creator God who from the beginning, 
before creation, existed, (Gn. 1: 1), and as such he is 'the first and the 
last' (Is. 41: 4,44: 6). He is spirit (Is. 31: 3), the most high (Ps. 47: 2), 
the almighty (Ps. 135), the all-powerful (Dt. 4: 32-40). Unlike man he 
does not come to be or pass away. He 'never changes' and his 'years 
are unending' (Ps. 102: 27). He is above all other gods, and he alone is 
truly God: 'Before me, no god was formed and there will be none after 
me; I, I, I am Yahweh, there is no other savior than I' (Is. 43: 10f). 
While God is with his people, he challenges them: "'To whom could you 
liken me and who could be my equal? " says the Holy'One' (Is. 40: 24-25, 
Cf. 40: 18). He resembles nothing in the created world (Ex. 20: 4, Dt. 5: 8). 
For the Hebrew people God's transcendence does not take away from his 
immanence, but gives meaning and value to his immanence. The God who 
is wholly other than they is the God who walks, talks, listens, weeps, 
judges, and loves. 
It is this dual conception of God which is basically the biblical 
prologomenon to this study. God reveals himself in time and history as 
one who transcends time and history. He is present as the wholly other. 
1 
With the coming of Christ this dual conception of God is radically 
made evident. With Christ God is no longer present and active through 
Judges, Kings and Prophets, but now the Word himself, who in the beginning 
was with God and is God, has become flesh and lives among men (Jn. 1: 1-14). 
The divine Logos himself is in time and history living as a man. While 
the Fathers will ask philosophical questions and use philosophical 
constructs and language, it is this radical and unprecedented presence 
of God himself as a man which challenges them. 
1. God in revealing his name as Yahweh brings out this dual under- 
standing. He reveals and names himself as the wholly other and 
the unknowable. Cf. W. Eichrodt, Theoloty of the Old Testament, 
Vol. 1, (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 179-187; J. C. Murray, 
The Problem of God, (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 5-30. 
For a good summary of the Old Testament notion of God see J. L. 
McKenzie, The Two-Edged Sword, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967), 
pp. 286-294. 
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B. Early Patristic Development 
For the Patristic theologians the immutability of God, as philosophi- 
cally understood, is taken for granted. Pelikan notes that 'the early 
Christian picture of God was controlled by the self-evident axiom, 
accepted by all, of the absoluteness and impassibility of the divine 
nature. '1 Thus, the early Christological controversies and debates were 
never concerned with the immutability and impassibility of God as such, 
but rather they centred around the reconciliation of God's immutability 
and impassibility with the new reality of Christ. 
The theological development concerning the person of Christ raised 
the question of immutability and impassibility of three levels. The 
three levels arise out of John's statement 'The Word became flesh. ' 
Each of the three words (except 'the') raised a distinct question con- 
cerning God's immutability and impassibility. The first level concerned 
God in himself and as such can be designated the Trinitarian question. 
If the Word is divine, how can he be from the Father without destroying 
the oneness of God and thus his immutable nature? Does belief in the 
divinity of the Son, that he is from the Father, imply that God in 
someway changes from one to two? The second level revolved around the 
notion of 'Become. ' It is an incarnational concern. If the Word is God, 
does he change in becoming man? The third level centres on the manhood 
of the Son. If the divine Word is man, do his experiences as man effect 
a change in his divinity? The last two levels may be designated 
Christological. 
2 
While the questions are on three levels, these levels are not 
separate or independent of one another since all find their point of 
departure and unity in the person of Christ. Thus the immutability and 
1. J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition I: The Emer nce of the Catholic 
Tradition (100-600), (Chicago: University Press, 1971)v p. 229. Cf. 
R. M. Grant, The Early Christian Doctrine of God (Charlottesville 
University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp. 10,13-15,21,111-114. 
2. While this study is primarily concerned with the two Christological 
levels, the Trinitarian question will also be treated until Nicea 
and Athanasius. It was thought wise to treat the Trinitarian 
level until after the Arian controversy since God's immutability 
played such a major role in the controversy and the Church's 
subsequent teaching. 
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impassibility of God is not a question outside of or a sidelight to 
the major Trinitarian and Christological controversies, but rather a 
constitutive factor in the controversies themselves. 
The first controversy involving the immutability and impassibility 
of God comes early with Docetism. As a Christological heresy it concerns 
God's immutability and impassibility on the two Christological levels. 
While it was condemned because it denied the real humanity of Christ, 
it was motivated to do so because of God's immutability and impassibility. 
For the Docetists God could not really be united to matter without 
becoming mutable and passible. To preserve God's immutability and 
impassibility they denied the physical and real-humanity. God only 
appeared to be a man. 
Part of their difficulty resided in their Manichean and Gnostic 
belief that matter was the principle of impurity and evil. Moreover, 
it was their zealous adherence to the Greek notion of God's immutable 
transcendence which scandalized them when confronted with the New 
Testament data of Christ's sufferings. For the Docetists, and for all 
who are overly influenced by Platonic thought, for God to be transcendent, 
and thus immutable and impassible, meant not only that God was wholly 
other than creation in the Biblical sense, but also wholly apart from 
man. Transcendence for the Greeks was not only a description of God 
in himself, but also a description of God's relation or lack of relation 
to man. This notion of transcendence usually expressed itself by 
allowing no direct relationship between God and man at all, but only 
indirectly through intermediaries. Thus one finds the Platonic concepts 
of Mind or Thought, Soul, and Demiurge. 
Docetism then was not only a heresy in its own right, but also an 
integral component of all dualistic systems where what pertained to the 
transcendent God and what pertained to matter were seen not just as 
separate and distinct, but as radically opposed to any relationship. 
1 Thus one finds Docetic elements in Marcionism and Gnosticism. 
1. Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam and 
Charles Black, 4th ed., 1968), pp. 140-142. Also see A. Grillmeier, 
Christ in Christian Tradition (London: Mowbray, 1965), pp. 103-122. 
Also see Pelikan, pp. 174-175" 
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Ignatius of Antioch is an example of a very early attack against 
thosewAo 'deny God, ' 'those sceptics, ' who say 'that his sufferings 
were not genuine' or who deny 'that he ever bore a real human body. ' 
For Ignatius Christ 'was the son of Mary; he was verily and indeed 
born, and ate and drank; he was verily presecuted in the days of Pontius 
Pilate, and verily and indeed crucified, and gave up the ghost in the 
sight of all..... . '2 
The full weight of Ignatius' defence, which would scandalize any 
good Docetist, comes to the fore when one realizes that the person who 
was really born and suffered was 'Jesus Christ our God. '3 For Ignatius 
'There is only one Physician--very flesh, yet Spirit too; Uncreated, 
and yet born;.... At once impassible and torn by pain and suffering 
here below..... . '4 
The strength Of Ignatius' position lies in the fact that he expresses 
the faith of the Church with little ambiguity. It is indeed surprising 
that at such an early date one finds the full divinity and humanity 
predicated of the one person of Christ almost in Chalcedonian rigor. 
However, while one sees this clear development in Ignatius' Christology, 
there is a lack of theological argumention. While he attacks the 
Docetic teaching as false, he does not present any theological arguments 
as to why they are wrong. He in no way tries to answer the problem that 
they brought to the fore: how can God become man and undergo real 
human experiences while remaining immutable and impassible in his 
divinity? Ignatius could have attacked their understanding of matter 
and creation or their notion of God's transcendence. Or he could have 
speculated on the nature of the union between God and man in Christ. 
5 
For Ignatius it was enough to place the true faith concerning Christ 
over against that of the Docetists. 
However, one should not be too critical of Ignatius' response, for 
as a heresy Docetism was precociously ahead of its time. The problem 
1. Ignatius of Antioch, Trall., 10 and Sm ., 2&7. Trans. Maxwell 
Staniforth, Early Christian Writings, Penguine Classics, 1968). 
2. Trall., 9. 
3. Eph., 18. Cf. Poly., 8; Rom., 6. 
4. EEph., 7. Cf. Poly., 3. Besides Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp of 
Smyrna and soon after Iraneus of Lyons also took the Docetists to 
task. Cf. Polycarp, Phil., 7. Iraneus, Adv. Haer., 3: 16: 9,4: 6: 7. 
5. Ignatius' arguments for the real humanity are solely soteriological. 
Cf. Eph., 18; Trall., 2& 11; Phil., 9& 11; Smyrn., 5&7. 
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problem of Docetism only comes when one holds for the full divinity 
of Christ. Thus the problem raised by the Docetists only comes fully 
to the fore in the aftermath of Nicea and the Arian controversy when 
it is taken up by Nestorious and Cyril. 
With the demise of the Docetists, at least in the extreme form, 
the early Church turned its attention to the divinity of the Logos and 
his relation to the Father. 
1 While the major problem was trying to 
preserve the oneness of God, the influence of and repercussions on 
Christology are readily apparent. This speculation is exemplified by 
the extreme forms of Monarchianism and by the responses of Tertullian 
and Origen to them. 
Dynamic Monarchianism or Adoptionism is not so much concerned 
with the immutability and impassibility of God as they pertain to the 
Incarnation, but more to the oneness of God in himself. Christ as 
Son of God was not Son by nature but son by adoption for to be Son by 
nature would destroy the oneness of the monarchy, and thus indirectly 
make God mutable and changeable. 
Paul of Samosata, for example, saw the Logos not as a subsistent 
divine person, but rather as that power and enlightenment given to 
Christ by which he became the adopted Son of God. Thus Paul saw the 
Logos and the Son as distinct. The Logos was God's impersonal power 
or grace given to the man Christ by which he is adopted as Son. 
2 While 
Paul is mainly remembered for his heretical Christology, it was due 
in actual fact to his erroneous view concerning the oneness of God based 
on the absolute monarchy of the Greek Platonic One. 
Paul argued that if the Logos was an ousia or person in his own 
right, it would demand that the Logos be homoousion with the Father. 
This in turn would demand, according to Paul, that if the oneness of 
God were to be preserved, there must be a third, antecedent and common 
ousia underlying both the Father and Son. As two copper coins share 
in the same common substance of copper, so the Father and Son share 
1. Docetic influences can incirectly be seen in such a man as Clement 
of Alexandria. With his stoic notion of apateia he is able to 
down play the sufferings and human experiences of Christ. The 
humanity of Christ is suffused and governed by the Logos protecting 
it from human passion and suffering. Cf. Kelly, pp. 133-134. 
Grillmeier, pp. 159-163. 
2. For a fuller presentation of Paul of Samosata's thought see Kelly, 
PP- 117-119 and 158-160. 
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the same common substance of deity. While Paul himself did not bring 
his argument to the ad absurdum conclusion (Arius would), this under- 
standing of substance would mean that the divine substance was divisible, 
material and thus changeable and corruptible. 
1 Obviously such an 
understanding of the Logos being homoousion with the Father was not only 
repugnant to Paul, but also to the Fathers who condemned him. Thus 
while the Fathers at the Council of Antioch (268) maintained that the 
Logos was a divine ousia, he was not homoousion with the Father as Paul 
understood this. 'While the Origenist Fathers at Antioch could not 
explain the relation between the divine ousia of the Logos or Son and 
the divine ousia of the Father, they knew they did not mean Paul's 
materialistic understanding of it. It would take Nicae to clarify this. 
Modalistic Monarchianism and its chief exemplification, Sabellianism, 
was mainly concerned, like Dynamic Monarchianism, with preserving the 
oneness of God. Unlike the Adoptionists however the Modalists or 
Sabellians also wished to maintain the full divinity of Christ. In 
order to do both they taught that while the Godhead is one, it expresses 
itself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Son and Spirit are not 
distinct from the Father, but modes or expressions of the one Godhead 
of the Father. While one could nominally speak of the Father, Son, and 
Spirit, one was really speaking of one and the same reality manifesting 
itself in different ways. In actual fact within the Godhead itself no 
such distinction could be made. 
2 
Modalistic Monarchianism may seem to have maintained God's oneness 
and the divinity of Christ, but it did so at the expense of tradition 
and scripture. Theology may not as yet have clarified the distinction 
between the Father and Son, but to say that there was no distinction 
was unsound both from scripture and tradition as Hippolytus and 
Tertullian were quick to point out. 
3 
What is important here, however, is that while the Modalists wished 
1. Cf. Athanasius, De. Sym., 45 & 51. Besides giving Paul's teaching 
Athanasius also shows how the Council of Antioch and Nicea are saying 
the same thing even though one condemns and one approves the word: 
homoousios. Cf. G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (London: 
SPCK9 1952), PP. 201-209. 
2. Cf. Kelly, pp. 119-123. Pelikan, pp. 176-180. Prestige, God in 
Patristic Thou, --ht, p. 113-114. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, 
(London: SPCK, 1968), pp" 77-80. 
3. Cf. Pelikan, pp. 180-182. 
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to preserve the oneness of God, in effect they undermined their own 
belief. To hold that God reveals himself at one time as Father, 
another time as Son, and yet another time as Spirit is to imply that 
God changes with each successive mode of expression. By eliminating 
the distinction between the persons and making them nominal expressions 
of the one Godhead, the Modalists forced the Godhead to change in 
-itself. For God now reveals himself not as he really is, as Father, 
Son, and Spirit, but according to the manner of expression assumed. 
Each new mode of expression demanded that the one God change to fit that 
new mode of expression. Tertullian shows the absurdity of this position 
when he says: 'He who raised up Christ and is also to raise up our mortal 
bodies will be as it were another raiser-up, if it is the case that the 
Christ who died is the Father. 
" Ps. -Athanasius states the same with 
a little more theological precision when he says that if the Modalists 
are correct then 'the Divine Monad, indivisible as it is, must be compound, 
being severed into essence and accident. '2 The one immutable God that 
the Modalistic Monarchians wished to defend ironically vanishes in the 
multiple metamorphic modes of expression. Nominal Trinitarianism 
demands alterable Unitarianism. 
Modalistic Monarchianism likewise caused difficulty on the Christo- 
logical level with what came to be called Patripassianism. Noetus and 
Praxeas held that since the Son is but a different expression of the 
Father, one could say with equal validity that the Father suffered and 
died etc.. Sabellius seems not to have wanted to go quite that far. 
However, the problem remains that because the divine names of the Godhead 
are notional, the human predicates attributed to Christ are attributed 
directly and undifferentiatedly to the Godhead itself. It was not 
uncommon to speak of God being born, suffering, etc., as Ignatius of 
Antioch exemplifies, but the orthodox usage of such language presupposed 
that one was referring to the Son of God as incarnated in Christ and not 
to the undifferentiated Godhead. Hippolytus and Tertullian could not 
1. Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 28. Trans. E. Evans, Tertullian's 
Treatise Against Praxeas, (London, SPCK9 1948). 
2. Ps. -Athanasius, C. Ar., 4: 2. Cf. 4: 13 & 25. Unless otherwise 
stated all quotations of Athanasius and Ps. -Athanasius are taken 
from translation in Athanasius, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
Vol. IV. 9 ed. H. Wage and P. Schaff, 
(Oxford: Parker and Comp., 
1892). 
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clearly state why it was that one could speak of the Son suffering 
and not the Father, since they are both God, but they were sure that 
to pretend that there was no difference was blasphemous. In a desperate 
tone Tertullian writes: 'Let this blasphemy be silent, let it-be silent, 
Let it be enough to say that Christ the Son died, and this only because 
it is so written. ' With Athanasius a more reasoned answer would be 
given. 
Coming to Tertullian one finds that God the Father is the one un- 
divided and unoriginate Godhead. As such he is the source of the deity 
in the Son and Spirit who emanate from him. The Son and Spirit, while 
distinct, are not different substances from the Father since they share 
in the one substance of the Father from whom they derive. As Tertullian 
states: 'We believe in one only God, (and) that the one only God has also 
a Son, His Word, who has issued out of himself.... which Son then sent,.... 
the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, out of the Father. '2 Thus Tertullian 
sees three persons in the one substance of God. while his notion of 
substance has a Stoic materialistic flavour about it, it nevertheless, 
albeit crudely, expresses the fact that the Son and Spirit equally 
partake of the divine essence of the Father. 
However, while the Son and Spirit are fully divine for Tertullian, 
and thus a far cry from Plotinus, his use of the principle of emanation 
has a weakening and blemishing effect on the unity and equality of the 
persons within the Trinity. The source of the unity and the source 
of the deity is the Father. Since the Son and Spirit are divine by 
derivation, only the Father holds the primacy of position. They are 
numbered second and third not as enumerations, but as positions in a 
hierarchy. 
3 Understanding the Trinity in such wise inevitably places 
a strain on the unity precisely because the unity is placed not within 
the Trinity of persons as such, but in the Father alone. Likewise, 
to see the Son and Spirit as divine by emanation and derivation from 
the Father seems to imply some sort of change in the Godhead of the 
Father. There is also a tendency, inherent in the principle of emanation 
which is not lacking in Tertullian, to see some sort of subordination in 
1. Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 29. 
2. Ibid., p. 2. 
3. Cf. Grillmeier, p. 143. 
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those who emanate from the one. Origen exemplifies these problems even 
more clearly. 
Greatly influenced by contemporary Platonic thought, Origen's 
Trinitarian theology bears witness to the one, unoriginate, transcendent 
Monad of God the Father. From all eternity the Father generates the 
Son who is God, but as derivative he is a God in second place or degree, 
a secondary God, a Deuteros Theos. Viewing the Trinity as such, Origen 
can speak very clearly and distinctly of three persons in the one God 
even to the point of being accused of Tritheism. This threeness, however, 
is a graded threeness, even more so than in Tertullian. 
Origen's use of the Platonic notion of emanation places a great 
strain on his Trinitarianism. While it is the key-stone of Origen's 
understanding of the Trinity, it is also a two-edged sword. It serves 
as the basis both for the one, unoriginate and immutable nature of the 
Father as source of all divinity, and also for the derivative divinity 
of the Logos as a distinct person emanating from the Father. However, 
the more Origen stresses the fact that the Son is really God the more 
he weakens, by necessity, the unitive nature of the Father, and thus the 
oneness of God. The more he stresses the unitive nature of the Father 
and the derivative aspect of the Son the more he weakens the true divinity 
of the Son. At the critical point in Origen's Trinitarianism the sword 
of emanationism always turns against him. Prestige points out Origen's 
dilemma very clearly. 
'On Origen's principle it was very difficult to avoid falling 
into one or other of two disastrous pitfalls. Either the effort 
to maintain the ultimate unity by magnifying the transcendence 
of the transmitting source, might lead to depreciation of the 
degree of authentic deity transmitted, and so to the denial of 
. the other Persons were in any full sense God.... Or else, if this 
tendency were resisted and a firm grasp retained of the equality 
of the three persons, no amount of assertion that the equality was 
transmitted could by itself save people from thinking of the three 
Persons as three separate Gods..... ' 1 
It should also be noticed that the principle of emanation influences 
Origen's understanding of God's transcendence. It is the same influence 
as that in the Docetists and Paul of Saznosata. Only the Father for 
1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, pp. 86-87. Cf. Prestige, God in 
Patristic Thought, pp. 131-145. Kelly, pp. 128-132. 
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Origen is the totally transcendent One Godhead. Not only is he wholly 
other than man, but he also has no direct relation to man. Only the 
Logos, as God in second place, is able to form a relation to man. The 
Logos is the mediator between the one immutable transcendent Father 
and the multiplicity of corruptible creatures. In so understanding the 
role of the Logos, Origen hopes in some way to protect the immutable 
and impassible nature of God. However, he is only able to argue this 
way when stressing the secondary nature of the Logos' divinity. As soon 
as he asserts that the Logos is nevertheless God the problem remains, 
for as God the Logos himself is immutable and impassible. 
1 
Turning to the Christological levels, Tertullian after arguing for 
the distinct personality of the Logos enquires: 
'How the Word was made flesh, whether as transformed into flesh 
or as having clothed himself with flesh. Certainly as having 
clothed himself. God however must necessarily be believed to be 
immutable and untransformable, as being eternal. But change of 
form is a destruction of what was first: for everything that is 
transformed into something else ceases to be what it was and 
begins to be what is was not. But God neither ceases to be, nor 
can be anything else.... For if the Word was made flesh as the 
result of a transformation or mutation of substance, Jesus will 
then be one substance (composed) of two, flesh and spirit, a kind 
of mixture, as electrum is (composed) of gold and silver: and 
he begins to be neither gold (that is, spirit) nor silver (that 
is, flesh), seeing that the one thing is changed by the other and 
a third thing is brought into being. In that case Jesus will not 
be God, for he has ceased to be the Word, since it has become 
flesh: neither will his manhood be flesh for it is not properly 
flesh, seeing it has been the Word. Thus out of both things there 
is neither: there is some third thing far other than both.... We 
find him [Jesus] set forth as in every respect Son of God and 
Son of man, since (we find him) as both God and man, without doubt 
according to each substance as it is distinct in what itself 
is.... we observe a double quality, not confused but combined, 
Jesus in One Person God and Man. 2 
Three things must be noted in the above. Firstly, for Tertullian 
the Incarnation cannot be the transformation of God into man because God 
1. Origen believed that he could save his Trinitarian theology 
with the concept of Deuteros Theos by stressing both that the 
Son was God and God by derivation. However, the mind, when the 
principle of emanation breaks under the pressure, very easily 
turns 'second God' into 'first creature. ' Origen may be very 
close to Nicea, but he is even closer to Arius. 
2. Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 27. 
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is immutable and cannot cease to be by changing into something else. 
Secondly, if he were transformed into man, the effect would be that 
Christ is some tertium quid being neither God nor man, but a mixture 
and confusion of both. Thirdly, while the Son must remain immutably 
divine and the flesh full and real, yet Christ must be one. The one 
Christ must be God and man. This is precisely the problem. How can 
Christ be one and yet be both God and man. Tertullians says that the" 
Son 'cloths' himself in flesh, that he is 'combined' with flesh, but 
that is more a restatement of the problem than an answer to it. 
Nevertheless Tertullian has advanced the true question even if he is 
not able to fully answer it. 
1 
Because Tertullian sees the divinity and humanity of Christ as 
distinct he does not hesitate to uphold the full human experiences of 
Christ over against the impassibility of God. 
'Thus the official record of both substances represents him as 
both man and God: on the one hand born, on the other not born: 
on the one hand fleshly, on the other spiritual: on the one hand 
weak, on the other exceeding strong: on the one hand dying, on 
the other living. That these two sets of attributes, the divine 
and the human, are each kept distinct from the other, is of 
course accounted for by the equal verity of each nature, both 
flesh and spirit being in full degree what they claim to be: 
the powers of the Spirit of God proved him God, the sufferings 
proved there was the flesh of man. ' 2 
However, the unity of the human and divine attributes is ambiguous 
for Tertullian due ultimately to the fact that he does not fully formulate 
the true incarnational union. His reaction to the communication of idioms 
1. It is difficult to ascertain what Tertullian understands by 
'clothed' and 'joined', but Grillmeier believes that it is along 
the lines of the Stoic concept of mixtia 'i. e., the total mutual 
penetration of solid bodies which preserve their co-natural 
characteristics, and concretio (krasis), the complete mutual pene- 
tration of fluid bodies which preserve their corresponding properties. ' 
(p. 155. ) Thus Tertullian denies mixture in the sense of confusion 
and transformation, yet sees the union as an unconfused inter- 
penetration of the two substances. While this conception is difficult 
to comprehend and while it has a monophysite flavour, what is 
important is the fact that Tertullian wishes to express both a sub- 
stantial union without in anyway destroying or changing the immutable 
nature of God or the true nature of man. 
2. Tertullian, De Carn. Chr., 5. Trans. E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise 
on the Incarnation, (London: SPCK, 1956). Cf. De Pat., 3; C. Marc., 2. 
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exemplifies this. 
'The Son of God was crucified: I am not ashamed--because it is 
shameful. The Son of God died: it is immediately credible-- 
because it is silly. He was buried, and rose again: it is 
certain--because it is impossible. ' 1 
To hold the communication of idioms for such reasons may denote admirable 
faith, but hardly the best theology. The communication of idioms needs 
theological justification. 
In writing against Celsus Origen was faced with the real question 
studied here. Celsus said: 
'God is good and beautiful and happy.... If then He comes down to 
men, he must undergo change, a change from good to bad, from 
beautiful to shameful, from happiness to misfortune.... Who would 
choose a change like this? It is the nature only of a mortal 
being to undergo change and remoulding, whereas it is the nature 
of an immortal being to remain the same without alteration. 2 
Accordingly, God could not be capable of undergoing this change. ' 
Origen responds that God cannot change and even though he comes down 
to earth he remains 'unchanged in essence. '3 'If the immortal divine 
Word assumes both a human body and a human soul, and by so doing appears 
to Celsus to be subject to change and remoulding, let him learn that the 
Word remains Word in essence. He suffers nothing of the experience of 
the body and, soul. '4 
The above may be true as far as what has been revealed and believed, 
but Origen has not said in the above how the Word can remain God and yet 
assume a human soul and body. Celsus persists that 'Either God really 
does change, as they say, into a mortal body; and it has already been 
said that this is an impossibility. Or he does not change, but makes 
those who see him think he does so, and leads them astray and tells 
lies. '5 Celsus has reduced the Incarnation to an impossible either/or 
situation. God must either change into man or be a deceiver and a liar. 
1. De Carn. Chr., 5- 
2. Origen, C. Cels., 4: 14. Trans. H. Chadwick, QYgen: Contra Celsum, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953)- 
3. Ibid. 
4. ibid., 4: 15. 
5. Ibid., 4: 18. 
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Origen's reply is interesting. 
Because Origen understands that the Logos was united to a human 
soul from all eternity the change which takes place in becoming man 
is seen as a change in the soul and not in the Logos since it is the 
soul that it is united to a body. 
'Concerning Jesus' soul, if anyone supposes that there was 
a change when it entered a body, we will ask what he means by 
a "change". If he means a change of essence, we do not grant 
this.... But if he means that it undergoes something because 
it has been mixed with the body and because of the place into 
which it has come, then what difficulty is there if the Word 
out of great love to mankind brings down a Saviour to the 
human race?. ' 1 
Origen uses the human soul of Christ as the mediator and buffer of 
the incarnational act. It guarantees that the Logos becomes man and 
absorbs what ever change is involved in so becoming. However, this just 
pushes the question back. 'What sort of union is there between the Logos 
and the soul? While Origen wishes to maintain a real ontological union, 
one must admit that for Origen the union is purely mystical. 
2 
The Logos 
is united to the human soul in the deepest mystical union possible, and 
thus only differs in degree from the Logos' union with other men. One 
must conclude with Grillmeier that 'the fact is that the unity of the 
God-man is only meant to be an ontic unity, and is not really proved 
as such. 
3 
The lasting effect and contribution of Origen's use of the soul 
lies in the fact that it guarantees the real and full human experience 
of Christ, and yet, because of the soul, these experiences do not 
directly bear upon the divinity of the Logos. 
4 Future theologians 
will develop and clarify this. 
The point of development concerning God's immutability and impassi- 
bility in relation to the person of Christ can be summarized by the 
following. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Cf. Ibid., 2: 9; 5: 34. However, Origen does not wish to say that 
the Logos and the humanity are 'two separate beings', 6: 47. 
3. Grillmeier, p. 169. 
4. Cf. Origen, C. Cels., 7: 13,16,17. 
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On the Trinitarian level the status of the Logos' divinity has 
come to a head and with it the whole question of the immutable nature 
of the one God. This point has been reached by upholding the true 
personal divinity of the Logos against the Adoptionists and Paul of 
Samosata, and by maintaining that the Logos is really distinct from 
the Father against the Modalists. Tertullian and Origen tried to bring 
some theological understanding and continuity to the problem through 
the principle of emanation, but the principle of emanation placed them, 
especially Origen, in a bind. It seems that either one must allow 
for a change or mutation in the one Godhead of the Father to account 
for the fact that the Son and Holy Spirit really shared in his divine 
nature. Or, one has to subordinate the Son and Spirit to the point 
that one in no real sense can call them divine. 
This either/or situation developed because, up until now, the 
transcendent and immutable oneness of the Godhead was located in the 
Father alone. It was the Father who was the God, who was one, trans- 
cendent, and immutable. The Son and Spirit were not God in the absolute 
sense of the word, but only in so far as they received their divinity 
and were related to the one Godhead of the Father. What is needed is a 
realization that the Son and Spirit were divine not by derivation, but 
ontologically and metaphysically God in themselves. Until theologians 
realized that the one Godhead or deity is three related persons, they 
would continue to find that they were always in danger of destroying 
the oneness of God by change or alteration, or subordinating the Son 
and Spirit. The realization that must take place is well stated by 
Prestige. 
'The truth is that God is one, not because one divine Person 
is more important than the others, whether as being their source 
or on any other grounds; nor because deity is something that 
can be transmitted entire from hand to hand, like a purse of 
gold, or from owner to owner, like a plot of land--deity means 
something that God is, rather than something that he has--but 
because all three Persons are distinct expressions of a single 
divine reality. ' 1 
This realization would come when the Fathers recognized that God's 
1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 87. 
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revelation of himself as a Trinity of persons breaks the Greek Platonic 
principle of emanation. The principle may have been adequate to express 
Greek theodicy, but it was incompetent to handle the Christian 
revelation. 
On the Christological levels concerning the immutability of God 
and his becoming man and the passibility of God as man the development 
is not quite as advanced as it is on the Trinitarian level. The full 
weight of the problem articulated by the Docetists and Celsus has not 
been fully felt or realized. Tertullian and Origen realized that for the 
Logos to become man did not mean that he changed into man. However, they 
were unable to satisfactorily state how the Logos could truly become 
and be man without change. As for the communication of idioms the 
distinction of natures proposed by Tertullian and Origen, and the use of 
the soul by Origen contributed to a proper understanding, but left a 
great deal to be desired by way of clarity and refinement. 
The above is but a brief summary of what role the immutability and 
impassibility of God played in pre-Nicene speculation on the Trinity 
and the Incarnation. The above is not so much a study of the problem 
itself, but an introduction to it. The main purpose of the above is to 
show how the problem arose and developed, and what the initial responses 
to it were. It is only with the Arian controversy and Nicea's pro- 
clamation of the homoousion doctrine that the problem comes to full 
maturity. A mature answer, however, will be long in coming. 
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CHAPTER 1 
NICEA'S HOMOOUSION: DEFINING GOD'S BEGETTING AND BECOMING 
To fully understand and appreciate the implications of the homoousion 
doctrine of Nicea as it bears on the immutability and impassibility of 
God both in himself as a Trinity of persons, and as it pertains to his 
becoming man and experiences as man, this chapter will be divided into 
two parts. The first part will treat the immutability of God in himself 
or the Trinitarian question. It will concentrate on Arius' teaching 
concerning the Son as well as Nicea's and Athanasius' response. The 
second part will study the immutability and impassibility of the Logos 
on the Christological levels. Thus not only-will Arius be treated, but 
also Apollinaris since Christologically they are similar. Athanasius 
will be studied as a contemporary response to them. This division is 
rather arbitrary, but for clarity of presentation it is thought wise to 
distinguish, but not separate, the Trinitarian and Christological 
questions. 
A. The Trinitarian Question 
1. Arius 
The debate between the Church and Arius revolved around the status 
of the Logos or Son. Arius, in so many words, asked very clearly and 
precisely is the Logos, in himself, God or a creature? There could be 
no half-way position for Arius such as Origen's Deuteros Theos. In 
asking the question in this either/or form Arius had raised the question 
to a metaphysical or ontological level. He wanted a definition of the 
Logos, and not a description of what he is like in relation to the 
Father, or what function he performs apart from the Father. As an 
existing being, is the Logos ontologically God or not? 
I 
There are basically two presuppositions to the answer Arius gave 
to his question. The first presupposition resides in his understanding 
of God as the wholly transcendent and absolutely unique source of all 
1. Cf. Murray, The Problem of God, pp. 38-44. 
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reality. 'We acknowledge One God, alone Ingenerate, alone everlasting, 
alone Unbegotten, alone True, alone having immortality,.... unalterable 
and unchangeable. 
" God for Arius was above all One, a 'Monad' without 
division or change. 
2 
Arius' second presupposition arises from his Christology. The Logos 
for Arius was physically and naturally united to flesh, analogous to 
the union of body and soul. The Logos, taking the place of the human 
soul, becomes the vital and life-giving principle of the flesh. 
3 
With these two presuppositions in mind logic forced Arius to 
proclaim: 'The Word.... is called Word conceptually, and is not by nature 
and of truth Son of God, but is called Son, He too, by adoption, is a 
creature. 14 There is no doubt in Arius' mind that the Logos was 
ontologically a creature. To be otherwise was impossible. For if the 
Logos was God, he would destroy both the oneness of God in himself and 
his transcendence and immutability in becoming man. 
While this is Arius' basic position, it is important to look deeper 
into the reasons why the Logos is a creature, first in relation to Arius' 
understanding of God, and secondly (with Apollinaris) in relation to his 
understanding of the Incarnation. 
Three adjectives best define Arius' doctrine of God. God is trans- 
cendent, unoriginate, and One. All are intrinsically inter-related with 
one another, but as expressing different attributes of God have a 
profound affect on the question of God's immutability and Arius' claim 
that the Logos is a creature. 
Arius' notion of God's transcendence is a familiar one. God's 
transcendence is not that of the Old Testament where God remained in 
the midst of creation and history. Arius once more exemplifies the 
Greek Platonic understanding of transcendence which has been so prevalent 
in early development. Thus God is not only wholly other than man, but 
also wholly apart from man. God to remain God is allowed no contact 
with man or creation, but stands apart, aloof, and solitary in his 
transcendence. There exists a gulf between God's immutable oneness 
and the originate and changeable many of creation. To close that gulf 
1. In Athanasius, De. Syn., 16. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Cf. Grillmeier, pp. 183-192. 
4. In Athanasius, De Sent. Dion., 23. 
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by any direct relationship would corrupt God's transcendent immutability. 
This understanding of God's transcendence exemplifies itself very 
well in the role Arius gives to the Logos as mediator between God and 
the rest of creation. While Arius believes in creatio ex nihilo, God 
himself is responsible for creating only the Logos. The Logos creates 
all other beings. As Arius states: God isÄ who begot an Only-begotten 
Son before eternal time, through whom he made both the ages and the 
universe. ' This is why Arius makes the somewhat incomprehensible 
statement that the Logos is the 'perfect creature of God, but not one 
of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of the things begotten.... '1 
But why does the Logos create all other creatures? Arius feebly professes 
that this is due to the fact that 'other creatures could not endure to 
be wrought by the absolute Hand of the Unoriginate and therefore the 
Son alone was brought into being by the Father alone, and other things 
by the Son as an underworker and assistant. '2 However, Athanasius 
rightly responds to Arius' claim by stating 'It is irreligious to suppose 
that He (God) disdained, as if a humble task, to form the creatures 
himself.... for there is not pride in God. '3 Arius' real concern was not 
to protect creation from God, but rather to protect God from creation. 
Because of Arius' Platonic notion of transcendence, the status of God's 
immutability is in direct proportion to his unrelatedness to creation. 
The reason for God's aloof transcendence lies in Arius' favourite 
definition of God.. God is the unoriginate or unbegotten, and as such 
is immutable and impassible. In contrast, creation, including the Logos, 
is originate and begotten, and as such as mutable and passible. 
The Greek words aRennetos and Rennetos (unbegotten and begotten) 
and agenetos and genetos (unoriginated and originated) are similar not 
only in spelling, but also, up until Nicea and Athanasius, were 
considered to have relatively the same meaning and used interchangeably. 
This did not cause any problem in the beginning. All Christians, as 
well as Greek philosophers, would hold that God is unbegotten and un- 
originate. However, once one concerns oneself with the ontological status 
1. In Athanasius De Syn., 16. See also De Dect., 7- 
2, In Athanasius De. Deer., 8. Athanasius points out that if creatures 
as such are unable to bear direct. creation by God then the Logos 
himself, since he is a creature, is likewise unable to bear direct 
creation by God. Thus Athanasius shows the reduxio ad absurdum of 
Arius' argument. 
3. Ibid., 7. As will be seen the mediator role of the Logos is even 
more clearly seen in Arius' Christology. 
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1 
of the Logos a problem does arise and a very grave one indeed. 
-The whole of Christian tradition stemming from the New Testament 
held that the Logos was from the Father, sent by the Father. The New 
Testament stated that the Son is 'first born among many' (Rom. 8: 29), 
and that 'the Father is greater' (Jn. 14: 28). The Arian proof text 
states that 'the Lord created me' (Prov. 8: 22). Besides that the very 
concept of 'Son' denotes some sort of dependent relationship to the 
Father. Prom this background emerged the ontological question of the 
Logos' status. Being from the Father, is the Logos or Son ontologically 
God? 
For Arius there was only one way of understanding the mode of 
begetting, only one way of expressing how the Son is from the Father, 
and that is by creation. For Arius the Greek Work gennetos and genetos 
expressed one and the same concept. To be begotten is to be created. 
God unoriginate and unbegotten creates the Son out of nothing, and thus 
as begotten the Son is a creature. Thus 'God was not always Father, 
but once afterwards He became a Father. The Son was not always for the 
Word of God himself was "made out of nothingU and "once He was not, " 
and "He was not before his origination, " but He as other "had an origin 
of creation. "'2 While the Son may have 'this prerogative over others, 
and therefore is called Only-begotten, because he alone was brought to 
be by God alone. '3 Nevertheless as begotten he remains a creature 
and like all creatures 'there was a then (time) when He was not. '4 
Because Arius understood God to be unequivocably unoriginate and 
unbegotten and all begetting to be creation, it logically follows that 
the Logos has to be a creature. Prestige states Arius' logic very 
well when he says 'Behind all expression of Arian thought lay the hard 
and glittering syllogism that God is impassible; Christ, being aennetos, 
was passible; therefore Christ is not God. '5 Only God is immutable 
because only God is unoriginate. 
But why did Arius conceive of all begetting as creating? Why is 
1. For an historical study of the meaning and use of these-two words 
prior to Nicea see Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 37-52. 
2. In Athanasius, C. Ar., 1: 5- 
3. In Athanasius, De. Decr., 7. 
4. In Athanasius, C. Ar., 1: 13- 
5- Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 156. 
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the only possible relation between the Father and Son that of Creator 
and creature? Throughout the whole patristic development the Fathers 
have tried to express another sort of relationship between the Father 
and Son in which both-could be understood to be God. This was the whole 
motivation behind Tertullian's and Origen's emanationism, if not that 
of the Docetists and Modalists as well. Why did Arius not look for 
another form or mode of relationship? The answer lay in Arius' under- 
standing of what it means for the transcendent, unoriginate God to 
be One. 
For Arius God was a Monad, utterly, solitarily and absolutely One. 
As One not only was God unable to have any direct relationship with the 
many, the created world of change, without destroying his immutable 
oneness, but also God could have no duality or triplicity in himself 
without destroying that oneness. It was impossible, thought Arius, for 
the One God to be in himself three. 
The Son has to be a creature for any other type of generation besides 
that of creation would decimate the immutable oneness of God. Only 
'heretical and uninstructed men.... speak of the Son as an emission, 
others as a projection, others as co-unbegotten. '1 The Son is 'neither 
a part of God nor (formed) out of any substratum. '2 'He is not equal, 
no, nor one in essence with Him (God).... not intermingling with each 
other are their subsistences. '3 The Son has to be creature and 'not as 
Valentius pronounced that the offspring of the Father was an issue; nor 
as Manichaeus taught that the offspring was a portion of the Father, 
one in essence; nor as Sabellius, dividing the Monad, speaks of a 
Son-and-Father; nor as Heiracas, of one torch from another, or as a 
lamp divided into two.... '4 Why are all of these positions heretical 
and uninstructed? To understand 'from God' to mean that the Son is 
'a part of Him, one in essence or'as an issue, then the Father is according 
to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material, and, as far 
as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who is the 
1. Arius' letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia in Theodoret, Church History, 
1: 5. -Trans. Library of Christian Classics, Vol. III, Christoloyv 
of 'the Later Fathers, ed. E. R. Hardy, (London: SCM, 1954)t pp. 329-331. 
2. Ibid. 
3. In Athanasius, De. Syn., 15- 
4- Ibid., 16. 
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Incorporial God. " For Arius all types of generation and begetting 
other than that of creation destroy the oneness of God making him mutable 
and changeable like a material body. His arguments against any other 
form of generation, as stated above, basically fall into three sorts. 
If God begets his Son by sharing with him his divine substance, 
either as a whole or as a part, then there is a division in the divine 
substance from one to two and thus a change. Using the same argument 
as Paul of Samosata, Arius believes that to say that the Logos is a 
divine ousia is to say that he is homoousion with the Father, which 
means, for him, that the divine substance is divided, changed, and 
compounded. Neither could the argument be salvaged by speaking of a 
common third substance seen as a substratum which both the Father and 
the Son shared since this too would still demand that the divine 
substance be divided and mutable. 
Another alternative is to say that the Son exists from all eternity 
with the Father and thus has no beginning and is 'co-unbegotten. ' 
However, this too is absurd since one would either have two unbegottens 
and thus two Gods, or the Son would be an 'unbegotten - begotten' which 
is a contradiction in terms. 
A third alternative revolves around the principle of emanation. It 
is somewhat surprising that Arius finds fault with this principle since 
he is influenced so much by Greek Platonic thought. His rejection of it 
may be due to Aristotelian influence. 
2 
Whatever the reason it is to 
his credit to have seen and understood what Tertullian and Origen did 
not see even though the weakness was present in Plotinus and the 
Gnostics. The fault of the principle of emanation is that, if logically 
followed through, one must admit that God changes. His divine substance, 
what he is in himself, emanates and effuses from him, and thus there is 
a change in God himself. To say that the Logos is divine by emanation 
or derivation from the One Godhead is to render change in that Godhead 
from whom the Logos emanates since he shares by derivation what God is. 
1. Ibid. 
2. For discussions of whether Arius was influenced by Aristotle or 
Plato cf: T. E. Pollard, 'The Origins of Arianism, ' Journal of 
Theological Studies, L. S. 9, (1958), pp. 103-111. -Also, M. Wiles 
'In Defence of Arius, ' J. T. S. N. S. 13, (1962), pp. 339-347" Also, 
G. C. Stead, 'The Platonism of Arius, ' J. T. S. N. S. 15, (1964),, pp. 16-31- 
Also, Ephrem Boularand, L'Heresie D'Arius et Le "Foil' De Nicee, 
Premiere Part: L'Heresie D'Arius, (Paris: Editions Letouzey et 
Ane, 1972), pp. 104-105 and 118-122. 
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Arius may have been influenced by Origen's subordinationism, but he 
realized that Origen's principle of emanation could not bear the strain 
of explaining the one immutable Godhead of the Father and the derivative 
divinity of the Son. One or the other had to go. The failure of the 
1 
emanationist principle forced Arius to choose the former. 
For Arius then all attempts at trying to explain the divinity of 
the Son failed precisely because they rendered the transcendent, un- 
originate, one Godhead of the Father mutable, changeable and divisible. 
The only adequate mode of generation left was that of creation. For 
God to remain God the Logos had to be a creature. 
In all fairness one must admit that Arius' arguments are correct 
as he understood them and as they were promulgated, for the most part, 
by his predecessors. Neither Tertullian nor Origen, for example, would 
have agreed with his final conclusions, but he did find the inherent 
weakness in their theological presentation. Neither wished to imply 
that God was mutable nor that the Son was a creature, yet their principle 
of emanation led to either one or the other once one asked, as Arius 
did, whether the Logos is ontologically God or not. 
2. Nicea and Athanasius 
The challenge of Arius was met head on, but not without some 
difficulty. The problem resides not in any doubt as to whether Arius 
was right or wrong. Alexander of Alexandria and Athanasius were sure 
that both Scripture and tradition refuted Arius, 'for who ever heard 
such assertions before" 
2 
Rather the problem that confronted the Church 
was primarily conceptual and linguistic. How does one say that the Son 
is God absolutely, that the Logos is God as the Father is God, without 
falling into one of the many heresies which Arius believed necessarily 
1. M. Wiles believes that Arius was trying to say the same thing as 
Origen. Thus the Deuteros Theos of Origen would be the same as 
Arius' notion of the Logos as a 'creature but not one of the 
creatures. ' They may have been trying to say the same thing, which 
is doubtful, but they surely did not say the same thing. Wiles 
seems to forget that Origen had the Logos ontologically on the side 
of God and Arius had the Logos ontologically on the side of creation. 
This is a very great difference indeed; one that Wiles does not seem 
to recognise. 'In Defence of Arius, ' J. T. S., N. S. 13, (1962), 
pp. 243-245- 
2. Alexander of Alexandria, Devositio Arii, 3, in Athanasius, 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV. 
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followed from such an assertion? To answer the challenge of Arius on 
the Trinitarian level the Church had to answer two questions simultaneously. 
First, how does one express the full divinity of the Son, and secondly, 
how does one express this without destroying the oneness of God through 
some sort of change or division? At one and the same time they had to 
say that the Son was God and that God was one. 
It fell to the Council of Nicea (325) to define the Church's belief 
and to condemn the errors of Arius. The conservative members of the 
Council wished to refute Arius by the sole means of using Scripture since 
this was the traditional way of expressing true doctrine and refuting 
error. However, the majority of the Fathers soon realized that this 
would not do. Arius and his cohorts were all too willing to recite 
Scripture while at the same time giving to it their own meaning. 
1 
The positive response that Nicea gave was that the Son is 'from the 
ousia of the Father.... begotten not made, homoousios with the Father. ' 
Negatively it condemned the Arians' pet phrases: 
'As for those who say: "there was a time when he did not exist, " 
and "He was made from nothing, or from another hypostasis or 
essence, alleging that the Son of God is mutable or subject to 2 
change--such personSthe Catholic and Apostolic Church condemns. "' 
Arius is unable to manoeuvre around this profession of faith, for 
1. Cf. Athanasius, De. Decr. 20. The reason the Arians were able to do 
this was due to the fact that the Trinitarian and Christological 
doctrine of the New Testament is expressed in functional and re- 
lational concepts. Once one rises above the functional and relational 
to the ontological one is able to interpret the meaning of the 
functional and relational by means of the ontological. Thus once 
the Arians had decided that the Logos was ontologically a creature, 
they could agree with and interpret any functional and relational 
statement concerning the Logos, such as the Creed proposed by 
Eusebius of Caesarea, within their ontological framework. The 
whispering and winking among the Arians at Nicea upon hearing 
the status of Logos stated in terms such as 'like, ' 'always, ' 
'from him (the Father), ' 'in him (the Father), ' as. narrated by 
Athanasius, were the whispers and winks of ontological minds inter- 
preting functional and relational concepts. In order to overcome 
this difficulty Nicea was forced to answer Arius on the same level. 
His ontological question demanded an ontological answer. 
2. Enchiridion Symbolort, Denzinger-SchBnmetzer (Freiburg: Herder 
35 ed., 1973), 125. Trans. The Church Teaches, ed. J. F. Clarkson 
et alai, (St. Louis: Herder, 1955 , .. 
2" 
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the Council unequivocally stated that the Logos is absolutely and 
ontologically God--as the Father is God, so the Son is God. Contrary 
to Arius, the Council answered that the Logos is in himself homoousios 
with the Father, that in himself he is what the Father is--of the same 
ousia. Thus 'the word God connotes precisely the same truth when you 
speak of God the Father as it does when you speak of God the Son. '1 
Likewise, while Arius made no distinction between begotten and 
made, Nicea does. Thus, as Athanasius points out, if the Arians mean 
is calling God unoriginate that he always was and not created 'then 
they must constantly be told that the Son as well as the Father must 
in this sense be called unoriginate. For He is neither in the number 
of this originated, nor a work, but has ever been with the Father.... ' 
However, if the Arians mean by unoriginated that something exists 
without being begotten or without a father, 'we shall tell them that 
the unoriginate in this sense is only one, namely the Father.... '2 
Thus for Nicea while one can speak of both the Father and Son as un- 
originated in the sense of not having a beginning or being created or 
made, one can only call the Father unoriginated in the sense of not being 
generated or begotten. Since both are God, both are unoriginated and 
uncreated. However only the Father is unbegotten in the sense of having 
no relational dependence, and the Logos is begotten for he is eternally 
related to the Father as Son. In short, the Father, as unbegotten, is 
logically prior to the Son, as begotten, but not ontologically prior to 
the Son since both are God and thus uncreated. 
Nevertheless two interrelated questions arise out of Nicea's 
profession of faith which bear directly on God's immutability in himself. 
To say that the 'Son is begotten and not made' upholds the true divinity 
of the Son, but does not 'begotten' still imply that some change takes 
place within the Godhead itself? Likewise, to say that the Son is of 
the same ousia as the Father mean that they share in the same 'stuff 
common to several individuals of a class, or does it connote an individual 
as such. '3 If the Council meant the former, did it not divide the 
substance of God into two? Or if it meant the latter, did it not fall 
1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 89. 
2. Athanasius, C. Ar., 1: 31. CF. ' De. Deer., 29 & 30. 
3. Kelly, p. 234. 
a 
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into Sabellianism? Either way the immutability of God would be destroyed, 
and Arius would be vindicated. The questions are interrelated for to 
, understand 
the full meaning of the word 'begotten, ' other than in its 
negative connotations of denying that the Logos is created, it is necessary 
to see it within the context of the unity and oneness of God. as expressed 
by the homoousion doctrine. It. is only within the context of the. unity of 
God that one can understand how the Son can be 'begotten, ' and yet not 
bring division and change within God. 
The question arises at the onset whether the Fathers at Nicea understood 
-ousia and homoousios as meaning that the Father and Son shared in one 
common 'stuff' as. several individuals or whether they understood it to 
. connote 
the fact that the Father and Son are one reality. Up until Nicea 
homoousios was usually understood in the first sense as witnessed by 
. 
Paul of Samosata's and Arius' claim that thus understood it demanded 
division and change in God. 
1 It would seem that for most of the Fathers 
at Nicea, with the probable exception of the Roman delegates such as 
Ossius of Cordoba, as well as Athanasius, understood it in the first 
-generic sense that the Logos was of the same common stuff as the Father. 
This does not mean that they wished to sanction division or change in 
. 
God. Their primary concern at Nicea was to uphold the absolute divinity 
of the Son. The question concerning the unity of God was not a conscious 
. concern. 
This fact is witnessed by Eusebeus of Caesarius. In his letter 
to his diocese explaining the Council's decree he only stresses the fact 
that the Son is fully divine and never touches upon the question of the 
unity between the Father and Son. 
2 
Thus while a majority of the Fathers 
maintained, against Arius, that the Son was God as the Father is God by 
saying that he was begotten and not made and homoousios with the Father, 
they did not in any conscious way understand this to mean that Father 
and Son were one and the same reality. In fairness they to both the 
majority of Council Fathers and to Arius one must say that the Fathers 
adequately condemned Arius for denying that the Son was God, but did 
not consciously answer Arius as to how one could say this without dividing 
and changing God. It is left to Athanasius as the defender of the 
1. Cf. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 197-209. 
2. Cf. Ebistola Eusebii. In Athanasius, Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. IV, pp. 74-76. See also Prestige, God in Patristic 
Thought, pp. 212-214. 
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homoousion doctrine to bring out its full implications, and thus to 
refute Arius' charge that such a doctrine implied change and division. 
The Arians denied that the Son 'is the proper offspring of the 
Father's substance on the ground that this must imply parts and 
divisions, ' but to think thus for Athanasius, 'is to have material 
thoughts about what is immaterial. 
' For God the Father to beget his 
Son is not the same as for human fathers to beget children. According 
to Athanasius 'the divine generation must not be compared to the nature 
of men, nor the Son considered to be part of God, nor the generation to 
imply any passion whatever; God is not as man .... for He is not composed 
of parts, but being impassible and simple, He is impassibly and in- 
divisibly Father of the Son. '2 To be Son then means that he is not only 
like the Father, 'but also inseparable from the essence of the Father, 
and He and the Father are one.... the Word is ever in the Father and the 
Father in the Word.... 
3 
To say then, as Nicea stated, that the Son is 
homoousios with the Father, not only means that they are both God, but 
also that they are one God. Homoousios confirms both the full divinity 
of the Sons and the unity of God since 'the Son, being an offspring 
from the substance, is one by substance, Himself and the Father that 
begot Him. '4 
Thus the Godhead does not reside in the Father alone, and from whom 
the Son is given a share, but God is in himself Father and Son (and 
Holy Spirit). If the Son were God by participation in the Godhead of 
the Father : 
'then indeed call him Like-in-essence [homoiousios], but thus 
spoken of He is (not) in nature God.... Therefore if this be out 
of place, He must be, not by participation, but in nature and 
truth Son.... and being by nature, and not by sharing. 5 He would 
properly be called, not homoiousios but homoousios. ' 
Arius failed to realize that to be begotten of the Father is not by 
division or change, for God in his essence and substance is the Father 
begetting his Son. 'The Son is begotten not from without but from the 
Father. '6 The Son 'is proper to and identical with the substance of God, 
1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 1: 15- 
2. Ibid., 1: 28. 
3. Athanasius De. Dear.,, 20. 
4. Athanasius De Syn., 48. 
5. Ibid., 53- 
6. Athanasius C. Ar., 2: 33. 
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and an offspring from it by nature.... (and) by this fact homoousios 
with Him that begot it. 
" 
While the majority of the Nicene Fathers may only have understood 
explicitly that homoousios guaranteed the full divinity of the Logos, 
implicitly they also guaranteed the oneness of God. To say that the 
Logos is homoousios with the Father is to relocate the principle of 
unity. No longer does unity and oneness of God reside in the Father 
as Godhead, but rather in the fact that the one God is a trinity of 
related persons. 
2 Homoousios declares that the Father and Son are equally 
God in an absolute sense, and also that they are the same being. Thus 
Athanasius in fully explicating Nicea broke the erroneous presupposition 
that caused so much strain in Origen's teaching and which Arius exploited 
to his own advantage. That presupposition was that the Godhead resided 
in the Father alone and the Son and Spirit were divine only in relation 
to the one Godhead of the Father. This position presupposed the 
validity of the Platonic principle of emanation which demanded that the 
Father be the point of reference both to account for why the Son and 
Spirit were divine as well as for why there was only one God. With 
Nicea and Athanasius no longer is the Logos God in a derivative or sub- 
ordinate sense because he emanated out from the Father, nor was the 
immutable oneness centred in the Father as Godhead. Athanasius concurs 
with those who say that 'there is one Godhead, and that it has one 
nature, and not that there is one nature of the Father, from which that 
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are distinct. '3 With Nicea and 
Athanasius the Logos is God and God is one because the Father and Son 
are not only equally God, but also one and the same God. To be begotten, 
then, does not mean participative emanation from the Godhead, but rather 
a complete eternal generation within God himself. Within the one 
immutable nature of God, God the Father eternally begets God the Son. 
All of Arius' arguments against the divinity of the Logos on the 
grounds that it would in some way destroy the immutable oneness of God 
are no longer applicable. This is due precisely to the fact that the 
1. Athanasius, Ad. Afros., 8. 
2. Athanasius extends the word homoousion to apply to the Holy Spirit 
as well. See Ad Semi)., 1: 27- 
3. Athanasius, Ad Antioch., 6. 
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Platonic principle of emanation is no longer operative. It has been 
superceded by the insight that the Father/Son relationship is part and 
parcel of what God is in himself. 'In truth, the process has to be 
imagined not as the transmission of-disintegrating stuff away from a 
fixed point, but as the timeless and unceasing passage of a personal 
being through a circular course which ends where it began and begins 
again where it ended. ' There is no hint of division or change for the 
immutable and indivisible God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
However, the Arian controversy did not subside with the realization 
that to call the Son God one means not only that he is ontologically 
God as the Father is God, but also that they are one and the same reality. 
In fact the semi-Arian controversy was precisely over this realization. 
If the Father and Son are the same reality, is not this Sabellianism? 
How do you distinguish the Persons? Would it not be better to say that 
the Son is Homoiousios with the Father, thus a perfect likeness but not 
one and the same reality? 
The basic answer to these questions has already been given in the 
above discussion on the oneness and unity of God. However, with the 
Semi-Arian cry of Sabellianism the homoousion doctrine must be looked 
at from a different perspective. 
If one continued, after Nicea, to understand that the unity and 
oneness of God still resided solely in the Father as Godhead, and then 
proceeded to affirm that the Son is homoousios with the Father not only 
in the sense of being fully divine as the Father, but also in the sense 
of being one and the same reality, then one is forced to conclude 
something to the effect that the Godhead of the Father changes its 
mode of expression when seen as Son. Or to put it another way, if one 
did not grasp Athanasius' insight into the Nicene doctrine that the 
oneness of God did not reside solely in the person of the Father, but 
rather in God as such, then to say that the Father and Son are one 
reality is to say that the Father and Son are only nominally or notionally 
distinct since to say that the Son is one and the same reality as the 
Father is not understood to mean that they exist in the one nature of 
God, but rather that the Son is one and the same as the Father. If 
this were so, then, as Tertullian pointed out so long ago, change and 
1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 92. 
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and mutation once more takes place in the Godhead as the Father changes 
his mode of expression to that of Son. 
This may seem a complicated and round about way of becoming a 
Sabellian, but this is precisely what the Homoians thought that Athanasius 
and his Nicene party had done. They were aided in their false under- 
standing by one of Nicea's proponents, Marcellus of Ancyra. 
1 However, 
the problem lay not with Athanasius and Nicea, but as the above points 
out, with the Semi-Arians themselves. They still held to the notion 
that the Godhead resides in the Father alone. The influence of the 
principle of emanation is still being asserted. 
Athanasius points out very clearly that neither he nor Nicea are 
Sabellian. The Father and the Son are not 
'as one thing twice named, so that the Same becomes at one time 
Father, at another time Son, for this Sabellius holding was judged 
a heretic. But they are two, because the Father is Father and is 
not the Son, and the Son is Son and not also Father, but the 2 
nature is one,.... and all that is the Father's, is the Son's. ' 
In actual fact the term homoousios guarantees the distinction between 
Father and Son against the Sabellians. For to use the word homoousios 
implies that there are two which are homoousios with one another. As 
Athanasius states: We do not 'hold a Son-Father, as the Sabellians, 
calling Him monoousios but not homoousios, and thus destroying the Son. '3 
The Father and Son are not one and the same person, but one of the same 
God. 
One final point needs to be made which will lead into the Christo- 
logical side of the question. Up until Nicea and bthanasius the 
transcendence of God was understood by many to mean that God was not 
only wholly other than man and creation, but also apart from man and 
creation. This was again due to the Greek philosophical idea that the 
further God was from creation the more his immutable and unchangeable 
nature was insured. Part of the motivation behind the use of the 
principle of emanation was to protect the immutable transcendence of 
1. Cf. Kelly, pp. 240-241- 
2. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 4" See also C. Ar., 4: 3&4, and De Syn., 
52 & 53- 
3. Ibid., De Fide, 2. 
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the Father's Godhead. However, now that God is understood to be a 
Trinity of-equal persons, all of whom equally are God and thus partake 
equally of the divine attributes, the Greek notion that God is apart 
from man fades from Christian theology. The Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit are God and thus all equally transcendent and immutable. One 
of them is no more transcendent or immutable than the other. Thus 
while God as transcendent is wholly other, his transcendence does not 
him 
isolate or shieldAfrom the created order. 
However, one may ask: Thy can one not make the whole Trinity of 
persons transcendent in the sense of being apart from man? Before it 
was only the Father as Godhead, why not now the whole Trinity? Because 
one of the Trinity became man! In proclaiming the Logos to be God 
ontologically and absolutely, the very same Logos who became man and 
only came to be known because he did so, destroyed any notion of trans- 
cendence which understood God to be isolated from creation. Thus the 
transcendent God of Nicea is the transcendent God of the Old Testament - 
the God who is present as the immutable transcendent other in the 
created world of change and finitude. The homoousion doctrine has 
utterly purged Christianity of the Platonic One and all its implications. 
B. The Christological Question 
In light of the fact that the Logos is true God, homoousion with 
the Father, as Nicea has proclaimed, how can 1) he become man, and 2) as 
man experience all that it means to be man, and yet as God remain 
immutable and impassible? The Arians put this very question to the 
Orthodox. 'How could he (Logos), being God, become man? '1 To the Orthodox 
it was a real question. For the Arians, however, this question was 
rhetorical eliciting a negative response. 
1. Arius 
It has been apparent that the negative response of the Arians was 
partially due to their understanding of God's immutable transcendence 
which would allow no contact with the order of creation or finitude 
without destroying it. This understanding has already been exemplified 
in the Arian notion of creation where God created the Logos and the 
1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 27. 
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Logos created all other creatures. The Logos acted not only as a 
mediator between God and creation, but also as a protector of God's 
immutable transcendence. If God's immutable transcendence demanded 
that the Logos be a creature in order to protect God even from the act 
of creation, so much the more must the Logos be a creature if it is he 
who becomes man. If God became man, he would ipso facto destroy his 
immutable transcendence and thus he would cease to be God, which is 
impossible. Thus the Logos, since he became man, can not be of the 
same ousia as the Father, but must be a creature. 
While the presupposition in the above Arian argumentation is their 
false Platonic notion of transcendence, there is also an implicit 
assumption that the Logos in some way changes in the act of incarnating 
himself and becoming man. 
Athanasius accused the Arians of believing this when he states: 
they 'suppose that by reason of the flesh He is changed and becomes 
other than He was. '1 Thus for the Arians if the Logos were God not 
only would his becoming man mitigate God's transcendence as being apart 
from man, but also his transcendence as being other than man. John's 
statement that 'The Logos became flesh' is understood to mean then that 
the Logos in some way changed into flesh. Thus if the Logos were God, 
God would no longer be the immutable being he is in himself, but would 
be in some way changed into another in the Incarnation. This again 
is an impossible position to hold. 
Unlike the Platonic aspect of transcendence which kept God apart 
from man, this aspect of transcendence, which demanded that God remain 
God, unchanged and immutable in himself, was a much more serious problem 
for Orthodox Christology for it as well would wish to maintain thatGod 
does not change into another in becoming man. The Arians themselves 
were able to alleviate the difficulty by professing that the Logos was 
a creature. Being a creature he was subject to change and mutation 
from the very beginning, and thus his becoming man with its subsequent 
change proposed no great problem. 
The above exemplifies itself and is brought to the fore with all 
its repercussions in the Arian attack on the Orthodox understanding 
of the Logos' experience as man. 
1. Ibid., 1: 36. 
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'How can the Son be from the Father by nature, and like him in 
essence, who says, "All power is given unto me.... " If he was, as 
you say, Son by nature, He had no need to receive, but had it by 
nature as a Son. Or how can he be the natural and true Power of 
the Father, who.... says "Now is my soul troubled.... " How can he 
be the own Word of the Father, without whom the Father never 
was.... who said upon the cross, "My God, My God, why hast Thou 
forsaken me?.... " If the Son were, according to your inter- 
pretation, eternally existent with God, He had not been ignorant 
of the (last) Day, but known as Word; nor had been forsaken as 
being co-existent; nor had asked to receive glory, as having it 
from the Father; nor would have prayed at all; for being the Word, 
He had needed nothing; but since He is a creature and one of the 
things originate, therefore He thus spoke, and needed what He had 
not, for it is proper to creatures to require and to need what 
they have not. ' 1 
It was a scandal in the eyes of the Arians for the Logos to be God and 
to have died on the cross. 'How dare you say that He is the Word proper 
to the Father's Essence, who had a body, so as to endure all this? ' In 
short, 'How can He be Word or God who slept as man, and wept, and 
enquired? '2 For the Arians the answer was a simple matter of logic. 
Because human attributes implying change, passion and development were 
predicated of Christ in the New Testament then the Logos must be a creature. 
As Athanasius states, the Arians 'deny the Eternity and Godhead of the 
Word in consequence of those human attributes which the Saviour took 
on Him by reason of that flesh which he bore. '3 
The problem of predicating human attributes to the Logos is not new. 
However, with the Arians the problem has taken a new turn and a more 
critical stance. This is due not just to the fact that Arius wished to 
deny that the Logos is God becav, se of the human predicates attributed 
to him in scripture, but more so to the fact that the Arians' notion 
of the union between the Logos and flesh is understood in such a way 
that they are forced by reason to deny the true divinity of the Son. 
At the centre of the Arian Christology, which forces them to maintain 
both that the Logos changes in becoming man and that subsequent upon 
this he is affected by the human experiences, lies the fact that the 
Logos is directly united only to flesh without a soul in a physical 
and natural conjunctive union, analogous to the union of soul and body. 
1. Ibid., 3: 26. 
2. Ibid., 3: 27- 
3. Ibid. 
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Ps. -Athanasius states their position: 'In vain, then, do the Arians 
use sophistry, suggesting that the Saviour assumed flesh only, and 
impiously referring to the impassible Godhead the notion of suffering. ' 
Or again, 'Arius acknowledhes flesh alone, in order to a concealment 
of the Godhead, and says that instead of that inward man which is in 
us, that is, the soul, the Word came to exist in the flesh: -- for he 
dares to ascribe to the Godhead the idea of suffering and the resurrection 
from Hades. '2 
While more will be said concerning this position a little later with 
regard to Apollinaris, a few comments must be made at this time. 
Firstly it is quite obvious that the Arian understanding of the 
union in Christ is an extreme form of Logos/Sarx Christology. Within 
this extreme understanding there is a substantial conjunctive union of 
Logos and flesh which is physical or vital. The Logos, taking the place 
of the soul, is united to flesh in such a way that it becomes the 
vivifying principle forming a new and complete being. It is not a union 
in the person, as will be seen in later Christology, but a physical and 
natural union composed of component parts, as body and soul, forming the 
complete reality of Christ. The Arians believed such a union was 
necessary to account for the fact that Christ was one being. It follows 
then that because the Logos enters into a vital and physical union with 
the flesh, and since he performs the functions of the soul, he must be 
changed from what he was into the new reality which is the consequence 
of the union. 
Secondly, and flowing from this extreme Logos/Sarx framework, the 
human and physical attributes are not predicated to the Person of the 
Logos, but directly to his nature as such since it has become the vivi- 
fying component part of a new being and reality. Because of the nature 
of the union, what is predicated of the Logos must be predicated of him 
according to his nature. It should be noticed that Ps. Athanasius, in 
the above quotation, is shocked for this very reason. He is concerned 
not solely with the fact that the Arians denied the full humanity of 
Christ, that the Logos did not assume a soul as well as a body, but 
also, and maybe even more so, at the consequence of such a denial which 
1. Ps. -Athanasius, C. Apoll., 1: 15. Trans. Later Treatises of St. 
Athanasius Library of the Fathers, (Oxford: James Parker and 
Co., 1881). 
2. Ibid., 2: 3. 
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demanded that the human predicates attributed to the Logos refer to 
his very nature as God, and thus affect him as God. 
The Arians, being well aware of this, followed the logic of their 
argument to its end. The Logos could not be God for God could not become 
man since to do so would mean that God would become mutable and change- 
able, and this is impossible. 
1 Looking at the Orthodox Christology 
from within their framework it was only natural that the Arians should 
ask 'If he (Logos) were very God from God, how could be become man? 12 
2. Athanasius 
While Athanasius is mainly concerned with the Trinitarian question 
of the Logos being homoousion with the Father, nevertheless in book three 
of Contra Arianos he does take up the Christological challenges levelled 
against the Orthodox who maintain simultaneously that the Logos is God 
and that he became man. And even though a majority of Athanasius' 
arguments were concerned with the true divinity of the Logos, one of 
his primary aims throughout was to guarantee the fact that it was really 
God who became man. In actual fact Athanasius' major problem was not 
whether the Logos was God, but rather, as Meijering states, 'How God 
could really act in time without changing His nature, '3 As has been 
seen the Arian doctrines of God, the Logos, and the Incarnation were all 
based on and argued from the major presupposition that God could not act 
in time and history and remain God. Athanasius tries to meet this 
challenge throughout and especially in his Christology. 
Athanasius, like all Alexandrians, takes his starting point from 
Jn. 1: 14. Echoing Tertullian, Athanasius states: The Logos 'became man 
1. Grillmeier may be correct when he maintains that the Arian doctrine 
of the Logos primarily and logically arose from their understanding 
of the union of the Logos and flesh rather than from their doctrine 
of God. Because of the physical and organic union between the Logos 
and flesh 'We are therefore justified in asking whether the doctrine 
-of the Incarnation was not rather the starting point for the whole 
Arian system. Could not the heresy of the creatureliness of the 
Logos have been occasioned by the doctrine of the Incarnation....? ' 
p. 190. See also pp. 189-192. 
2. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 27- 
3, E. P. rdeijering, Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis 
or Antithesis? Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 194" 
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and did not come into man. '1 Thus the Logos in becoming man is present 
in a different and much more profound way than in the prophets or saints. 
'Of old he was wont to come to the Saints individually, and to hallow 
those who rightly receive Him, but neither, when they were begotten was 
it said that He had become man, nor, when they suffered, was it said 
that He Himself suffered. '2 Working from a Logos/Sarx framework then 
Athanasius denies any sort of adoptionism, but rather states emphatically 
that God really became man. To maintain this, however, forces Athansius 
to face directly the Arian charge. 
If God becomes man, does this not destroy his immutability? Does 
not the very concept of 'becoming' imply that the Logos was in some way 
changed? Athanasius answers that in becoming man the Logos 'did not 
become other than Himself on taking flesh, but, being the same as before, 
He was robed in it; and the expressions "He became" and "He was made", 
must not be understood as if the Word, considered as the Word, was made, 
but that the Word, being Framer of all, afterwards.... putting on a body 
which was originate and made.... 13 It must be remembered that 'He 
(Logos) has become flesh not by being changed into flesh, but because 
he has assumed on our behalf living flesh and become man. '4 For 
Athanasius, then, while the Logos really became man, he did not change 
in any way or become another. Making a very critical distinction 
Athanasius maintains that the Logos became man, but did not change into 
men. 
This is an important junction of Orthodox Christology. Because of 
the faith of Nicea, Athanasius had to maintain the full divinity of the 
Son and thus his immutability. Likewise he could not uphold any form 
of adoptionism at the expense of denying a true incarnation. In order 
to maintain both he tries to define more precisely and technically the 
notion of 'becoming. ' He does this by making, as has been seen, two 
important negative judgements. 'Become' neither means 'come into man, ' 
nor does it mean 'change into man. ' While these are important distinctions 
1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 30. 
2. Ibid., 3: 31. See also Ad Adel, 3. Also Ad Epic. -9 
2,11,12. It 
is interesting to note that Athanasius argues for a true incarnation 
in the above quotation from the communication of idioms. Because 
all human predicates are attributed to the Logos he must have 
become man and not just into man. 
3. Athanasius, C. Ar., 2: 8. See also ibid., 1: 60. 
4. Athanasius, Ad. Epic., 8. 
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in so far as they negate two false notions of 'become' which would 
mitigate against either the immutability of God or a real incarnation, 
they do not define in a positive way what 'become' does mean. It is 
at this point that Athanasius comes to an impasse. 
The centre of Athanasius' understanding of the union is the belief 
that the Logos became man, which for him has an ontological and meta- 
physical meaning. However, in order to clarify the positive meaning 
of this statement Athanasius reverts to descriptive terminology that 
sometimes implies less than an ontological union or at least is ambiguous. 
Thus one constantly finds Athanasius' positive meaning of 'become' 
stated in such phrases as 'put on flesh and become man, '1or 'entering 
into the flesh, '2 or 'took flesh, '3 or the flesh seen as 'clothing. '4 
Athanasius even goes so far as to describe the Incarnation in terms of 
the favourite Antiochene analogy of the Logos dwelling 'in the flesh 
as in a temple. '5 Such statements in no way imply that Athanasius in 
actual fact sees the union of the Logos and flesh as merely accidental; 
but rather, such statements are made precisely because he does see the 
union as ontological, and yet does not wish this union to be such as to 
imply any change or mutation on the part of the Logos. As Grillmeier 
states: 'it is.... remarkable that all the expressions which seem to 
suggest an accidental relationship between the Logos and flesh are 
immediately expanded by the intimation that the Logos really "became" 
flesh. '6 The real problem resides in Athanasius' inability to state in 
one consistent conceptual framework both the ontological nature of the 
union and the distinction that must necessarily be made in order to 
ensure the integrity of the Logos, and as will be seen, the humanity. 
while Athanasius gives ontological depth to the statement that 'the 
Logos became flesh, ' and can deny false interpretations of 'become, ' 
because he lacks proper concepts he is unable to state exactly this 
ontological depth in positive ontological terms. He must resort to 
positive descriptive phrases in order to ensure that his ontological 
understanding of the union is not interpreted to mean that the Logos 
in some way changes or is mutable. He refuses to follow through with 
I. Athanasius, C. Ar., 2: 47. Also 3: 32 and 34. Also De. Irrcar., 8,9,10. 
2. Athanasius, Ad Adel., 3. 
3. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 29 and 31. 
4. Ibid., 2: 8. 
5. Athanasius, Ad Adel., 7. See also De Incar., 8,9,20. 
6. Grillmeier, p. 218. For examples of this in Athanasius see C. Ar., 
2: 47,3: 299 31. Also Ad Epic., 8. 
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the inherent logic of the Logos/Sarx framework. Athanasius is very 
close to an ontology of the hypostatic union, as the following will very 
clearly exemplify, but a full and exact conceptual statement of it 
will come only with Cyril. 
Athanasius' proximity to the notion of the hypostatic union, which 
in a real sense presupposes such a union, is brought out in his treatment 
of the second Christological question concerning the Logos' passibility. 
Because Athanasius believes in a true incarnation of the Logos, he 
insists against the Arians that all human attributes must be predicated 
of him. Because the Logos has become man 'the properties of the flesh 
are said to be His, since he was in it, such as to hunger, to thirst, 
to suffer, to be weary, and the like of which the flesh is capable. 
" 
Thus, 'when the flesh suffered, the Word was not external to it; and 
therefore is the passion said to be His. '2 This is necessary 
'because he [Logos] had a body, not in appearance, but in 
truth.... with the affections proper to it.... and as we say 
that the body was his own, so also we must say that the 
affections of the body were proper to Him alone.... If then 
the body had been another's, to him too had been affections 
attributed; but if the flesh is the Word's.... of necessity 
then the affections also of the flesh are ascribed to Him, 
whose the flesh is. ' 3 
Moreover, there is no hint that Athanasius understands this to be the 
case because of a confusion or mixture between the Logos and flesh. 
Not only does his understanding of the union, treated above, preclude 
this, but also 'we must recognize what is proper to each [nature]' 
even though two see and understand that both.... are done by one. '4 
Nevertheless, does this mean that the Arian claim that the Orthodox 
make God passible is true? Atharnasius thinks not. Arguing from 
1 Peter 4: 1 Athanasius contends that the Logos' human experiences affect 
him only in so far as he is flesh and not as God. 
'when he [Logos] is said to hunger and thirst and to toil, and 
not to know, and to sleep, and to weep... and in a word undergo 
1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 31. 
2. Ibid., 3: 32. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 3: 35" See also De Sent Dion, 9. 
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all that belongs to the flesh.... Let no one stumble at what 
belongs to man, but rather let a man know that in nature the 
Word Himself is impassible, and yet because of the flesh which 
he put on, these things are ascribed to Him, since they are 
proper to the flesh, and the body itself is proper to the 
Saviour. ' 1 
For Athanasiüs, then, all human 'affections were not proper to the nature 
of the Word, as far as He was Word; but in the flesh which was thus 
affected was the Word.... '2 
It is at this point that Athanasius shows his greatest strength and 
his greatest weakness. Athanasius argues very astutely that if the Logos 
really became flesh, then he must be the subject of all predicates, 
human as well as divine. At the same time Athanasius clarifies exactly 
how these human attributes are to be predicated of the Logos. They are 
predicated of him, not in so, far as he is God for to do so would destroy 
his immutable nature by making him passible, but rather they are 
predicated of him in so far as he is flesh. This clear and unambiguous 
understanding of the unity of subject exemplifies Athanasius' proximity 
to a hypostatic understanding of the unity between the Logos and the 
humanity. 
'The special future significance of the Christological formula 
of St. Athanasius and of the Logos-Sarx framework in general, ' 
[states Grillmeier) 'lies in its clear presentation of the 
"unity of subject" in Christ.... A true conception of the per- 
sonality of Christ is certainly revealed here. It is an old 
Christian legacy, which we were able to establish as early as 
Ignatius of Antioch and his source John 1: 14"' 3 
Athanasius has given a firm justification for the communication of idioms, 
which will be brought to fulfilment in the Nestorian controversy. 
However, it is here also that Athanasius seems vulnerable to criticism 
which could undermine his argument for the impassibility of the Logos as 
subject of human experiences, as well as the humanity of Christ. 'The 
central problem of his Christology, ' states Kelly, '(is] whether he 
envisaged Christ's humanity as including a human rational soul, or 
regarded the Logos as taking the place of one. '4 
1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 34- 
2. Ibid., 3: 55- 
3. Grillmeier, pp. 218-219. 
4. Kelly, pp. 286-287. 
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Athanasius often speaks of the Logos becoming 'flesh' rather than 
the Logos becoming 'man'. However, on a number of occasions he does 
say 'He [Logos] took flesh and became man, '1 and once even points out 
that the Biblical use of 'flesh' means the-complete man. 
2 Likewise after 
the Synod of Alexandria in 362 in his Tomus ad Antiochenos, Athanasius 
professes against the Apollinarians that Christ must have a human soul. 
3 
Nevertheless, it is difficult not to come to Grillmeier's critical 
judgement that for Athanasius, while the soul may have been a physical 
factor, it played no theological role in his Christology. 
4 
This 
exemplifies itself in that the Logos becomes the sole motivating and 
vital force of all of Christ's actions analogous to the Platonic union 
of body and soul. The body becomes the mere external instrument of all 
that the Logos accomplishes. 
5 Likewise in his scriptural exegesis con- 
cerning human attributes predicated of the Logos such as ignorance, 
sadness, suffering, etc., he makes no mention of a human soul. To have 
brought in the concept of Christ's human soul would have bolstered his 
argument against the Arians on how the Logos could be the subject of the 
human predicates without becoming passible in himself. However, he fails 
to do this. 
6 
Thus while Athanasius nowhere explicitly denies the human 
soul of Christ, he never brings out its theological significance. 
Such a lack weakens not only Athanasius' understanding of the 
humanity of Christ, but also, and this is important for this study, his 
argument against the Arians that the human attributes do not affect 
the Logos directly in his divinity, but only in his humanity. Because 
Athanasius does not give any function to the human soul it is difficult, 
1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 31. See also 3: 30 and 32. Also Ad Enic. 8. 
2. Cf. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 30. 
3. Cf. Athanasius, Tomus ad Antioch, 7 and 11. 
4. Cf. Grillmeier, pp. 194-217- 
5- Cf. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 31 and 35. This can very easily be 
seen in Athanasius' understanding of Redemption. The flesh of 
Christ plays no real complementary role in the redeeming act, 
but is the mere instrument by which the Logos alone brings about 
redemption. Likewise, Christ's death is seen as the separation 
of the Logos from the flesh and not the human soul from the body. 
See C. Ar., 3: 57" Also Ad B'Dic-, 5,6. 
6. Cf. M. Richard, 'Saint Athanase et la Phychologie du Christ selon 
leg Ariens, ' Melanges de Science Religieuse, 4 (1947), PP- 5-54- 
See Athanasius, C. Ar., 3: 54-58" 
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if not logically impossible, to see where the ignorance, sadness, agony 
and suffering directly reside since it is the soul that is the centre 
of these and not the flesh as flesh. Without the soul it seems that they 
must directly reside in the Logos himself. This, of course, would make 
him passible as God, which Athanasius would abhor. Even with Athanasius' 
very important and valid distinction between the Logos in himself and 
as incarnate, it is difficult not to come to such a conclusion. 
Thus while Athanasius does argue well against the Arian Christology, 
he does not fully succeed, precisely because he fails to challenge them 
on their major weakness--the absence of a human soul which stems from 
their Logos/Sarx framework. Nevertheless, Athanasius' Christology is 
not just Arian Christology differing only 'in his estimate of the status 
of the Word' as Kelly maintains. 
' Nor is Athanasius, as will be seen, 
an Apollinarian. While all three work from a Logos/Sari framework, only 
Athanasius keeps his framework 'open for an explicit doctrine of the 
soul of Christ. That of Apollinaris [and the Arians] is closed. '2 
3. A'pollinaris 
Since Apollinaris works from within the same basic Logos/Sari framework 
as the Arians and Athanasius, the same basic problems are present: the 
difference being that with Apollinaris the inherent weaknesses of a strict 
Logos/Sari Christology become very much in evidence, and, being seen as 
such, cause a reaction to take place. 
Being an arch-supporter of Nicea, Apollinaris upholds against the 
Arians the full divinity of the Logos. At the same time he was dis- 
satisfied with any Christology which seemed to advocate an accidental or 
adoptionist union between the Logos and flesh such as that of Paul of 
Samosata, the Paulinians, Flavian, or Diodore. For Apollinaris there must 
be a substantial union between the Logos and flesh and this union is 
understood in the same manner as the union between the soul and body in 
man. Understanding the union in such a way obviously is not new. That 
is new is the acuteness and depth with which Apollinaris works out this 
understanding. 
Christ is a compound being in which the Logos substantially joins 
1. Kelly, p. 287- 
2. Grillmeier, p. 217. 
2ND 
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himself to flesh and through this union constitutes a 'human being. ' 
Christ could not have a human soul because this would mean that there 
were two wholes: the Logos and the complete man of body and soul. 
According to Apollinaris 'two perfect things cannot become one. ' Thus 
Christ is made up of parts which in union with one another form a new 
organic and complete substance. 'A single nature is constituted out 
of the several parts, and the Logos supplies to the whole a special 
energy.... The same thing comes to pass in the case of the ordinary man 
out of two incomplete parts. These make up one complete nature and 
are revealed by one name.... '2 As the union of body and soul form a man, 
so the union of the Logos and flesh form Christ. It must be pointed out 
that because Apollinaris understands man to be any spirit united to 
flesh, he believes that he is able to maintain that while the Logos 
takes the place of the human soul, Christ is nevertheless man. 
3 
However, because this new being is a compound of Logos and flesh and 
not a human soul and flesh, he is not man as other men. Rather to quote 
the New Testament, the Logos is 'Found as man' and 'In the likeness of 
men. '4 Christ then is a 'Heavenly man. 'S 
The full significance of such a description of Christ is only grasped 
when one realizes that this union between the Logos and flesh is not seen 
in a static way, but rather the Logos gives life and vitalizes the 
whole of the flesh. In this new reality called Christ it is the Logos 
who is the sole governing and active principle. 
1. Ps. -Athanasius, C. Auoll., 1: 2. While it does not affect this study 
it should be noted that there has been some discussion over 
whether Apollinaris saw Christ as made up of Logos and flesh 
(dicotomist) or Logos, animal soul, and flesh (tricotomist). For 
discussion of this point see: H. Lietzmann, Apollinaris von 
Laodicea und seine Schule (Tubingen: 1904). See also C. E. Raven, 
A ollinariarnism Cambridge, 1923); R. A. Norris, Jr., Manhood 
and Christ Oxford: 1963); H. De Riedmatten, 'La Christologie 
d'Apollinare de Laodicea, Studia Patristica, Vol. II (T. U. 64, 
Berlin: 1957), eds. K. Alard and F. L. Cross. 
2. Apollinaris, De Unione, 5, (Lietzmann, p. 187). Trans. R. A. Norris, 
p. 105- 
3- Apollinaris, Anacenh., 16 (Leitzmann, p. 244). Trans. Kelly, p. 
292. For a discussion of Apollinaris' anthropology see Norris, 
pp. 81-94- 
4- Apollinaris, Fragment 45, (Lietzmann, p. 214)- 
5- Apollinaris, Tomus Synod. Also Fragment 25. Also Anaceph., 12, 
(Lietzrnann, pp. 263,210,243)" 
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'The flesh, which is moved altogether from without by the mover 
and agent..., and which is not in itself a complete living being, 
has come together into union with its governor, and has been 
put together with the heavenly governor, being conformed to it 
in virtue of its own passive nature, and receiving the divine (element), which has been made its own, by reason of (the 
Tatter'sactive nature. For thus out of mover and moved one 
living being is constituted--not two, nor out of two complete 
and self-moving (parts). ' 1 
Thus one sees the full weight of Apollinaris' formula 'One nature 
of the Word incarnate. '2 Christ is one not because of a hypostatic union, 
but one because of the naturalistic and organic unity of two parts. 
Thus the concept of 'person' for Apollinaris is attributed not so 
much to the Logos as subject, but to the new composite being of the Logos 
and flesh as such. 'The flesh and the "determining principle of the 
flesh" are one prosopon. '3 Or again 'Holy scripture makes no difference 
between the Logos and his flesh, but the same is one Physis, one hypostasis, 
one power, one prosopon, fully God and fully man. '4 
Because of this natural, physical, and vital unity between the Logos 
and flesh, which forms a new being, Apollinaris is able to justify the 
communication of idioms. However, it is now due, not to the fact that 
there is one subject in Christ, but to the fact that there is the one 
composite being of Christ. As Norris states: 
'It is the fact of the composite, vital unity of material and 
spiritual principles which makes the "exchange of names" 
possible.... This is Apollinaris' explanation of the scriptural 
datum of a double language...: an explanation founded on the 
view that the concrete nature of the incarnate Christ is 
constituted by an organic union of divine Spirit and human 
flesh, on the model of twofold human nature. ' 5 
However, Appolinaris did not believe that either the Logos or the flesh 
radically changed in the union, or that the communication of idioms 
denoted such change. 'The flesh of the Lord while remaining flesh even 
1. Apollinaris, Fragment, 107, (Lietzmann, p. 232). Trans. Norris, 
p. 100. 
2. Apollinaris, Ad. Joy., 1. (Leitzmann, p. 251). 
3. Apollinaris, Logoi, Leitzmann, p. 248). Trans. Grillmeier, 
p. 230. 
4. Apollinaris, De Fide et incarn., 6. (Leitzmann, pp. 198-199). 
Trans. Grillmeier, p. 231. 
5. Norris, pp" 105-106. 
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in the union (its nature being neither changed nor lost) shares in the 
names and properties of the Word; and the Word, while remaining Word 
and God, in the incarnation shares in the names and properties of the 
flesh. ' 
1 
With regard to the first Christological problem of the Logos' 
immutability in becoming man, Apollinaris' Christology has a definite 
appeal. This is due to the fact that the relationship between the 
Logos and flesh is portrayed in a very dynamic and active way, and yet 
Apollinaris professes that the Logos remains immutable. However, at a 
closer study, this dynamism is such that it completely destroys the 
Incarnation. It not only has little regard for Christ's humanity, but 
also the immutability of the Logos as God. 
While Apollinaris is able to maintain the oneness of Christ, the 
union is such that the parts united can no longer preserve their complete 
integrity. This is obvious with regard to the humanity of Christ, for 
which Apollinaris was condemned. 
2 However, not only is the humanity 
of Christ incomplete without a soul, but the remaining flesh is also 
transformed. Because the divine Logos must now take the place of the 
soul it becomes the lifegiving principle of the flesh in a vitalistic 
and organic way, and thus transforms the flesh, or to use Apollinaris' 
term, makes it 'heavenly. ' At the same time, in so becoming the life- 
giving principle, the Logos not only transforms the flesh, but he himself 
is also forced to undergo change and transformation, even though 
Apollinaris would protest this. (The Arians realized this and thus 
logically made the Logos a creature. ) This is so because the necessity 
of Apollinaris' vitalistic and organic unity renders the concept of 
'become' to mean that in some manner the Logos is changed. Ps. -Athanasius 
is very much aware of this when he asks: 'Do they suppose the Word to 
have undergone a conversion into flesh, or been made "like" to soul, 
or to have exhibited the human form in mere semblence.... '3 
While Apollinaris wished to uphold a true Incarnation, and his 
emphasis on the nature of the union is to do just that, he fails 
1. Cf. Timothy of Berytus, ED. ad Homo, (Leitzmann, p. 278). Trans. 
Kelly, p. 295" 
2. Apollinaris was condemned for denying the full humanity of Christ 
by Pope Damasus at the Council of Rome, 377. Also at the Synod 
of Antioch, 379" Finally, at the First Council of Constantinople 
in 381. 
3, ps. 4thanasius, C. Atoll., 2: 1. See also 1: 2,3,12. 
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because the union as he understood it must necessarily change and 
transform both the Logos and the humanity. In Apollinaris' Christology 
it is no longer God who becomes man because by the nature of the union 
he must change, and thus he can no longer be logically called God, 
but only that which he has changed into. Neither can God be said to 
be man since the flesh is likewise transformed and changed. Christ 
is rightly one for Apollinaris, but in the last analysis it is logically 
impossible to say that he is 'God become man' or 'God incarnate' since 
both the divinity and the humanity have been transformed by the union 
into a composite tertium quid. Because of Apollinaris' denial of the 
human soul, and because of the organic unity which ensued, PsrAthanasius 
can rightly ask: 
'In what sense then, according to you, did the Word .... having 
united flesh to Himself, become rational man, and how, being 
unchangeable and unalterable, did he become man, if it was not 
by constituting the form of the servant so as to be endued with 
reason, so that the Word might remain unchangeable, remaining 
what he was, and also the man, being God, might be seen on earth 
as rational? ' 1 
It may seem paradoxical but for Ps. -Athanasius it is only if Christ has 
a soul and is fully man that one can guarantee the immutable and full 
divinity of the Logos and thus also a true Incarnation. In other words 
to maintain a true Incarnation one must guarantee the immutability of 
the Logos not just because he is God, but also in order that one can 
truly say that it is God who became and is man. If the Logos changes 
because of the nature of the union in becoming man, then he is no 
longer God, and thus to say 'God has become man' or that 'God is man' 
becomes untelligible. The same is true with regards to the humanity. 
It too must maintain its integrity, if the Incarnation is to remain 
intelligible. 
From the above discussion it is quite obvious what happens on the 
second Christological level concerning the passibility of the Logos as 
man. As was already stated in delineating Apollinaris' thought, because 
the union is organic the communication of idioms is justified not because 
there is one subject, but because there is one composite being. 
Apollinaris did not wish to imply that the Logos suffered as God, 
1. Ibid., 2: 16. 
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but because of the nature of the union and the lack of a human soul 
the Logos, contrary to Apollinaris' protests, must both be mutable and 
passible in his divinity and not just as man. 
Gregory of Nazianzus brings Apollinaris' argument to its logical 
end. 'For if the manhood is without soul, even the Arians admit this, 
that they may attribute his passion to the Godhead, as that which gives 
motion to the body is also that which suffers. ' If the Logos takes 
the place of the soul it must not only become the primary principle of 
life, it must also become the direct and primary centre of all human 
experiences--hunger, thirst, suffering, etc.. It is no longer the Logos 
as man who experiences these, as Athanasius maintained, but the Godhead 
of the Logos. 
The only way that Apollinaris can protect the impassibility of the 
Logos as God is to deny the reality of his human experiences. This, 
of course, makes him a Docetist. Ps. -Athanasius presents Apollinaris' 
dilemma well when he says: 'These men either imagine an alteration of 
the Word, or suppose the economy of the passion unreal. '2 
The whole dilemma on the second level concerning the passibility 
of the Logos as man goes straight back to the first level concerning 
the nature of the union. Because of Apollinaris' understanding of the 
union he is unable to maintain any real distinction between the Logos 
and humanity, and thus no real distinction between the attributes of 
each nature. Again Ps. -Athanasius sees this very clearly: 
'But if you do not believe that Christ was passible because he 
was man, yet impassible because he was God, but, when driven into 
acorner, argue, that if you confess Christ to be God and Man, 
you will be saying, "Not one, but two, " you must necessarily 
either.... call the economy of the passion and the death and 
resurrection a mere appearance; or like Arius and his followers, 
call the Godhead of the Word passible. ' 3 
In the end the communication of idioms for Apollinaris is a word game, 
that has no foundation in his Christology even though he felt that his 
1. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad. Cled. (Ep. 101). Trans. Library of 
Christian Classics, Vol. III, Christolo_qV of the Later Fathers, 
ed. E. R. Hardy Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954)- 
2. Ps. -Athanasius, C. Apoll., 1: 2. See also 1: 3,12,16; 
2: 13,17- 
3. Ibid., 2: 12. 
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understanding of the union was the only firm justification for it. 
' 
4e The Inadequacy of the Logos/Sarx Framework 
While the above three theologians have diverse conclusions concerning 
the ontological status of the Logos and mode of the incarnational union, 
they nevertheless have one thing in common: the Logos/Sarx framework. 
Arius, Athanasius, and Apollinaris realised that Christ was one 
ontological being. If this was nottrue, one could not speak of a true 
Incarnation. Working from the Logos/Sarx framework they very easily 
could give ontological depth and meaning to the concept of 'become' for 
all three, to a greater or lesser degree, understood the union as 
analogous to the ontological relationship between the soul and body. 
There was no fear of adoptionism for all three would agree that the 
'Logos became "flesh"' and 'did not come into flesh. ' 
While it was Apollinaris who developed and elaborated most fully 
a Logos/Sarx Christology, it was Arius who saw most clearly its full 
implications. Apollinaris, in denying a human soul, very clearly 
explicated the organic and physical nature of the union in which the 
Logos becomes the life-giving and vivifying principle of the flesh. 
However, it was Arius who realised that such a union not only destroyed 
the integrity of the humanity, but also demanded that the Logos be mutable 
and passible in himself. Following the inherent logic of the Logos/Sari 
framework Arius concluded that the Logos must be a creature. 
Athanasius challenged Arius, but, as has been seen, was not fully 
successful. His lack of full success resided in his use of the Logos/ 
Sarx framework. With it he could give ontological depth to the union, 
but could not make a positive statement on the ontological nature of 
the union in an ontological way which would uphold both the oneness of 
Christ and the integrity of the natures. He could deny any false notion 
of the union which would imply change or mutation in the Logos in 
becoming man; however, in order to give a positive meaning to the nature 
1. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad. Cled. (Ep. 102). It should be noted 
that while the above arguments against Apollinaris are Christo- 
logical in substance, the primary argument which caused his 
condemnation was soteriological: 'That which he 
(Logos) has not 
assumed he has not healed; but that which is united to his 
Godhead is saved. ' Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad. Cled. (Ep. 101). 
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of the union so that he could state how the Logos could remain immutable 
in becoming man, he was forced to move from negative ontological state- 
ments concerning the union to positive descriptive statements of the 
union: 'took flesh, ' 'put on flesh. ' Unlike Arius, Athanasius was not 
conscious of the full implications öf the Logos/Sarx framework, yet 
he unconsciously moved out of the framework when he wished to uphold 
the immutability of the Logos and the completeness of the humanity. 
That Arius, Athanasius, and Apollinanis did not realise was that 
Nicea in proclaiming that the Logos was fully God rendered the Logos/Sarx 
framework unworkable. As Nicea's homoousion doctrine broke the Platonic 
principle of emanation on the Trinitarian level, so it broke the Logos/ 
Sarx framework on the Christological level. It is incapable at one 
and the same time to explain both the ontological unity between the Logos 
and his humanity, and the real distinction between the two in order to 
ensure that the Logos remains God, and thus immutable, and that the 
humanity remains complete. This is due precisely to the fact that 'become' 
in the Logos/Sarx framework always implies change. To understand the 
concept of 'become' as expressing an ontological unity only, without at 
the same time expressing a distinction between the Logos and what he has 
become: man, destroys the terms to which 'become' is predicated. This 
is where the Logos/Sarx framework always failed. Its understanding of 
'become' always tended to produce a hybrid tertium quid being. 
That has to be grasped, and up until now has not been, is that while 
the concept of 'become' must express an ontological unity between the 
Logos and his humanity if a true Incarnation is to be maintained, it must 
likewise and at the same time guarantee the distinction within the unity 
between the Logos and his humanity for the very same reason. It will 
take the Nestorian controversy to bring this about. 
Because of the above the situation becomes critical on the level of 
the communication of idioms. For Arius, Athanasius, and Apollinaris 
the Logos is the subject of all human predicates. However, it was only 
Athanasius who could maintain with any consistency and logic the 
homoousion doctrine of Nicea and the fact that the Logos was the subject 
in so far as he was man and not in so far as he was God. However, his 
distinction was weakened because, due to his Logos/Sarx framework, he 
did not utilize the human soul as the seat of the human experiences. 
With Apollinaris the distinction looses its whole rational. His 
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Christology dramatically showed the unworkability of the Logos/Sari 
framework to account for the unity and distinction in Christ, and thus 
brought to the forefront the question of the communication of idioms. 
It is not surprising then that the Nestorian controversy started off on 
this level. If the Logos is homoousion with the Father and thus 
immutable and impassible as Nicea proclaimed, how could Mary be 
Theotokos? In actual fact it is not a new question, but an Arian question 
in Nestorian garb. Arius: 'If the Logos is born, how can he be God? ' 
Nestorius: 'If the Logos is God, how can he be born? ' The upshot is 
that while Arius and Nestorius are poles apart, both give negative 
responses to his respective question for the very same reason: God is 
immutable and impassiblel Underlying both is the presupposition that 
God can not really be present in time and history and remain unchanged. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHALCIDONIAN CBRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS PERSONAL/EXISTENTIAL 
The full implications of Nicea's homoousion doctrine on Christology 
have not yet been fully realized and understood. The Patristic Church 
must live through the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies before 
it reaches maturity at Chalcedon. As with the previous controversies 
studied in Chapter 1, the controversies in this chapter do not primarily 
concern the immutability and impassibility of God as such. Rather they 
are conscious concerns within the primary problem of trying to state 
the unity and distinction in Christ. The Fathers who will be studied 
here wish to maintain that the Logos is immutable and impassible in 
himself. However, the difficulty in maintaining this, as was seen from 
Chapter 1, arises when one tries to formulate what it means for the Logos 
to 'become' man and be the subject of human experiences. 
Basically two men will be studied in this chapter. Nestorius and 
Cyril of Alexandria. In relation to these men such personages as 
Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, Pope Leo and Euthches will 
also be mentioned. The chapter will conclude with a theological exegesis 
of Chalcedon. 
A. Antioch and Alexandria 
The controversies and the men treated in this chapter fall into either 
the Antiochene or Alexandrian school of theology. From the previous 
chapter, some idea of the Alexandrian school has already been obtained 
through the thought of Athanasius and Apollinaris. Nevertheless, it is 
impossible to fully appreciate the forthcoming Christological problems 
without some idea of the different theological milieus of each school. 
It may be somewhat simplistic to say that the School of Alexandria 
is Platonic and the School of Antioch is Aristotelian, yet there is a 
basis for such a division, and such a division helps to grasp the 
different theological attitudes and presuppositions which influence 
their respective Christologies. The basic difference can be seen in 
the way each approaches reality. Being Platonic Alexandria tended to 
grasp reality through general and universal metaphysical principles, 
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always trying to get beyond the material and concrete appearances to 
the really real. Antioch, on the other hand, in true Aristotelian 
style, tended to stress the individual concrete and factual nature of 
empirical reality. This basic difference exemplifies itself in a 
number of areas that bear upon Christology. 
Unlike the Alexandrians, who delighted in mystical and allegorial 
exegesis, the Antiochenes were factual and historical in their inter- 
pretation of Scripture. Thus, when it came to reflecting on Christ in 
the New Testament, Alexandria was interested in his inner metaphysical 
make-up, while Antioch delved into the factual and historical aspects 
of his human life and what he accomplished. 
The same basic difference can be seen in their respective anthro- 
pologies. Man for the Antiochenes was the doer, the actor, the free 
moral agent. For Alexandria he was the thinker, the knower, the mystic. 
Thus, Antioch stresses what Christ did as man, how he acted, his free 
moral integrity. Alexandria sees Christ more as the revealer, the giver 
of divine knowledge, the guarantee of truth. Their soteriologies differ 
then also. Salvation for Antioch was not the divinization of man as it 
was for Alexandria, but the bringing about of man's moral rectitude. 
The culmination of these two basic attitudes and approaches are 
found then in their understanding of the person of Christ. Stressing 
the distinct oneness and unity of individual existing beings, Antioch 
lays much more emphasis on the distinction between God and creatures; 
and thus the humanity and divinity of Christ are not only distinct, but 
tend to be understood as separate entities existing in their own right. 
Grounded in the historical and factual nature of reality Christ as a 
man is seen as a separate whole with the full operations of intellect 
and will. This is not only in keeping with their philosophical under- 
standing of reality as composed of individual and distinct beings, but 
also in their anthropology and soteriology. The stress being in both 
instances that man is a free moral being. Christ with full moral 
integrity freely wills and acts to bring about the possibility for men 
to once more live virtuous lives. Thus, the Man Jesus remains distinct 
from the Logos. However, as will be seen, this is not just due to the 
Antiochene desire to maintain the full humanity of Christ, but also to 
avoid confusion with the divine nature of the Logos which would render 
him mutable and passible. However, such stress on the distinction of 
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natures obviously gives rise to the question of the unity in Christ. 
Alexandrian Christology, as was seen, is more, philosophical in nature, 
stressing the ontological oneness of Christ. But, as Apollinarianism 
exemplifies, the distinction of natures can become ambiguous and with it 
the Logos' immutability and impassibility. 
1 
B. The School of Antioch: Nestorius 
While Nestorius is the man most closely associated with the School 
of Antioch, he is neither the first nor the best of their theologians. 
Because of Nestorius' ambiguity his Christology can only be fully under- 
stood in the light of his predecessor Theodore of Mopsuestia, who in 
many ways was a much more careful thinker. 
Theodore was the first theologian to bring together into a complete 
Christology all the Antiochene insights and presuppositions. It is not 
surprising then that he is primarily, a scriptural exegete to the extent 
that he. is known as 'the Interpreter, ' rather than a systematic theologian. 
However, Theodore did not perform his exegsis in a theological vacuum, 
but like his predecessors Eustathius and Dodore of Tarsus took up the 
attack against the Arians and Apollinarians. 
Theodore was well aware of why Arius denied the divinity of the Logos, 
and he also understood the full implications of the Apollinarian notion 
of the union. As he states: 
'The disciples of Arius and Eunomius say that he (Christ) took 
a body but not a soul; the divine nature, they say, takes the place 
of the soul. And they lower the divine nature of the Unique (Son) 
.... and performs the actions of the soul .... Consequently, if the 
divinity takes the place of the soul, it (the body) had neither 
hunger, nor thirst, nor was it tired nor did it have need of food; 
for all this happens to the body because of its weakness and because 
the soul is not equipped to satisfy the needs which it has save 
according to the law of the nature which God has given it. ' 2 
Theodore is not only concerned with the full humanity of Christ, but 
1" For a more extensive treatment of these two schools see Kelly, pp. 
153-158; 301-302. Also R. V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christolo ies, 
(London: SPCK; 1954). R. V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon, 
(London: SPCK, 1961)q pp. 132-181. 
2. Theodore of Mopsuestia, Hom. Catech. V-'99 ed. R. 'Tonnieau, 
Studi e Testi, 145 (Vatican City, 1949), pp. 111f.. Trans. Norris, 
p. 150. 
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also with upholding the immutability of the Logos as God. In order to 
close all the openings to an Arian denial of the Logos' divinity, 
Theodore will stress the distinction and completeness of the natures 
against Apollinarianism. In this way. he will not only guarantee that 
Christ is really a man; body and soul, intellect and will, for soterio- 
logical and anthropological reasons; but also that the Logos remains 
immutable and impassible and thus truly God. As Grillmeier states: 
'Theodore is always moved by one concern: to deprive the Arians-of any 
occasion of violating the divine transcendence.... he is always concerned 
not to confuse the Godhead with the creature. 
" 
Flowing from his Aristotelian background, Theodore understands 
'nature' (physis), to mean a concrete reality of a specific kind. Thus 
'human nature' is not just a general abstract term specifying what. is 
common to all men, but an individual concrete human being. Likewise, 
'divine nature' refers to the individual reality of the Logos. It must 
be stressed that Theodore is not just maintaining the fact that Christ's 
humanity is real as opposed to illusionary against the Docetists, nor 
just complete against the Arians and Apollinarians. Rather, Theodore's 
concept of 'human nature' when applied to Christ also has the note of 
metaphysical oneness as a being in its own right. Thus Theodore can ask: 
'How is it not plain that the divine Scripture, clearly teaches us that 
God the Word is one thing, and the man another, and that it shows us 
the difference between them? '2 Theodore can clearly speak of 'the man, ' 
'the assumed man, ' and 'the man Jesus, ' as opposed to 'the Logos, ' 
'the one who assumes, ' 'the Son of God. '3 
It would seem that because of Theodore's understanding of the natures 
as distinct realities in themselves, he must see the incarnational union 
as moral or accidental. However, he did not wish this to be the case. 
1. Grillneier, p. 341. Cf. Francis A Sullivan, The Christoloky 
of Theodore of Yopsuestia 
(Roma: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1956), 
pp. 197-202. ' 
2. Theodore of Mopsuestia, In Ps. viii, 5, ed. R. Devreesse; Studi 
e Testi, 93 (Vatican City: 1939), P. 46" Trans. Norris, p. 199. 
3. The separate realities of 'the Man' and 'the Logos' is so great 
for Theodore that 'the Man' can speak of - and to the Logos in 
the second'and third person. For exanple, see'Theodore of 
Mopsuestia, In Ev. Jo. xii, 30, ed. J. M. Vost6, Cornue Scriptorurn 
Christianorum Orientalium Scri tores S i, Series IV, vol. 3 
Versio , 
(Louvain: 1940), p. 174. Trans. Norris, p. 200. 
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'He became man, they [Nicea] said, And it'was not through a 
simple providence that he'lowered himself, nor was it through 
the gift of powerful help, as he has done so often and still 
(does). Rather did he take our very nature, he clothed himself 
with it and dwelt in it so as to make it perfect through 
sufferings; and he united himself with it. ' 1 
One can discern that Theodore did not wish to maintain an accidental or 
moral union from his opening denials and that, he wishes to uphold a real 
union through the concepts of 'take, ' 'clothe, ' and 'dwell. ' Nevertheless, 
it is assured that Theodore did not understand the Incarnation in any 
Arian or Apollinarian sense. 
Commenting on John's Prologue Theodore states: 
"'And the Word was made flesh. " He used this phrase in a very 
striking way.... Since this was, in point of fact, the opinion of 
those who saw Him - because He existed in such a humble way in 
man that this alone was believed by many, just as he appeared -- 
so to explain the phrase was added: "and He tabernacled among us. " 
And it must be noted that Scripture uses the word "flesh" to 
designate the whole man .... And so in the present passage when it 
says "The Word became flesh, " it means "The Word came to be in 
man. " But "became" is not used as though he were changed, but 
it was believed so on account of the appearance. ' 2 
It is obvious that Theodore's commentary is motivated by one thought: 
the Logos must remain immutable and unchanged in the act of incarnating 
himself. For Theodore 'become' always means 'change into. ' Thus, 
while it may a near to many that the Logos 'became' 
(i. es change into) 
man, in actual fact he did not. Theodore in saying that the Word 
'appeared' to become man is in no way denying a real incarnation or 
union. He is not saying that the Word only appeared to be man, but 
really was not, as Sullivan seems to imply. 
3 
Theodore holds that the 
Logos 'in reality' and 'not in appearance' took flesh. 
4 
Thus Theodore's 
use of 'appearance' is not a positive statement concerning the union, 
but only a denial of change in the Logos. 'So then, we find no other 





Theodore of Mopsuestia, Höm. Catech. vii, 1 (Tonneau, p. 161). 
Trans. Grillmeier, p. 348. 
Theodore of Mopsuestia, In Ev. Jo. (Voste, p. 23). Trans. Rowan 
Greer, Theodore of"Mo suestia: Exe ete and Theologian, (London: 
Faith Press, '1961 , p. 139. 
Cf. Sullivan, p. 230. 
Theodore of Mopsuestia, De Incarn. as quoted by Leontius, Prag. 8, 
P. G. 66,981o-d. Trans. Sullivan, pp. 231-232. 
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appearance... and when it says "become" then it means it according to 
appearance; for (the Word) was not changed into flesh. 
" 
While Theodore's positive understanding of the union does not directly 
pertain to this study, its effects on the passibility of the Logos as 
man does. Briefly stated Theodore understands the indwelling of the Logos 
in the Homo Assumptus as taking place 'by good pleasure, and by "good 
pleasure" is meant the best and noblest will of God which he exercises 
when pleased with those who have been zealous to be dedicated to him,,., 
/2 
Moreover, the indwelling by good pleasure of the Logos"in the Homo 
Assumntus is not like that in 'apostles or just men.... for never would 
we rave -- but so as in a son. ' For the Logos to indwell 'as in son' 
means 'that in coming to indwell, he united the assumed (man) as a whole 
to himself, and made him share with him in all dignity in which he who 
indwells, being Son by nature, participates: so as to be counted one 
prosonon according to the union with him. '3 This prosopon however is 
not the Logos, nor for that matter, the Homo Assuniptus, but rather a 
'common Qrosopon' brought about as an effect and consequence of the union. 
'For when we distinguish the natures, we say that the nature of 
God the Word is complete, and that his prosopon is complete (for 
it is not correct to speak of an hypostasis without its trosooon); 
and (we say) also that the nature of the man is complete, and 
likewise (his) prosoron. But when we look to the conjunction, then 
we say one prosopon. ' 4 
While Theodore then can clearly speak of Christ being one person in 
two natures, it is evident that he is not near Chalcedon's understanding. 
The common yrosoron has no metaphysical or ontological content. It is 
not a 'who' in itself, but rather a phenomenal representation brought 
about by the closeness of the two natures. Thus in no real sense can 
one say 'God became man' or that 'God is man. ' This is clearly seen 
in Theodore's understanding of the communication of idioms. 
Theodore's understanding of the natures as well as the union not 
10 Ibid., Trans. Greer, p. 55- 
2. H. B. Swete, 'Theodore isco i Mo su'stenii Eistola B. Pauli' 
Cömmentarii, (Cambridge, 1882)9 Vol. 2, p. 294. Trans. Norris, 
p. 219. 
3. Ibid., p. 295. Trans. Norris, p. 221. 
4. Ibid., p. 299. Trans. Norris, p. 229. 
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only allows him to uphold the immutability of the Logos in 'becoming' 
man, but also his impassibility. Being an ontological entity. in itself 
the human nature, the Man, becomes a subject in its own right. Thus 
the human experiences, of Christ are not predicated of the Logos, but 
of the Homo Assumptus. Theodore was well aware of this and in his exegesis 
went to great lengths to ensure this. The Homo Assumptus must be the 
subject precisely because Theodore wished to main the impassibility of 
the Logos in himself against the Apollinarians. Thus in no real sense 
does Theodore allow such statements as 'God suffered, ' or 'God. died. ' 
He only allows a mitigated form of the communication of idioms. The 
nroroson of the union allows him to refer the two sets of predicates to 
the 'one Son, ' or 'Lord, ' but this is only due to the fact that the 
natures are seen as one because of the conjunction. The nrosoron to 
which the predicates refer is neither the Logos nor 'the man' but 
rather a linguistic and grammaticaly contrivance 'to emphasize the con- 
junction between them. ' 
1 
While, Theodore is not a Nestorian before Nestorius and did not wish 
to be one, it is easy to see that because of his Antiochene background 
and his zealous defence of the immutability and impassibility of the 
Logos, he was forced in that direction. Theodore's major problem was 
that he could not think abstractly in metaphysical and ontological 
categories. He did the best he could with descriptive pictorial images 
that had a biblical basis, but at the hands of a less cautious thinker 
the tensions in Theodore's Christology could very easily break into 
the open. 
2 Nestorius was such a thinker. 
Turning to Nestorius one finds basically the same type of Christology. 
However, because of the controversy with Cyril, all the Antiochene pre- 
suppositions and difficulties reveal themselves more clearly; and thus 
the role of the Logos' immutability and impassibility is more easily 
studied. With Nestorius the full implications of the Nicean homoousion 
doctrine come fully into focus on the two Christological levels concerning 
the immutability and impassibility of Christ. If the Logos is homoousion 
1. Sullivan, p. 264. Cf. Greer, pp. 62-63,146f. Also Norris, 
pp. 228-233. 
2. Greer sees the whole of Theodore's Christology worked out in 
biblical 'pictorial Semitic images. ' p. 65. 
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with the Father and thus immutable, in What manner was he 'incarnate 
and made man? ' And if he is impassible, in what manner was he passible 
in that he 'was born of the Virgin. Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, 
was crucified, died and was buried. ' It is no longer a question of, 
whether the Logos is fully God nor whether the humanity is complete, 
but rather the question centres on the union and relationship between 
the two. The question concerns the Incarnation itself. Thus the Logos/ 
Sarx vs. the Logos/Anthropos question is now superseded by concern over 
the nature of the unity and distinction in Christ. Within this discussion 
the concepts of immutability and impassibility played a major role. 
While Theotokos is a title given to Mary, its Christological 
significance is radically apparent. To say 'Mary is the Mother of God' 
not only states who Mary is, but primarily and more importantly, it - 
states something about her son. If Mary is the Mother of God, then, to 
state the obvious, her son is God. While this may be obvious, the truth 
and meaning of such a simple logical conclusion demands distinctions 
and justifications, which up to this point in-the Christological 
development, no, theologian has fully rendered. With the fall of 
Apollinarianism, one could ask if any justification was possible. 
Such a question was put to Nestorius. 
1 
While Nestorius judged Theotokos to be inappropriate and Christkos 
to be much more precise and theologically sound, his major concern was 
much broader than one individual title. 
2 For Nestorius Theotokos was 
but one example of a whole kind and type of statement which exemplified 
a false understanding of the Incarnation. To say 'God was born, ' or 
'God suffered, died. and rose, ' not only implied that the-Logos was 
passible in himself, but that he changed in becoming man. The whole 
of Nestorius' Christology then is articulated to uphold the integrity 
and distinction of the humanity and divinity, and thus the immutability 
and impassibility or the Logos. This can be seen not only in, his 
attack on the Arian, Apollinarian, and Cyrilian Christologies, but also 
1. Nestorius did not initiate the controversy over the appropriateness 
of the Theotokos title, but was asked'to make a judgement on it as 
Bishop of Constantinople. Cf. ' Loofs, Nestoriäna, (Halle: 1905), 
p. 185 (ED. 'ad Joann. Antioch., December, 430). See also Tra oedia 
(Nestoriana, 230). Also Liber Heracleidis, p. 99. The references 
and translation of the Liber Heracleidis used here are from G. R. 
Driver -- L. Hodgson, The Bazaar of Heracleidis (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1925)" 
2. Nestorius' initial condemnations appear in Ep. ad Caelest. 1: 3, 
ad Schol. Eunuch., and Serra. 1 (Loofs, Nestoriana, 167; 181f.; 
191; and 252. 
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saying that the union with flesh resulted in one nature.... even 
as the soul and the body are bound (together) in one nature 
in the body, suffering of necessity, whether he will or not, 
the sufferings of the nature which he took upon himself, as 
though he was not of the nature of the Father impassible and 
without needs.... : he hungered and thirsted and grew weary and 
feared and fled and died; and in short they say that he 
naturally endured whatever appertained to the sensible nature 
which he assumed. ' 1 
However, it was not only the Arians who understood the union in such 
a way. While the Apollinarians wished to maintain that the Logos did 
not change in becoming man they also 'incline towards the Arians in saying 
that the union resulted in one nature, not by change of ousia but by 
combination and natural composition, as soul and body are combined in 
one nature.... that which each one of them by its nature cannot accept, 
such as the sufferings and the activity, it has accepted in the natural 
combination by mixture, by one sensibility. '2 
In the end the Apollinarians are 
'compelled to join either the Arians or Manichaeans in such a way 
as to admit either that he suffered not naturally any of these 
things but only in illusion and fiction [Manichaean position]. 
Or, by granting that in nature naturally, by a passible sensibility, 
he accepted sufferings, you evacuate him of impassibility and of 
immortality, and of being consubstantial with the Father, because 
he acquired a change of nature, seeing that (the Son) accepts and 
(the Father) accepts not (these sufferings). ' 3 
Nestorius rightly condemns the Arians and the Apollinarians. He 
understands well that their organic and physical union demands that the 
Logos change in becoming man and that as man, since he possesses no human 
soul, he is the direct subject and seat of all human attributes and 
predicates. Thus he is on safe ground when he condemns their use of the 
communication of idioms. 
The heart of Nestorius' critique of the Arians and Apollinarians 
lies in his realization that the concept of 'become' cannot mean 'change 




Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides, pp. 8-9. It should be noted 
that while The Bazaar is a post-Ephesian document, it will nevertheless 
be the source used here in presenting Nestorius' thought since there 
is no major development in his thought after the Council of Ephesus. 
Moreover it is less inflammatory and polemical than some of his earlier 
statements and thus his true thought is more easily discernible. 
Cf. Grillmeier, p. 452. Also Kelly, p. 312. 
Nestorius, pp. 33-34. 
Ibid., p. 39. 
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astutely perceives that this notion of 'become' is not only metaphysically 
impossible for God as well as man, but even if it were possible it would 
render the Incarnation unintelligible and meaningless. As Nestorius 
states: 
'He indeed who changes the divine nature into human nature brings 
about its suppression, and he who changes human nature into the 
divine makes mock of it and makes of it a nature unmade, in 
declaring a nature (which is) made unmade, which cannot be.... 
It is not possible that the unmade (should become) made and the 
eternal temporary and the temporary external and that the created 
(should become) uncreated by nature.... For how can anyone 
conceive that the Maker, seeing that he is in every way other 
than that which is made, should change into his being the other 
which has been made?.... In effect either he is what he is by 
nature, eternally god, and became not another nature while 
remaining in the ousia of God; or not being the nature of God, 
he was made and is not the Maker, which is absurd and impossible. 
' 
What Nestorius is saying is the simple truth that God is what he is 
and cannot change himself into something other than he is. Containing 
all perfection God is immutably and unchangeably himself for all eternity. 
Even to conceive 'God' as potentially changeable reveals that the being 
so conceived is not really God. For God to change into another demands 
that he ceases to be God, but God cannot cease to be; therefore he cannot 
change into another. Likewise, the human nature cannot change into God 
without ceasing to be a human nature. Unlike God, material beings can 
change into other material beings but in so doing they no longer are 
what they were but that which they have changed into. Nevertheless, it 
is metaphysically impossible for a created material being to change into 
God. Thus the Creator cannot change into a creature, nor a creature 
into the Creator. 
Even if one allowed such a change to take place, one could still 
not speak intelligently of the Incarnation. For Nestorius those who 
confess one nature in Christ must understand him neither to be God nor 
man but a tertium quid being combining the properties of both. 
'You do not confess that he is God in ousia in that you have 
changed him into the ousia of the flesh, and he is no more a man 
naturally in that you have made him the ousia of God; and he is 
not God truly or God by nature, nor yet man truly and man by 
nature. ' 2 
1. Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
2. Ibid., p. 16. 
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Nestorius clearly perceives that to see the concept of 'become' as 
meaning 'change into, ' by mixture or confusion, that is, the Logos and 
the humanity forming one nature (in his understanding of nature), destroys 
the real meaning of the Incarnation. God is not man since both the Logos 
and humanity have ceased being what they were. 'He indeed who by a 
change of ousia becomes man is of another nature and not of the nature 
of man, in that he has another description of nature and not that of 
man.... '' In other words the Logos must be immutable and unchangeable 
in becoming man not only because he is God, but also because he is man, 
for the sake of the Incarnation. If the Logos changes in becoming man, 
he ceases to be God; and thus one cannot truly say that God is man, or 
that God became incarnate. On the same token one must maintain the 
Logos' immutability if one is to say that God became and is man. To 
see a change in the Logos by way of mixture or confusion in becoming man 
not only destroys the fact that it is God who is man, but also the fact 
that it is man he has become. This is so since the terminal effect of 
the change in the Logos in his becoming man resides in the human nature, 
thus causing it to change as well. 
What one sees then in Nestorius is a threefold argument for the 
Logos' immutability. Firstly, the Logos must be immutable because he 
is God and God cannot cease being God. Secondly, he must be immutable 
because of the Incarnation, i. e., if God changes in becoming man, he 
who is 'man' is no longer God but that which he has changed into. 
Thirdly, the Logos must be immutable for the sake of the humanity, 
i. e. a change in the Logos in becoming man effects a change in the 
humanity as well; and thus one cannot speak of a true human nature or 
manhood. God may appear to become man, but not really since the manhood 
is changed. For Nestorius then it is impossible to see the Incarnation 
as forming one nature: 
'For human nature is definite, and (the things) which he 
possesses who is man in ousia and in nature ought to be his 
(Logos') who comes to be in the nature of man neither more or 
less; ... Either then 
(he became) man in such a way that the union 
of God the Word with the body and soul took place not with the 
view to (forming) one nature but in order to serve for the 
1. Ibid., p. 22. 
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dispensation on our behalf, or he had the (properties) of 
another nature apart from that of man and of God, which is an 
animate body and God the Word which nature is neither that 
of a man nor that of God, but a new nature, to which belongs 
something of all our natures. ' 1 
Flowing from the above, it is easy to see why Nestorius is so adamant 
against the communication of idioms. Because of his understanding of 
ousia, the communication of idioms as traditionally used not only meant 
that the Logos in his ousia as God was born, grew, suffered, etc., but 
also implied a false notion of the Incarnation. The Arians and Apollinarians 
could predicate human attributes of the Logos because they saw the 
Incarnation as the ousia of the Logos changing into the ousia of the 
manhood by mixture or confusion forming one new tertium quid ousia. 
Nestorius is correct that their understanding of the Incarnation forced 
them either to admit that the Logos was passible and corruptible, and 
thus not God; or to deny the reality of the human nature with all the 
human attributes, and thus not man. As Nestorius states: 'One ought 
neither to be an Arian nor a Manichaean, according to whom the Incarnation 
took place in schema or in the nature of God the Word and (who: Arians) 
refer all things to him in their doctrine; the manner of life and the 
sufferings and the death. '2 To uphold and maintain the integrity of 
each nature, that Christ is really God and man, and thus a true under- 
standing of Incarnation, Nestorius believed that the attributes of each 
nature must be predicated only of the respective nature and not of 
the other. For Nestorius there is no distinction, as found in Athanasius, 
between the Logos in himself and as man. It is at this point that 
Nestorius' Christology begins to show its weakness. While Nestorius' 
understanding of the concept of 'nature' as a distinct individual 
reality helped him to criticize the Arian and Apollinarian errors and 
provided him with a conceptual tool to say what the Incarnation is 
not, when it came to expressing what the Incarnation is, his concept 
of nature drove him headlong into a Christological cul de sac. 
Nestorius did not wish the union between the divine and human 
natures to be moral. He did not wish to be a Nestorian and accused 
Cyril of calumny for saying that he was. 
3 He realized that there must 
1. Ibid., p. 36. Cf. pp. 181-182. 
2. Ibid., p. 184. Cf. pp. 91-95- 
3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 44-45,189,196. 
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be a substantial union between the two. However, working from within 
his framework, it seems impossible for him to do so. 
Following the lead of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius sees the 
union between the divine and human natures as prosopic. That is, 
the union is such that it brings about a common prosopon of union. 
The common prosopon of union is the result and consequence of the union 
and not the union itself. The union which brings about the common 
nrosopon is 'through the compensation of the urosopa and through the 
mutual interpenetration or perichoresis of these rrosona. '1 
Through the compensation of the iarosopa of the natures the proso-pon 
of union comes into being and the Incarnation takes place. Taking his 
starting point from Phillinians 2, Nestorius stated that 'the likeness 
of a servant which was taken should become the likeness of God and God 
the likeness of a servant and that the one should become the other 
and the other the one in prosopon, the one and the other remaining in 
their natures. '2 The Logos then 'made use of the likeness and of the 
prosonon of a servant, not the ousia nor nature, in auch wise that he 
was by nature in them both, as being Christ. '3 Remembering that prosopon 
is the appearance of the ousia, Nestorius then understands the Incarnation 
to be the appearance of the Logos humbling himself and taking the 
appearance of Man; thus the appearance of Man is exhalted becoming the 
appearance of God; and the union of the two appearances form a common 
appearance, the nrosonon, of union. 
4 
'In the prosopa of the union, the one in the other, neither 
by diminution nor by suppression nor by confusion is this "one" 
conceived, but by taking and giving and by the use of the 
union of the one with the other, the prosopa take and give one 
another but not the ousia. The one we conceive as the other 5 
and the other as the one, while the one and the other abide. ' 
The mutual taking and giving of the two rp osopa of the natures brings 
about the union forming the common Prosovon--Christ. 
Nestorius does not stop here but attempts to bring the union of 
1. Grillmeier, p. 442. 
2. Nestorius, p. 183. 
3. Ibid., p. 147. 
4. Cf. Ibid., p. 246. 
5. Ibid., p. 252. Cf. p. 233. 
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the natures even closer through the compenetration and perichoresis 
of the two rp osopa. 'Confess then the taker as he took and the taken 
as he was taken, wherein (each is) in another, wherein (there is) one 
and not two, after the same manner of the Trinity. '1 As the peri- 
choresis of the persons in the Trinity form one God'so the perichoresis 
of the two nrosona form one Christ. It is evident then that Nestorius 
wishes to express a substantial union. While the natures are distinct 
the prosopa are not. 'We understand neither that which took nor that 
which was taken in distinction but that which was taken in that which 
took-' 
2 
Flowing from Nestorius' understanding of the Incarnation, it is not 
difficult to see why he insists that Christ is the subject of all 
predicates and not the Logos. Nestorius feels that Nicea supports him. 
The Council Fathers did not predicate the human attributes to the Logos, 
but to 'Jesus Christ' the common Arosopon of union. 
3 
However, has Nestorius then conceived a true substantial union? 
Has he explicated the true nature of the Incarnation? Is the Nestorian 
Christ: God-become-man? At first sight, it may seen that Nestorius 
has even gone too far and unwittingly become a Monophysite with the 
compenetration of the prosopa. However, there is really no fear of that 
for Nestorius has in no way united the natures by compenetration, but 
only the prosopa, the complex of properties of each nature. It is here 
where the crux lies. Christ as the common prosonon has no ontological 
depth, but is the mere phenomenal representation of the interplay 
between the two natures. One might say that Nestorius is a phenomeno- 
logical Monophysite. Only the appearances are fused together as one, 
not the ousias. Christ is not a being in himself. He does not exist 
as a person or reality in and of himself, 'but owing to the concourse 
of the union of the divinity and humanity there came into being one 
Christ. '4 For Nestorius Christ is the 'sum of two natures and sees 
these in turn merely as a collection of'qualitative expressions. 'S 
The Logos qua Logos with its prosoron (complex of qualities) is an 
1. Ibid., p. 207- 
2. Ibid., p. 208. Cf. pp. 218-219,241- 
3- Cf. Ibid., pp. 141-150. 
4. Ibid., p. 144- 
5- Grillmeier, p. 377. 
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ousia, an existing ontological reality. The manhood qua manhood with 
its prosopon (complex of qualities) is an ousia, an existing ontological 
reality. However, Christ qua Christ is not an ousia; and thus he is 
not an existing ontological reality, but a phenomenological conglomeration 
of divine and human qualities. Christ is not God become man nor the 
Logos incarnate, but rather 'he' functions as the external manifestation 
and representation of the relation which exists between the human and 
divine natures. In the end one must admit there is only a moral union 
between God and man. 
Nestorius in delineating the positive content of his Christology 
makes two mistakes which are pertinent to this study. 
The first mistake is that Nestorius 'does not fully see the meta- 
physical structure of the word "Christ". As the above demonstrates 
Christ is not a being or reality in his own right. This is due to the 
fact that while Nestorius realized that the Logos must be immutable not 
only because he is God, but also because he must remain immutable if one 
is to say that it is God who 'became' man; i. e., for the sake of the 
Incarnation, he was never able to grasp the metaphysical and ontological 
complexion of the concept 'become. ' The concept 'become' for Nestorius 
lacks any note of substantiality, but only came to mean combine, join, 
or concur. He never grasped that the act of God becoming man terminated 
with the fact that God is man. Thus he is never able to comprehend the 
ontological nature of Christ's own personality. This is why he 
ultimately rejects the communication of idioms, and gives a faulty 
interpretation to Nicea. In order to say and understand that Mary is 
the Mother of God, or that God is born, hungers, suffers, etc., one 
must grasp the metaphysical nature of these statements: God ontologically 
became man, and Christ is the Logos incarnate. The Nicene Fathers 
intuitively realized that Christ as the Logos incarnate was ontologically 
one, and thus they could proclaim, with no hesitation, not only that 
'Jesus Christ' was homoousion with the Father, but also born, died and 
Was buried. As God the Logos was immutable and impassible, but as man 
he was mutable and passible. Nestorius never saw this, but always saw 
Christ as a phenomenological construct upon which one can hang divine 
and human qualities. As Kelly states: 
1. Ibid. 
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'All that it [common prosopon] in fact amounted to was the 
truism that Jesus Christ.... was a single object of presentation.... 
The real problem, however, especially for one who set the 
independence and completeness of the natures so much in the 
foreground, was to explain what constitutes His person, the meta- 
physical subject of His being, and this Nestorius' theory 
hardly touched. ' 1 
But why was Nestorius not able to grasp the true nature of the 
Incarnation and the true personality of Christ? It was partially due to 
his fear of Apollinarianism. Above all else he did not want a union in 
which the integrity of the natures was jeopardized and thus the 
Incarnation itself. He also knew that Arius' and Apollinarius' under- 
standing of 'become' always contained the note of 'change into. ' 
Nestorius himself could not see any way in which 'become' could have 
ontological depth without at the same time meaning 'change into. ' Thus 
he was forced to seek an understanding of the unity which would uphold 
the integrity of the natures, and yet be substantial. As has been seen, 
he failed in his search. 
However, the reason he failed and ultimately the reason why he never 
understood the ontological nature of the Incarnation lies in his under- 
standing of the concept 'nature. ' Nature for Nestorius is not a 
generic, universal, or abstract term, but an individual specific thing 
as such. Nature (ousia) was a concrete individual reality or being in 
itself. Philosophically there is nothing inherently wrong in this. 
Fido has one individual canine nature as opposed to the individual 
nature of another dog. God is one kind of nature and man another. 
However, when it comes to Christ, a difficulty does arise since he is 
said to have two, and yet be one being or reality. If one sees and 
understands the divine and human natures existing separately prior to 
the 'Incarnation, ' the only modes of union possible are either some sort 
of moral union or a substantial union in which the natures change in 
the uniting. There is no fear of the latter in Nestorius. There also 
seems to be no hint of the former either. It is obvious that Nestorius 
did not see the human nature existing chronologically prior to the 
union. The Logos did not adopt an already existing man. For Nestorius 
the union of the divine and human natures took place at conception. 
2 
1. Kelly, p. 317. 
2. Cf. Nestorius, p. 60. 
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However, while the human nature for Nestorius did not exist chronologi- 
cally or existentially prior to the union, it did exist conceptually 
and logically prior to the union, that is, in the mind of Nestorius. 
Thus he always conceived and thought of the Incarnation as two individual 
realities coming together. The human nature, as conceptually conceived 
by him)was already individuated prior to the union. The incarnational 
act was not understood as the Logos bringing into being, individuating 
and uniting to himself a human nature, and thus becoming man; but rather 
the uniting of two individual natures one of which eternally existed 
and the other, while not existentially existing prior to the union, was 
conceptually conceived to be an individual reality in itself logically 
prior to the union. Nestorius' mistake was not one of faith, but one 
of conceptual understanding. Because he conceived the human nature to 
be individual prior to the union, he could never see how they could be 
substantially and ontologically united without in some way causing 
substantial change in each. Thus, while Nestorius did not wish to have 
a moral union, he had no other option open to him since, above all, he 
wanted to uphold the integrity of the natures. 
C. Cyril of Alexandria 
The failure of Nestorius to account for a-substantial union in Christ 
and thus a true incarnation lay in the fact that he began with the natures 
distinct and individual, and then tried to put them together. However, 
as Prestige clearly states: 
'A permanently valid doctrine of Christ could only be forthcoming 
from men who somehow made the unity of His person the ultimate 
ground for their thought about the duality of His natures, taking 
their start from what is single, not trying to reduce two in- 
compatible concepts to identity. ' 1 
Until one grasped the fact that Christ is one ontological reality in 
himself and that the distinction of natures must be made within this one 
reality, one would never understand the true character of the Incarnation. 
Nestorius never obtained this insight. Cyril of Alexandria did. 
Above all else, Cyril wished to maintain that Christ is one; not 
1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 132. 
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1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 132. 
76 
just in appearance but in reality. 
'Yet how is it not obvious to all that the Only-Begotten being 
God by nature has been made man, not by connection simply 
considered as external or accidental, but by true union, in- 
effable and passing understanding. And thus he is conceived of 
as One and only, and everything said befits him and all will be 
said of one person. For the Incarnate Nature of the Word himself 
is after the union now conceived as one, just as will reasonably 
be conceived in regard to ourselves too, for man is really one, 
compounded of unlike things, soul I mean and body. But it is 
necessary now to notify that we say that the body united to God 
the Word is insouled with a reasonable soul. And I will for 
profit's sake add this too: other than the Word out of God is 
the flesh, in regard to its proper nature, other again essentially 
the nature of the Word itself. But even though the things are 
sundered in diverseness of nature, yet is Christ conceived of as 
one out of both, the Godhead and manhood have come together one 
to another in true union. ' 1 
'Whatever questions the above might raise, one thing is radically apparent: 
for Cyril Christ is one. 
What is not so obvious is exactly what Cyril means by Christ being 
one. To Nestorius and the Antiochenes it was all too obvious that-Cyril 
was an Apollinarian, or at least his understanding of the Incarnation 
and union was such that it demanded a change in the Logos and-in the 
humanity as well. In the above passage, for example, the Antiochenes 
would seize upon two phrases which they believed would prove their point. 
It contains first of all Cyril's celebrated or notorious mia Physis 
formula; and secondly, he speaks of 'one out of (ek)both. ' If one 
interprets these two phrases from a Nestorian understanding of 'nature; 4 
A Cyril obviously is a heretic. 
To-speak of 'one physis' could only mean to an Antiochene that the i)hysis of the 
Logos and the Physis of the manhood were united in such a way as to form 
a new tertium quid -physis which is Christ, thus changing the Logos and 
the manhood. Cyril's 'one out of both (natures)' was the key to their 
interpretation for it implied that he, like them, conceived the human 
nature to be an individual concrete reality logically prior to the union. 
Believing then that Cyril's understanding of 'nature' was the same as 
1. Cyril of Alexandria, C. Nest. 2: proema. All quotations from 
Cyril are from the English translation, Cyril of Alexandria, on 
the Incarnation A inst Nestorius. Libra of the Fathers, 
(oxford: James Parker and Co., 1881) unless otherwise noted. 
All following references are to Cyril unless otherwise noted. 
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theirs, it was only logical that they thought Cyril did what they 
rightly knew could not be done. Even though Cyril says he upholds 
the completeness of the natures, as the above passage exemplifies, 
and while he protests against any change in either, Nestorius attributes 
these statements to Cyril's confused and muddled mind. 
1 
While Cyril championed the mia physic formula against Nestorius 
because he thought it came from Athanasius (actually it is from 
Apollinaris), it is obvious that it could cause confusion, especially 
in the light of his unfortunate phrase 'one out of both. ' Nevertheless, 
it is possible to ascertain Cyril's true meaning. 
Part of the confusion lies in the fact that Cyril uses two variants 
of the mia Physis formula. In the more common formula, Cyril has the 
sesarkomene modify the mia thesis/hypostasis. At other times, however, 
it modifies the tou theou Logou. Thus one can have mia nhysis/hypostasis 
tou theou loarou sesarkomene or sesarkomenou. There may seem to be 
little difference in the two; however, what difference there is changes 
the emphasis and meaning of the formula. 
2 
Before explicating the difference it must be noted that for Cyril 
phvsis and hypostasis are complementary concepts; thus he feels free 
to interchange them. Physis (not only) means 'nature' or 'essence' 
as it did for Nestorius, but also contains the note of actuating or 
giving life. However, for physis to be actuated it needs hypostasis 
which expresses the notion of existential being or reality. Taken 
together they express the ontological or metaphysical make-up of one 
individual existing being or reality. 
3 Thus these concepts tend to 
express not only what something is: its essence or nature; but also 
who it is who is of such an essence or nature: the person. Thus when 
Cyril uses Physis/hyrostasis, he is speaking of one individual who is 
an ontological existing being or reality of a certain nature. However, 
depending on the context in which physis/hypostasis is used, the 
stress may be on one part of the total meaning rather than another. 
Proceeding now to the two renditions of the formula, Cyril in both 
1. Cf. Nestorius, Bazaar, p. 327- 
2. For examples of Cyril's use of and reference to the formula see 
Cyril of Alexandria, On the Incarnation against Nestorius, Library 
Qf tj= Fathersp. 41. n. C; p. 341, n. i. Also see Hubert du 
Manoir de Jauye, Dome et Sr, iritualite chez Saint Cyrille D'Alexandrie, 
(Paris: Vrin, 1944), PP. 124-141. 
3. Cf. Grillmeier, p. 410-411. 
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instances speaks of mia Physis/hypostasis tou theou logou. The 
meaning given to this depends on whether Cyril ends with sesarkomene 
or sesarkomenou. If he ends with sesarkomene, which then modifies the 
mia nhvsis, he is saying that Christ is the one nature (person) of 
God the Word incarnate. The sesarkomene specifies the mode or manner 
of existing of the physic tou theou logou. The one nature (person) of 
the Logos exists as incarnate, as man. (It is easy to see that 
Physis/hypostasis here tends to mean person in the Chalcedonian sense 
although Cyril does not fully come to this understanding. As will 
be seen the Chalcedonian understanding of person is more easily seen 
in Cyril's concept of the hypostatic union. )' However, when Cyril ends 
with sesaxkomenou, which then modifies the tou theou logou, he is 
saying that Christ is one phvsis/hvpostasis of the incarnate Word of 
God. He is stating that the Logos as incarnate forms or is one physic! 
hypostasis, one 'nature. ' The one ohvsis/hypostasis is the consequence 
of the union. This could be very close to, if not actually, Mono- 
physitism. If Cyril is Monophysite, then Nestorius is correct. The 
physic of God and physic of man cannot remain what they are if they 
form the one Phvsis of Christ. To understand what Cyril means in saying 
that the Logos as incarnate is one nature, it is necessary to see how 
he conceives the Incarnation. 
When Cyril professes that Christ is one sis of God the Logos 
incarnate (sesarkomene), above all else he is proclaiming that God 
really became man. The rhysis of the Logos is incarnate, is man. As 
he states Against Nestorius: 
'Shall we grant that the Word, God out of God, was incarnate, 
and say that he was made man? Or shall we allow this in no wise, 
but suppose that a man came hereto, connected with God, according 
to thee?.... If he was truly incarnate and has been made flesh, 
he is accredited as man, and not connected with a man, by mere 
indwelling or eternal relation or connection. ' 2 
For the Logos to truly become man, demands that Christ be one. 
'We say that the very Word essentially sprung forth from God the 
Father, was made as we and was incarnate and made man, that is, 
he took to himself a body from forth the holy Virgin, and made it 
1. Cf. Ibid. 
2. C. Nest. 1: 3. 
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his own: for thus will he be truly one Lord Jesus Christ, 
thus let us worship him as one, not putting apart man and 
God, but believing that he is one and the same, in Godhead 
and in manhood, that is God alike and man. ' 1 
The Logos who has been from all eternity homoousion with the Father 
'has been both sent and bath been made consubstantial with us, i. e., 
man. '2 Thus what one sees in Cyril is the notion of 'become' (once 
more) taking on an ontological complexion. For the Logos to become 
man, to incarnate himself, terminates in the fact that the Logos is 
man. Christ is God as man. Christ then is one ontological being in 
himself. The names Jesus, Emmanuel, Christ denote one reality, the one 
Physis of the Word of God incarnate. 
3 
It is now possible to grasp what Cyril means when he uses the 
genitive sesarkomenou modifying tou theou lorou. He is not so much 
giving or attributing to Christ one nature or essence in the sense of 
denoting one quiddity. He knows that Christ is not a composite 
tertium quid being: thus he is not using the formula in an Apollinarian 
or Monophysite sense. That Cyril is doing is making an ontological 
judgment concerning the being of Christ, rather than giving an essential 
definition of what Christ is. It is in the other variation of the formula 
that Cyril defines who Christ is--the one nature (person) of the Word 
incarnate (sesarkomene). For Cyril to say that Christ is 'one nature 
of the incarnate (sesarkomenou) Word of God' means that ontologically 
Christ is one being or reality in himself, and not that the nature 
or essence, the quiddity, of Christ is one. As Cyril states in a passage 
already quoted above: 
'The nature (h sis of the Incarnate Word himself (e autou tou 
lo ou sesarkemenou) is after the union now conceived as one 
mia , just as will reasonably be conceived in regard 
to ourselves 
too, for man is one, compounded of unlike things, soul I mean 
and body.... One out of both. ' 4 
It is also clear now what Cyril means by 'out of both. ' He is not 
using it in a Monophysite sense as Eutyches will; that is, out of two 
natures one composite tertium quid nature is formed. Rather, 'out of' 
1. Ibid., 2: proema. 
2. _, 3: 3. For further references to the fact that Christ is 
consubstantial with us see ibid. 3: 3,3: 5. 
3. Cf. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 1-3. 
4. C. Nest. 2: proema. 
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the humanity and divinity one being or reality comes to be. This is 
the whole point behind his use of the now 'ancient' analogy of the union 
of body and soul. Cyril uses the analogy to illustrate not that the 
divine and human natures form a new composite nature such as manhood, 
but rather to show only that as the body and soul form the one reality 
of man, so the divine and human natures form the one individual 
reality of Christ. 
1 
Cyril wishes this same point to be made when he refers to the union 
as 'natural' or 'according to nature. ' The union is 'natural' in the 
sense that it results in one ontological being. Again as the union of 
body and soul is 'natural' forming the one reality of man, so the union 
of divinity and humanity is 'natural' forming the one reality of Christ. 
2 
Cyril's use of phvsis/hypostasis and 'natural' in the above des- 
cribed sense can obviously cause a great deal of confusion and ambiguity 
not only for Nestorius, but also for the Alexandrians who come after 
him. Eutyches and the Monophysites will interpret the above use of the 
mia rhvsis not as one ontological reality, but as one nature, one 
quiddity. Nevertheless, the point that Cyril is trying to make is 
legitimate and true. Christ is one being in himself. The 'becoming' 
must be such that Christ as the Logos incarnate is ontologically one. 
The inevitable question now arises: How can Christ be ontologically 
one? How can the-Logos ontologically become man without changing 
either himself or the manhood he has become? It does no good to say 
1. For examples of Cyril's use of the body/soul analogy cf., Scholia de 
Incarn. Unigen. 8 and 27. Cyril is aided in his use of the body soul 
analogy since he has a Platonic understanding of the union between 
the two. In Platonic thought while the union between the two form 
one being (man), yet the soul is complete and entire in itself and 
maintains its unchanging integrity even in the union with the body. 
Thus for Cyril as the soul forms one reality in union with the body, 
and yet remain unchanged; so the Logos forms one reality with his 
manhood, and yet remains unchanged. 
2. For examples of Cyril's use of 'natural union' see C. Nest. 2: 1 and 
13, also ER. 45 ad Succens. 1, also Ep. ad Nest. 3 and appended 
3rd Anath. Trans. of the last two references see The Seven 
Ecumenical Councils, ed. H. R. Percival, Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 14, (Oxford: James Parker & Co., 
1900. All translations of Cyril's letters to Nestorius are 
taken from this volume. 
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that Christ is one if the one he is is neither God nor man. As 
Nestorius knew so well, his oneness must be such that he is both God 
and man or a true Incarnation has not occurred. 
Cyril insists throughout that the Logos does not change in becoming 
man. 
'God the Word full by nature and in every way perfect.... (is) in 
no wise wronged in his own proper nature, nor changed so as to 
become otherwise, nor made in ought inferior, for inconvertible 
and unchangeable is himself even as he who begot him.... But when 
he was made flesh, i. e. man, he made.... the poverty of the human 
nature his own.... in that he was once made man, albeit he 
remained God. ' 1 
It is 'unlearned and exceedingly unholy to think that it [become or 
was made] means change, rather (one must) strive to conceive of it in 
some other way, and to turn to wisdom to what most especially befits 
and is congruous to the unchangeable God. '2 While Christ is 
'one living thing, ' [nevertheless], 'as often.... as we hear that 
the Word was made Flesh, let us conceive of man made out of soul 
and body. But the Word being God was made perfect man .... Hence 
we say not by mutation or change has the Word of God been made 
man, nor yet that it recked not of being God (how could it be so? ) 
but that taking flesh of a woman and united to it from the womb, 
he proceeded forth the same, Man and God.... ' 3 
For Cyril the Logos must be immutable both because he is God, and 
because it is God who is man. Commenting on in. 1: 14 Cyril states: 
'For he (John) said that the Word was flesh, showing the force 
of the true union, i. e. understood as one "of person, " and by 
saying he "tabernacled among us, " he does not allow us to conceive 
that the Word who is from God by_nature passed into flesh which 
is of the earth. For one not thoroughly exact as to what the 
divine nature which surpasses everything generate is, might (I 
suppose) have deemed that it was haply recipient of change and 
could become regardless of its own essentially-accruing goods, 
and change .... into something other than what it is, and be brought 
down to the measure of the creation, subjected.... to changes and 
alterations. But that this is utterly impossible (for the nature 
of God is established and bath unshaken abidence in that where in 
it is), he (John) hath testified saying, that the "Word tabernacled 
among us, " albeit made flesh: both skillfully explaining the wisdom 
of the economy and guarding full well that the nature of the Word 
be not accused by any as though it had become flesh by change 
and turning aside. ' 4 
1. Scholia de Incarn. Uni en. 5- 
2. Quod onus sit Christus, trans. p. 241), (S. C. 718: a). 
3. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 27- 
4- C. Nest. 1: proema. Cf. ibid. 1: 8. 
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What one sees in the above quotations is Cyril echoing Nestorius' 
arguments presented earlier. The Logos must be immutable because he 
is God and for God to be God he must contain all perfection. Containing 
all perfection, it is impossible for him to acquire new perfection 
through change and alteration. Moreover, Cyril professes Nestorius' 
second argument for the immutability of the Logos, though not in quite 
so explicit a way. Cyril says that John added 'and tabernacled 
among us' to show that the Logos did not change in becoming man. What 
Cyril is pointing out is that if it is God who is man then he cannot 
change in so becoming. If he did then one can not say that it is God 
who is in our midst, who tabernacles among us, but rather that which 
he has changed into. While God can be in our midst only if he really 
becomes flesh, at the same time he must remain unchanged if it is 
really God who is in our midst. 
With the same force Cyril maintains that the manhood does not undergo 
change either in the Incarnation. Not only is it impossible for the 
flesh to change into the nature of God since what is created cannot 
become uncreated, but also, even if the flesh could and did change into 
the nature of God, then one could not say that God truly became and is 
man. 
' 'If his [Logos] flesh changed into the Nature of the Godhead, he 
ceased to be Son of 
2 
The humanity must remain unchanged for 
the same reason as the divinity: because it is God who is man. Neither 
will some sort of mixture do. 
'If they say that flesh has been commingled with the Word, there 
is every need of saying that each of the above mentioned leaves 
being what it was, and makes up of both some one intermediate 
thing, of a different nature full surely from what each was 
individually and as yet unmingled one with another. ' 3 
The heart of Cyril's Christology has now been reached. Cyril 
realises that for a true understanding of the Incarnation the 'becoming' 
must be such that it not only allows for the fact that God is man, that 
Christ, as one ontological being, is God incarnate; but he also realises 
1. Cf. Frag. C. Synous. (p. 367). This and following fragments are 
collected and translated in Cyril of Alexandria, On the Incarnation 
against Nestorius. Library of the Fathers. Page reference is to 
this volume. 
2. Ibid., p. 371 " Cf. ibid., (pp. 367,369,370). 
3. Ibid., 
(p. 
373 " Cf. C. Nest., 5: 4. 
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that for a true understanding of the Incarnation the 'becoming' must 
be such that God remains God in the 'becoming' if it is God who is man, 
and likewise, the manhood must remain unchanged if it is man that God 
has become. Patristic Christological'development has finally reached 
the ultimate question in Cyril. How does one conceive of such a 
notion of 'become, ' a notion of 'become' that guarantees that the Logos 
is man, that it is the Logos who is man, and that it is man that the 
Logos is? Has Cyril conceived 'become' in such a way that such a union 
is effected? 
From what Cyril says concerning the Incarnation and what he wishes 
to maintain as already delineated in the above study of his Christology, 
it is obvious that he at least wishes to understand 'become' and the 
ensuing union in such a way. However, he does not fully explicate the 
notion of 'become' that he knows must be necessary if one is to grasp 
a true understanding of the Incarnation. Nonetheless, one can determine 
how Cyril conceives 'become' not only from what he explicitly says 
about it, but also from the way he conceives the union effected by the 
'become. ' 
For Cyril, as has been seen, the same Logos, who exists from all 
eternity with the Father before the union, now, after the union, exists 
as man. 'The same even before the Incarnation was Son of God and Word 
of the Father, and after it hath become man as we and been made flesh. 
' 
The Logos exists as God 'before the ages.... at the end Man also.... '2 
It is the Logos 'who before the incarnation is called.... only-begotten, 
Word, God.... after the incarnation, man, Christ Jesus.... '3 
_ 
It is 
one and the same Logos 'who is homoousion with us in that he has been 
made man.... ' and yet he is also homoousion with'the Father himself, in 
that he remained God even in human nature.... '4 In a series of 






'Who is it who receives the servant's form which before it was 
free by nature, he is found to be man also who was not so, before 
he was so found when he was not? Who then is he that was rich 
by nature and abased himself into lowliness? Who the full, that 
he may be conceived as emptied? .... Who that not being aforetime 
man as we is said to be found? ' 5 
C. Nest. 2: 10. Cf. ibid., 2: 6: 
Fray'. C. Theod. Mops. (p. 338). 
Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 
C. Nest. 3: 3- 
Ibid. , 5: 2. 
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0 
The Incarnation for Cyril does not bring into existence a new person, 
but rather the Incarnation is the same person existing in a new way. 
To become incarnate then does not mean 'that the nature of the Word was 
changed and became flesh, or that it was converted into a whole man 
consisting of soul and body; but rather that the Word having personally 
united to himself flesh animated by a rational soul, did in an ineffable 
and inconceivable manner become man.... Thus 'the Word of God.... was 
made hypostatically onel"flesh.... '2 Christ is 'the one person of the 
Word of God incarnate; Christ is the Logos, God himself, existing as man. 
What one sees in the above is Cyril's attempt to define what it 
means for the Logos to become man, to become incarnate. 'Become' does 
not mean that the Logos is some way changes into man. The 'becoming' 
is not, what might be called, an essential becoming, i. e. the essence 
or nature of one being does not change into the essence or nature of 
another being. There is no exchange of quiddities. Neither what the 
Logos is (God) nor what he becomes (man) undergoes change. What 
'become' does mean is that the Logos takes on a new mode of existence. 
'To become man' means for Cyril 'to come to be man, ' and thus to exist 
as man. The incarnational 'becoming' is a personal/existential becoming, 
i. e. one and the same person comes to be, comes to exist in a new manner 
or mode. In the act of coming to be man the Logos brings into being 
(by the power of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary), individuates, 
and unites to himself a human nature, and thus comes to exist as man. 
The whole point of Cyril's emphasis on the pre- and post-incarnational 
status of the Logos and also his emphasis that it is one and the same 
Logos who is God and man is to highlight and make evident the fact 
that 'to become man' denotes not a change of nature, but a new manner 
of existence for the Logos. In understanding the Incarnation as the 
Logos personally or hypostatically uniting to himself a human nature, 
Cyril takes the 'becoming' out of the realm of natures changing from 
one thing to another thing and places the 'becoming' in the realm of 
personal existence. The person of the Logos existing as God in hypo- 
statically uniting to himself human nature comes to exist as man. 
'What the Logos is: God, and what the Logos becomes: man, in no way 
undergoes change. What is new is the manner in which the person of 
1. Ep. ad Nest. 2. 
2. Thid. 3. 
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the Logos exists. 
The whole tenor of the mia physis formula is such that it emphasises 
one fact: For the Logos to become man means that he Logos comes to be 
man, to exist as man. The sesarkomene does not denote any change in 
the Logos, but rather specifies in what manner the Logos is--as incarnate, 
as man. Paraphrasing Cyril's formula Sellers states: 'Jesus Christ 
the eternal Logos himself has become flesh, and that he is still one 
and the same person, though that same person now incarnate. 11 
Cyril's understanding of the incarnational act is a real Christo- 
logical breakthrough. In seeing the incarnational act as the Logos 
hypostatically uniting to himself a human nature and thus coming to exist 
and be man allows him to maintain both the proper oneness and duality in 
Christ. Christ is one and the same person of the Logos existing in two 
different modes: as God and as Man. The distinction between the natures 
(what the Logos is) is not made prior to or outside the incarnational 
act or the one reality of Christ as Nestorius would have it. Nor does 
the incarnational act, 'the becoming, ' abolish the distinction of 
natures. Rather the distinction is established in the incarnational 
act itself and maintained within the one being of Christ. The very act 
of the Logos coming to be man, which establishes that Christ is one 
being: the Logos incarnate, also establishes and maintains the dual 
distinction of natures, or dual modes in which the Logos exists: as God 
and as man. Thus for Cyril Christ is one person in two natures. Cyril 
logically and in truth can say: 'The very Word essentially sprung 
forth from God the Father, was made as we and as incarnate and made 
man.... He (Logos) is one and the same, in Godhead and in manhood, that 
is God alike and man. '2 
From Cyril's understanding of the Incarnation it is obvious why he 
attacked so vehemently Nestorius' denial of Theotokos. Since it is one 
and the same person who is God and man, it is only right and proper to 
understand that-the 'holy virgin brought forth corporally God made 
one with flesh.... for this reason we also call her Theotokos. 
3 Cyril 
in no way wants to imply that Mary was the Mother of God qua God, 
but rather because the Logos who is God is really man also, one must 
1. R. V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon, pp. 138-139. 
2. C. "Nest. 2: proema. 
3. EE. ad Nest. 3. Cf. C. Nest. 1: 1. 
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say that Mary is the Mother of God (qua man). As Cyril states: The 
Fathers called 
'the Holy Virgin Mother of God, not as if the nature of the 
Word or his divinity had its beginning from the Holy Virgin, 
but because of her was born that holy body with a rational 
soul, to which the Word being personally united is said to be 
born according to the flesh. ' 1 
Moreover it was not only the title Theotokos that interested Cyril, 
but like Nestorius, he was concerned with the whole question of the 
communication of idioms. Flowing from his understanding of who Christ 
is--the Logos incarnate, it was all too clear to Cyril that the Logos 
must be the subject of all divine and human attributes and predicates. 
'All the words in the Gospel are to be applied to one person, to one 
hypostasis of the Word Incarnate. For the Lord Jesus Christ is one, 
according to the Scriptures. '2 Cyril is able to justify this only because 
he has clarified the true understanding of what it means for the Logos 
to become man. 
Before proceeding however it must be pointed out that unlike 
Athanasius who was at least ambiguous about Christ's human soul, and 
unlike Apollinaris who denied it outright, Cyril not only affirms that 
Christ has a human soul, but also makes it an intricate part of what 
it means to be man. 
'He makes his own all that belongs, as to his own body, so to 
the soul, for he had, to be shown to be like us through every 
circumstance both physical and mental, and we consist of 
rational soul and body: and as there are times when in the 
incarnation he permitted his own flesh to experience its own 
affections, so again he permitted the soul to experience its 
proper affections, and he observed the scale of the emptying 
in every respect. ' 3 
For Cyril the flesh of Christ is 'animated by a rational soul' and thus, 
unlike Apollinaris, the humanity of Christ has its own natural principle 
of existence. 
4 Even though Cyril still understands the body/soul 
1. En. ad Nest. 2. Cf. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 28. 
2. Ei,. and Nest. 3. 
3. Cf. De Recta Fide, 176, C, D, (trans. Prestige, Fathers and 
Heretics, p. 166). 
4. ED. ad Nest. 2. Cf. Scholia de Incarn. Uni en. 8. 
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relationship in a Platonic sense, he nevertheless sees that the soul 
participates in the affairs of the body, and is the 'natural principle 
of suffering. ' 
1 
Because Cyril lets the human soul fulfil its function, he is not 
caught in the illogic of the Apollinarian Christology. As has been 
seen, because Apollinaris denied the human soul and saw the union of 
the Logos and flesh as substantial and dynamic, logic demanded either 
a denial of the divinity of the Logos in order to save the real human 
attributes, or a denial of the real human attributes to save the 
divinity of the Logos. Cyril's understanding of the true functioning 
of the soul escapes the Apollinarian dilemma. 
The above, however, is preliminary to Cyril's exposition of the 
manner in which human characteristics are attributed to the Logos. 
Following the above quotation on the birth of Christ, Cyril continues: 
'We say that he [ths Logos] suffered and rose again; not as 
if God the lord suffered in his own nature stripes, the piercing 
of the nails, or any other wounds, for the divine nature is 
incapable of suffering, inasmuch as it is incorporial, but 
since that which had become his own body in this way, he is 
also said to suffer for us.... In the same manner also we conceive 
respecting his dying.... ' 2 
What is important to grasp is that Cyril is not attributing human 
attributes such as suffering and death to the divine nature, but to the 
person of the Logos. To attribute human predicates to the divine 
nature implies not only that the Logos qua God is passible, but also 
that the Logos qua God in becoming man and existing as man changed. 
As was seen above, the person of the Logos came to be man, and thus is 
man without change or mutation. The union is in the person, it is 
hypostatic, and thus it not only guarantees that the Logos as God is 
immutable in becoming man, but also remains impassible in his divine 
nature even as man. Cyril brings this out in his somewhat paradoxical 
statement that the Logos 'suffers impassibly. ' 
'He [Logos] suffered without suffering.... If we should say 
that through conversion or mutation of his own nature info 
flesh, it would be in all ways necessary for us even against 
our will to confess that the hidden and divine nature was 
1. Ep. 46, ad Succens. 2, (Acta Conciliorium Oecurenicorum, I, 
T, 76,158: 13-18 . 
2. E- p. ad Nest. 2. 
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passible. But if he has remained unchanged albeit he has 
been made man as we, and it be a property of the heavenly 
nature that it cannot suffer, and the passible body has 
become his ovm through the union: He suffers when the body 
suffers, in that it is said to be his own body, he remains 
impassible in that it is truly his property to be unable 
to suffer. ' 1 
The point Cyril is making is that in the Incarnation the person 
of the Logos really came to be man; and thus as man he really undergoes 
all that pertains to man. However, it is only as man, in that manner 
or mode of existence, that the Logos is born, suffers, etc. precisely 
because the Logos came to be man and was not changed into man. One 
and the same person is also God, and in that manner or mode of existence 
he remains impassible. As Cyril states: 'He suffers humanly in the 
flesh as man, he is impassible divinely as God. '2 To say 'God suffers' 
simply means that God the Logos as man actually suffers. Thus 'Whoever 
shall not recognise that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, that 
he was crucified in the flesh and that likewise in that same flesh he 
tasted death, and that he became the first-born from the dead....: 
let him be anathema. 
3 
In conclusion, the difficulty so long ago articulated by Celsus 
is overcome by Cyril. For Celsus one either had to profess Docetism 
or a change in God. 
4 In Cyril's Christology it is possible to grasp 
that the Logos really did become man without changing his divinity. 
The Logos is God and is man. 
D. Ephesus and the Aftermath 
Ephesus was called upon to judge between Nestorius and Cyril. However, 
unlike Nicea and Constantinople I, it did not form a new creed. Never- 
theless, what it did do was important. Nestorius denied that Mary is 
the Mother of God, and in so doing implied that God did not really 
become man. Ephesus anathematised this and professed that Cyril's 
understanding of the Nicene Creed was the correct understanding. 
1. Scholia De Incarn. Unigen. 37, (pp. 232-233). 
2. Ibid., 36. 
3. Ep. ad Nest. 3, Anath. 12. 
4. Cf. Origen, C. Cels. 4: 18. 
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Ephesus proclaimed what Nicea proclaim: 
"'One and the same is the eternal Son of the Father and the 
Son of the Virgin Mary, born in time after the flesh; 
therefore she may rightly be called Mother of God. ".... 
This was the dogma of Ephesus.... Divine life with the Father, 
descent to the earth, incarnation and humanity must be 
predicated of one and the same subject, the Logos who is 
homoousios with the Father. ' 1 
It was Cyril's Second Letter to Nestorius, officially accepted 
by the Council of Ephesus, that demanded that Nicea should thus be 
understood. 
'The holy and great Synod (Nicea) therefore says, that the 
only begotten Son, born according to nature of God the Father, 
very God of very God.... came down, and was incarnate, and 
was made man, suffered and rose.... and ascended into heaven.... 
This expression, however, "the Word was made flesh, " can mean 
nothing else but that he partook of flesh and blood. like us; 
he made our body his own, and came forth man from woman, not 
casting off his existence as God, or his generation of God the 
Father, but even in taking to himself flesh remaining what 
he was.... therefore they (Fathers) venture to call the holy 
virgin, the Mother of God.... because of her was born that holy 
body with a rational soul, to which the Word being personally 
united is said to be born according to the Flesh. ' 2 
For Ephesus, as for Cyril, the primary reason for refuting Nestorius 
and attributing all to the one subject is the fact that God the Logos 
did not come into man, but that he truly came to be man and exist as 
man, while remaining God. Ephesus sanctioned Cyril's metaphysical 
intuition that Christ is one ontological being and that the distinction 
between who he is and the manner in which he is must be made within 
the one reality. Thus the Logos is properly the subject of all predicates 
which pertain to his two modes of existence. As Pelikan states: 
'In intent if not in all details the Fathers joined themselves 
to the position that "the Logos from God the Father was united 
to the flesh in a hypostatic way, and that with his own flesh 
he is the one Christ, the same one simultaneously God and Man. " 
It was wrong to assign some of the statements of Christ about 
himself, or those of the saints about him, to one or the other 
1. Grillmeier, p. 416. Cf. Pelikan, p. 261. 
2. Ei. ad Nest. 2. 
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hypostasis rather than to the single Christ. '1 
The Council of Ephesus did little however to bring about peace 
or unanimity in Christological thought. This was due to the fact that 
Ephesus did not go far enough in clarifying Christological concepts 
and terminology. Cyril not only maintained his ambiguous language, 
but his Third Letter to Nestorius with its Twelve Anathemas was also 
the catalyst for an intensification of the controversy. Nestorius 
and his followers felt sure that Cyril's Council of Ephesus was 
Apollinarian. 
2 
For Theodoret the major problem and concern is no longer over the 
human soul of Christ, but over the immutable and impassible nature of 
God. In his critical commentary on Cyril's anathemas Theodoret is 
motivated by one major concern: 
'All we who follow the words of the evangelists state that God 
the Word was not made flesh by nature, nor yet was changed into 
flesh, for the Divine is immutable and invariable-.... It is 
plain that,... the form of God was not changed into the form 
of a servant. ' [To speak of a hypostatic union with one 
hypostasis means that] 'there was a mixture of flesh and 
Godhead.... (and) mixture is of necessity followed by confusion 
and the confusion destroys the individuality of each nature. ' 3 
Thus it was not the Logos 'who suffered but the man assumed of us by God. '4 
The only step . tArd clarification and understanding was the 
shortlived peace brought about by the Formula Unionis of 433. The 
1. Pelikan, p. 261. Crowe states the same, 'The governing factor is 
simply the scriptural datum that the one who is eternal is the same 
one who is born temporally. And it is this what gave the hvoostatic 
union its meaning; the order was not the other way around. ' 
'Christology and Contemporary Philosophy, ' God, Jesus, Spirit, 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), P. 145- 
2. Cf. Theodoret of Cyrus, Ems. 150 ad Joannes Antiochi and Ems. 157, 
Relatio Orientalis Conciliabuli. Trans. Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. 3,2nd Ser., Theodoret Jerome, Gennadius, Rufinus, 
Oxford: James Parker and Co., 1892). All English quotations from 
Theodoret are from this volume unless otherwise stated. 
3. Theodoret, Reprehensio, 1 and 2, in Cyril of Alexandria, 
A ol. ctr. Theodoret. See also, 3,4,5,6,8,10. (ACO I, 1, 
6,107-146). 
4. Ibid., 12. 
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importance of this document lies not in any theological development, 
but rather in the clarification of theological terminology and concepts 
which would lead to Chalcedon's definition. Cyril and John of Antioch 
could agree that: 
'We confess, then)our Lord Jesus Christ the only-begotten Son 
of God, perfect God and perfect man, consisting of rational 
soul and body, begotten of the Father before the ages as to his 
Godhead, and on the last days the same, for us and for our 
salvation, of Mary the Virgin as to his manhood; the same 
homoousios with the Father as to his Godhead, and homoousios 
with us as to his manhood .... We confess the holy Virgin to be 
Theotokos because the divine Logos was incarnate and made 
man.... ' 1 
The breakthrough here was the recognition by Cyril of the true and 
clear distinction of natures with no confusion and mixture, and his 
willingness to lay aside his mia Physis formula. On the Antiochene's 
part they were willing to confess one and the same was God and man, 
and thus 'one Christ, One Son, One Lord. ' With this clarification both 
sides began to grasp the insights of the other. However, it must be 
pointed out that while the two sides could give assent to the wording 
of this document, and while they began to understand one another, it 
would be false to presume that each understood the Formula Unionis in 
exactly the same way. This is evident by the mere fact that it was 
only a short time later that Theodoret and Cyril were engaged once more 
in the controversy. 
With the death of Cyril (444) and the rise of the radical Alexandrians, 
Dioscorus and Eutyches, Theodoret once more takes up the attack in his 
three Dialogues called Eranistes in which he treats 'The Immutable, ' 
'The Unconfounded, ' and 'The Impassible. ' As Theodoret states: 
'For clearness' sake I will divide my book into three dialogues. 
The first will contain the contention that the Godhead of the 
only begotten Son is immutable. The second will by God's help 
show that the union of the Godhead and the manhood of the Lord 
Christ is without confusion. The third will contend for the 
impassibility of the divinity of our Saviour. ' 2 
1. Formula Unionis. Denziger-Schönmetzer, 271,272. Trans. 
Grillmeier, p. 432. The main architect of the Formula seems 
to be Theodoret of Cyrus. 
2. Theodoret, Eranistes, 1. 
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While Theodoret states very clearly the Antiochene position (far 
more clearly and precisely than Nestorius) there is really little new 
in theological substance. Theodoret can expound all the reasons why 
the Logos must remain immutable in becoming man, why the union must 
not fuse and confuse the natures, and why the Logos as God is impassible; 
but he begs the real question concerning the Logos' truly becoming man 
and existing as man, and thus being the subject of all the human 
experiences. 
Theodoret does come to the point of speaking of one person (prosopon), 
but this prosopon is again the result of the union between the divine 
and human natures. 'We preach so close an union of Godhead and of 
manhood as to understand one person undivided. ' 
1 
Theodoret continues 
to hold a phenomenological notion of person. Person is what one sees: 
the countenance. Thus the one person of Christ is the one combined 
appearance of God and Man. 'When we are discussing the person we must 
then make what is proper to the natures common and apply both sets of 
qualities to the Saviour.... '2 Grillmeier states: 
'This prosopon is constituted by the union of Word and manhood-- 
one might almost say by making the two of equal status.... His 
picture of Christ is built up too symetrically and is not con- 
structed clearly enough around the hypostasis of the Logos. For 
him, the common subject of the sayings is "Christ" (as the 
conjunction of the two natures), so that here the divine and 
human expressions are really justified, as of one subject. On 
the other hand, he will not make the Logos the common subject of 
the divine and human sayings. ' 3 
Theodoret, while he is close to Cyril in wording, has not yet grasped 
Cyril's metaphysical insight that the Logos really came to be man 
and exists as man. 
In Alexandria, to the horror of the Antiochenes, Eutyches proclaimed: 
'I confess that before the union our Lord had two natures, but after 
the union I confess one single nature. ' The Robber Synod 
(449) followed 
suit in saying: 'Whoever teaches two natures, let him be anathema. '4 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how Eutyches conceived this one 
ý. Ibid., 3. 
2. Ibid., 2. 
3. Grillmeier, p. 425- 
4- Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, 527 and 492-493, 
(ACO, 2, I, 1: 143 and 140). 
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nature, but what is certain is that no matter how he did conceive it, 
the union cannot uphold the immutable divinity of the Logos nor the 
complete humanity. Eutyches readily admits that Christ's humanity is 
not consubstantial with our own. 
1- 
The source of Eutyches' problem is the fact that he did not understand 
Cyril's notion of what it means for the Logos to become man, and exist 
as man. Unlike Cyril, Eutyches understands the mia physis formula to 
mean that Christ has one nature in the sense of one quiddity. Para- 
doxically Eutyches seems to conceive of the human nature in almost 
the same way as Nestorius did. Like Nestorius, Eutyches conceives the 
human nature as existing, at least mentally and logically, prior to the 
union. However, where Nestorius refused to fuse the two together, 
Eutyches did. 
The key to this interpretation is Eutyches' phrase 'before the union 
our Lord had two natures. ' Before the union there was neither 'Our 
Lord, ' nor a human nature. There was only the Logos qua Logos. The 
human nature did not exist outside the Incarnation nor can it be conceived 
to exist logically and mentally prior to the Incarnation. The incar- 
national act is not the fusion of two 'realities, ' but rather the Logos 
bringing into being and uniting to himself a human nature, and thus 
coming to be man. The distinction is established in the very act of 
becoming and maintained within the union effected, and not outside or 
before it. Eutyches, as all real Monophysites, understands 'become' not 
in Cyril's personal and existential sense of 'coming to be, ' as taking 
on a new mode of existence, but rather in an essentialist sense of 
pertaining to natures in some way coming together forming one quiddity. 
Understanding 'become' in this way always demands change and mutation, 
both in the divinity and humanity. The Antiochenes were very much aware 
of this and so was Pope Leo the Great. 
Pope Leo in his Tome to Flavian. is 'astonished' over Eutyches' 
formula of 'two natures before' and 'one after. '2 For Leo: Christ is 
not 'out of two natures' but räther: ' 
1. Cf. E. Schartz. Der Prozes des Eutyches. (Sitzb. Bay. Akad. Wiss., 
Phil. hist. 1929,5), 15. 
2. Pope Leo I, Tomus ad Flavian, (trans. from Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. 14, Second Series). 
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'While the distinction of both natures and substances was 
preserved, both are united in one person.... The same who, 
remaining in the form of God.... was made man in the form of 
a servant. For each of the natures retains its proper 
character without defect; and as the form of God does not 
take away the form of a servant, so the form of a servant 
does not impair the form of God. ' [Later Leo writes: ] 
'For the self same who is very God, is also very Man.... (since) 
the Word does not withdraw from equality with the Father in 
glory, so the flesh does not abandon the nature of our kind.... 
This unity of person.... is to be understood as existing in 
both the natures. ' 1 
As the above demonstrates, Leo, like Cyril, understands the 
Incarnation as the person of the Logos existing in two modes or manners: 
as God ans as man. Once more the Incarnation centres on the person and 
his manner of existing and not on the union of natures. Thus Leo can 
uphold both the ontological unity of Christ as well as the integrity of 
the natures. 
With this understanding of Christ, Leo can in rythmic style pre- 
dicate divine and human characteristics of one and the same person. 
Because the Logos is both God and man 
'Lowliness was assumed by majesty, weakness by power, mortality 
by eternity; and in order to pay the debt of our condition, the 
inviolable nature was united to a passible one.... (that) Christ 
Jesus might from one element be incapable of dying and also from 
the other capable. Therefore in the entire and perfect nature 
of very man was born very God, whole in what was his, whole in 
what was ours. ' 2 
As Grillmeier states: 'One and the same is God and man, twofold in nature 
but one in person. This unity of person is the point on which the 
pendulum of Leo's diphysite approach swings. '3 
The stage is now set for Chalcedon. Eutyches has brought the problem 
of unity and diversity once more to the fore. The Council of Ephesus' 
lack of a precise formulation, the break down of the Formula Unionis, 
the failure of the Synod of Constantinople in 448, and the fiasco of 
the Robber Council, all demanded a new Council and a 'new' creed. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Grillmeier, p. 467. 
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E. The Council of Chalcedon 
The Fathers cane together at Chalcedon to express and profess 
clearly who Christ is in himself. As in the earlier councils the main 
difficulty resided not in a doubt as to what the faith is, but rather 
in conceiving and rendering the faith in such a way as to leave no 
doubt as to what the faith is. The problem was conceptual and linguistic. 
It resided in how to conceive and express the unity and diversity in 
Christ. 
The Council reaffirmed the Creed of Nicea, as well as Cyril's 
interpretation of it as found in his Second Letter to Nestorius. It 
also canonized Leo's Tome as expressing the true faith. With these 
as their basis the Council Fathers set forth their own exposition of 
who Christ is. 
The key phrase for this study is that 'One and the same Christ, 
Son.... [is] made known in two natures [which exist] without confusion, 
without change, without division, without separation.... concurring into 
one prosoron and one hvnostasis. '1 The Council professes that Christ 
is God the Logos become man and in so doing neither what he is (God) 
nor what he became (man) is confused or changed. Moreover, neither 
are they divided nor separated. To fully understand what the Council 
means by this and how it can say this one must understand what goes 
before. 
First of all, for Chalcedon the terms 'nature' and 'person' do not 
denote diverse 'things' or 'components' out of which Christ is somehow 
formed. Christ is not one person (the Logos) attached to or made up 
of two 'things' called natures, one divine and one human. The concepts 
'person' and 'nature' are not Christological building blocks or 
arithmetic integers. One does not pull together two natures and then 
proceed to place a person on top or between them. Nor is Christ the 
sum of two natures and one person. Rather the concepts of 'person' 
and 'nature' for Chalcedon are metaphysical and ontological denoting 
who iss the manner in which the who is. This is clearly seen in the 
first part of the Chalcedonean Creed. 
1. Denzinger-Schännetzer, 301,302. Trans. R. V. Sellers, 
The Council of Chalcedon, pp. 210-211. 
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For Chalcedon the one historical being, Jesus Christ, is 'One and 
the same Son' who is 'perfect in Godhead (and) perfect in manhood. ' 
The same Son'is 'truly God and truly man. ' The same Son is 'homooüsios 
with the Father' and 'homoousios with us. ' The same Son who-was 
'begotten of the Father before ages as to his Godhead' is 'in the last 
days (begotten).... of Mary the Virgin Theotokos as to-his manhood. ' 
'What Chalcedon is stressing in almost repetitious monotony is that- 
Jesus Christ is the one Son, the Logos existing in two ways or modes: 
as God and as man. The stress on the 'one and same' is to make clear 
that the Son who is God as the Father is God is likewise the same Son 
who is man as man is man. In saying that the Son is Homoousios with the 
Father and with man, the Council is not conceiving of ousia (substance) 
as a block or hunk of 'stuff, ' as if Christ possessed a hunk of divine 
substance and a hunk of human substance, but rather specifying what 
the Logos is: fully God and fully man. 
Likewise when the Council speaks of one person and two natures, 
what it is distinguishing is who is, i. e. the Logos; and the manner in 
which the who is, i. e. as God and man. Again nature, like ousia is not 
conceived as something apart from the Logos and to which the Logos is 
attached or made out of, but rather for Chalcedon to be 'in two natures' 
is to be God and man, the term 'nature' denotes what the Logos is. 
The whole Counciliar discussion over the preposition ek (out of) 
or en (in) centres on this point. Christ is not made 'out of' a union 
of two previously separate things one called a divine nature and the 
other called a human nature as if 'a nature' was some sort of thing in 
itself apart from the Logos. To say that Christ is 'made known in two 
natures' indicates that the Logos who exists as God now exists as man 
also, and reveals himself as being both. 
1 
It is at this point that one can grasp how Chalcedon understands 
the notion of 'become'. Because the Council Fathers understand Christ 
to be the one person öf the Logos existing in two ways, as God and as 
man, one can see that like Cyril., they do not understand 'become' in 
a way that implies a change of natures. The Logos does not change his 
1. Over the confusion concerning which Chalcedon chose: ek or en, 
because of documentary discrepancies see Sellers, The Council of 
Cha lcedon, pp. 120-121, fn. 6. Cf. Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 302 fn. 
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nature, what he is, from God to man. Nor does what he becomes; man, 
change in some way into the nature of God. Rather Chalcedon understands 
'become' as an existential/personal concept denoting that the Logos has 
taken on a new mode of existence, that the Logos has come to be man. 
Chalcedon even rids this understanding of Cyril's ambiguity. The 
Council is opting for 'in two natures' rather than 'out of two natures' 
clarifies the fact that what the Logos is (God) and what he comes to be 
(man) is not changed or confused in the 'becoming' but rather the 
'becoming' maintains the fact that the Logos remains God and establishes 
the fact that the Logos comes to be and is truly and fully man. To be 
'out of two natures' implies that the becoming forms a tertium quid 
nature which in turn implies confusion and change. To be 'in two natures' 
means that God the Logos comes to be and continues to be man. 
It is now possible to understand what the Council means when it 
states that the natures exist 'without confusion, without change, without 
division, without separation. ' There is no confusion or change because 
the 'becoming' does not pertain to a union of natures, but to the mode 
of existence of a person. Thus Christ is God the Logos existing as man, 
and his modes of existing, his two natures, what he is, remain unchanged 
and unconfused. In like manner since the 'becoming' established what 
the Logos is, what he is not only remains unconfused and unchanged, 
but also undivided and unseparated. The natures 'concur into one rrosopon 
and one hvnostasis. ' Thus it is within the one reality of Christ that 
the unity of Person and distinction of natures is made. 
It is obvious that with regards to the passibility of the Logos, 
the Council has upheld Cyril. As Grillmeier states: 'Chalcedon leaves 
no doubt that the one Logos (person) is subject of both human and 
divine predicates. ' 
1 This is so precisely because Chalcedon clearly 
perceives that it is the one Logos who is truly God and man. Thus the 
Logos as God remains impassible, but since he is man also, he is truly 
passible. Because the natures exist without confusion and change the 
Logos as God remains impassible. Moreover, while the natures exist 
without confusion or change, they nevertheless are not divided or 
separated, but concur in one person. Thus one and the same Logos can 
1. Grillmeier, p. 490. 
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truly be said to thirst, hunger, suffer, and die, etc., as man. 
In closing this chapter, it should be pointed out that while Cyril 
and Chalcedon may have been able to conceive of 'become' is such a way that 
as to imply there is no change in the immutability of God, and yet that 
the Logos really did come to be man, and while they were able to, conceive 
of the, unity and, distinction in the one Christ without, confusion, 
change, division, or separation (especially Chalcedon), they did not 
in any way destroy the mystery of the Incarnation. One can still ask, 
either in doubt or amazement: 'Who ever heard of such a notion of 
"become"? Who ever heard of one person existing as God and as man? ' 
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CHAPTER 3 
THOMISTIC CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS A MIXED RELATION 
While this chapter is concerned with Saint Thomas Aquinas, it would be. 
a mistake to suppose that Christology came to a halt with Chalcedon 
and only began to develop again with Aquinas. Space was the determining 
factor in skipping the intervening years. While the problem discussed 
in this paper lost a great deal of its urgency and controversial 
atmosphere with the invasion of the Moslems into Egypt and the subsequent 
demise of the Monophysite movement as a powerful force in the Empire, 
it nevertheless remained part and parcel of all Christological 
discussion. 1 
A. Anselm of Canterbury' 
This can be very clearly seen if one takes a brief look at the 
'Father of Scholasticism' St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1100). while 
Anselm in Cur Deus Homo is primarily remembered for his soteriological 
theory, it is constructed precisely to answer the criticisms of the 
infidels who see the Incarnation not only as dishonourable to God, but 
also as incompatible with his divinity. As related by Boso: 
'Infidels ridiculing our simplicity charge upon us that we do 
injustice and dishonor to God when we affirm that he descended 
into the womb of the virgin, that he was born of woman, that 
he grew on the nourishment of milk and the food of men; and, 
passing over many other things which seem incompatible with 
Deity, that he endured fatigue, hunger, thirst, stripes and 
crucifixion among thieves. ' 2 
The problem raised by the infidels is hardly a new one. It is 
precisely the one discussed here. Does not God change in becoming man, 
1. 
2. 
For post-Cha7cedonian studies in Eastern Christology see L. H. C. 
Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement, (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1972). John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 
(Washington: 1969). Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition 2: 
The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700)9 Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1974)" 
St. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, 
trans., S. N. Deane La Salle: 
3. Trans. St. Anselm: Basic Writings, 
Open Court Press, 1968). 
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and is not his impassible nature then passible? Anselm's approach in 
answering their criticism nevertheless is unique. 
Without going into the details of Anselm's soteriology (which 
would lead into a controversy far afield from-this present study) 
the premises Anselm wishes to establish in order to defend the Incarnation 
are easy to ascertain. For Anselm man's sin so violates the honour of 
God that only God can restore and make satisfaction for the loss since 
once man has sinned he is unable to restore himself to a condition in 
which he can properly give God the honour and love deserved. Nevertheless, 
because it is man who has sinned the obligation of restoring God's 
honour falls directly upon man's shoulders. Thus for Anselm sin has 
created a situation in which 'None but God can make satisfaction.... But 
none but a man ought to do this. 
' What is needed therefore, in order 
to break the dilemma, is a person who is both God and man. As Anselm 
states: 'If it is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly 
kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the afore- 
said satisfaction be made, which none but God can make and none but man 
ought to make, it is necessary for the God-man to make it. '2 Thus, 
Hopkins is correct when he states: 
'In a sense, the entire Cur Deus Homo is directed towards 
proving this thesis. For Anselm thinks that if he can show 
the impossibility of human redemption's occuring other than 
through the agency of a God-man, he will have removed the 
stigma which seems to accompany the notion of incarnation. '3 
Thus the criticisms of the infidels that the Incarnation dishonours God 
are somewhat assuaged. 
Flowing from his soteriological premises Anselm's Christology demands 
both that God really become man, and yet at the same time neither God 
nor what God becomes: man, must undergo change or mutation. Anselm very 




3. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1972). p. 187. Also Anselm of 
Canterb ! Trinity, Incarnation and Redemption: Theological 
Treatises, ed. and trans., J. Hopkins and H. W. Richardson (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), p. xix. Also J. McIntyre, 
St. Anselm and His Critics, (London: 1954), p" 127" 
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'The divine and human natures cannot alternate, so that the 
divine should become human or the human divine; nor can they 
be so commingled as that a third should be produced from the 
two which is neither wholly divine nor wholly human. For, 
granting that it were possible for either to be changed into 
the other, it would in that case be only God and not man, or 
man only and not God. Or if they were so commingled that a 
third nature sprung from the combination of the two... , it 
would neither be God nor man. Therefore the God-man, whom 
we require to be of a nature both human and divine, cannot be 
produced by a change from one into the other, nor by an 
imperfect commingling of both into a third; since these things 
cannot be, or if they could be, would avail nothing to our 
purpose. ' 1 
For Anselm then while it is impossible for God to change into man or vice 
versa, even if this could be done, it would soteriologically serve no 
purpose. On soteriorological grounds Anselm rules out any form of 
Docetism, Apollinarianism, or Monophysitism all of which demand some 
alteration in the divinity or humanity. 
Moreover, for these very same soteriological reasons Anselm rules 
out Adoptionism and Nestorianism. 
'If these two complete natures are said to be joined somehow, 
in such a way that one may be divine while the other is human, 
and yet that which is God not be the same with that which is 
mann, it is impossible for both to do the work necessary to be 
accomplished .... Since, then, it is necessary that the God-man 
preserve the completeness of each nature, it is no less necessary 
that these two natures be united entire in one person .... for 
otherwise it is impossible that the same being should be very 
God and very man. ' 2 
For Anselm one and same person must be both God and man without change 
or mutation if man is to be saved. 
Thus when Anselm uses Deus-Homo (the God-man) as a definitional 
name for Christ, it should not be thought that Anselm sees Christ as two 
separate and complete entities or natures existing juxtaposed to one 
another and united by some sort of moral union? What Anselm is doing 
in using such language is stressing and highlighting the soteriological 
aspect of his Christology. Only a being who is fully God and fully man 
(Deus-Homo) is able to bring about salvation. 
1. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II, 7- 
2. Ibid. 
3. For examples of Anselm's use of the term 'Deus-Homo' see ibid., 
jig 6 and 7. 
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Likewise when he uses the phrase Assumptus homo in his Ep. de 
Incarnatione Verbi to designate the humanity of Christ, he is not 
understanding the Incarnation to be the Logos assuming an already exist- 
ing man. Rather he is stressing the fact that the Logos became and 
is fully man. As Anselm states: 
'For, although in Christ one thing is God and another is man, 
this does not mean that there is one en rson who is God and 
another person who is man. On the contrary, one and the same 
person is both God and mann. "The Word made flesh" assumed 
another nature, not another person. ' 1 
What one finds then in Anselm is a systematic soteriological argument 
for Chalcedonian Christology. Christ is one person existing in two 
natures. Following Chalcedon Anselm states in his ED. de Incarnatione 
Verbi that 'Clearly God did not assume manhood in such a way that God 
and man were one and the same in nature, but in such a way that God and 
man were one and the same in person. '2 Anselm realizes that while 
Christ is one, the Incarnation does not bring about a terium quid being, 
for that would demand change and alteration, but rather the Incarnation 
is the Logos coming to be and existing as man. 
The Christology which Anselm believes necessarily flows from his 
soteriology shows then not only that it is appropriate and necessary for 
God to become man, but also against the infidels it clarifies in what 
way it is proper to attribute human predicates to God. Those who think 
that it is incompatible with Deity to predicate of it human attributes 
'do not fully understand our belief'. 
'For we affirm that the divine nature is beyond doubt 
impassible, and that God cannot at all be brought down from 
his exaltation.... But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ is 
very God and very man, one person in two natures.... When, 
therefore, we speak of God as enduring any humiliation or 
infirmity, we do not refer to the majesty of that nature, which 
cannot suffer; but to the feebleness of the human constitution 
which he assumed. And so there remains no ground of objection 
against our faith. ' 3 
1. Anselm, Et. de Incärnatione Verbi, 11. Trans. Anselm of Canterbury: 
Trinity. Incarnation, and Redemption: Theological Treatises, ed. and 
trans. J. Hopkins and H. W. Richardson.. See also Hopkins, A 
Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, pp. 198-202. 
2. Anselm, Eo. de Incarnatione Verbi, 9; see also 1. 
3. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, 8. See also En. de Incarnatione 
Verbi, 11. 
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Anselm is but echoing the teaching of Cyril and the Council of Chalcedon 
concerning the communication of idioms. It is because one and the same 
person is God and man that it is proper to predicate divine and human 
attributes of him. Thus to say 'God thirsts, ' means for Anselm, as for 
Cyril and Chalcedon, 'God the Logos as man thirsts. ' 
McIntyre completely misunderstands Anselm on this point. He believes 
'that there occurs in St. Anselm a foreshadowing of the Lutheran 
dommunicatio idiomatum.... '1 By this McIntyre means that the human and 
divine predicates are not properly said of the person only, but as in 
Luther's Christology a real 'transference of properties takes place 
between the natures. '2 Whether McIntyre's understanding of Luther is 
correct is not at issue here. Luther's Christology will be discussed 
later. However, it is obvious that McIntyre does not understand Anselm's 
use of the communication of idioms. Anselm in no way sees the communi- 
cation of idioms as specifying or delineating the transference of divine 
and human attributes from one nature to the other. For Anselm the diverse 
attributes are predicated only of the person and not of the distinct 
natures. As was seen above in Anselm's remarks on the misunderstanding 
of the infidels, the human attributes predicated of the Logos only refer 
'to the feebleness of the human constitution which he assumed. ' If 
McIntyre's understanding of Anselm were corrects the infidels would have 
had an accurate understanding of what Christians believe, and thus the 
Christian belief would 'do injustice and dishonor to God. ' As strange 
as it may be, McIntyre's understanding of Anselm's use of the communication 
of idioms seems to be the same as that of the infidels, which is precisely 
the understanding Anselm wishes to deny. Anselm wished in his Christology 
to clarify exactly what the Christian use of the communication of idioms 
means. In McIntyre's case Anselm obviously failed in his attempt. 
More could be said concerning Anselm, but enough has been given 
to show that he was as much concerned with what it means for God to 
become man, and to be passible as man as the patristic theologians. 
Likewise it is evident that Anselm, like Chalcedon and Cyril, understood 
'become' to mean 'come to be' which upholds both the ontological unity 
of persön and the-unchangeable distinction of natures, thus also allowing 
for a correct understanding of the communication of idioms. 
1. J. McIntyre, P. 141. 
2. Ibd_, p. 142. 
104 
B. St. Thomas Aquinas 
When one comes to Aquinas, it is not surprising then that he too 
is concerned with the problem of God's immutability and his becoming man, 
as well as his passibility as man. It should not be surprising either 
that Aquinas' methodological approach to the subject is more systematic 
and clearly defined than that of the Fathers. This is due not only to the 
literary manner in which he approaches theology: the Questio Dis'utatae, 
but also to the fact that he, as no other theologian before him, and for 
the most part after him, nuanced and clarified theological concepts 
and language. 
Reality for Aquinas is rich in meaning and the concepts and language 
by which man grasps and expresses the meaning of reality is therefore 
rich also. This richness of conceptual understanding and linguistic 
expression helps man understand the fullness of reality, but the fullness 
can only be appreciated and known if man distinguishes the many uses - 
and meanings of his concepts and words. Many modern readers of Aquinas 
are put off by his many distinctions, but such a reaction is not so much 
a criticism of his 'scholastic' hair-splitting, as much as modern man's 
failure to appreciate the fullness of reality and the concepts and 
language used by man to grasp and express it. 
Moreover, it is not only the finite world that man must come to know 
and express for Aquinas. Man's wisdom does not consist solely of mathe- 
matics, astronomy, psychology, and metaphysics. For Aquinas God's 
revelation in word and action must be known and expressed and thus man's 
concepts and language must make room for such revelation. For Aquinas 
revelation is not just grasping finite reality in a new or deeper way, 
but rather because of God's revelation reality itself has changed and 
taken on new dimensions. New truths are operative in reality, truths 
not due to man's insight, but to God's revelation. Thus for Aquinas, 
theology, as other sciences, has its own first principles from which 
it proceeds to greater depths of understanding and clarity of expression, 
and these principles 'are the articles of faith. '1 Because of this 
1. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 1,8. See also I, 1,6, 
ad. 1. Trans. Summa Theologica, English Dominican Fathers, 
(New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947). All the following 
references will be from St. Thomas Aquinas' works unless 
otherwise stated. 
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there is operative in Aquinas' Christology what can be called 
'Christological logic. '1 If one accepts in faith who Christ is as 
he revealed himself and which has been handed down in Scripture and 
tradition, what must logically be understood and expressed concerning 
him? For Aquinas there is no stronger basis for theological argumen- 
tation than: 'Assuming, as the Catholic faith requires.... '2 
Flowing from this it should be pointed out not only for the sake 
of understanding Aquinas' approach to Christology, but also as a pre- 
liminary to the study of some contemporary Christologies, that he in no 
way uses philosophy, in an Averroeistic manner. 
For Averroes the Koran could be understood in three ways corres- 
ponding to the three different kinds of men. For the simple and un- 
learned religious person the Koran was used for exhortation and the 
exterior and symbolic meaning was accepted in faith. For the theologians, 
who gloried in dialectics, probable truth could be obtained. However, 
it was the philosopher with his superior philosophic knowledge who could 
judge the Koran's true meaning. Unlike the ordinary man, the philosopher 
did not have faith, but rather being 'in the know' because of his 
philosophy, he obtained truth in its pure form. This not only meant 
that the philosophericlew the Koran better, but that his pure knowledge 
surpassed what the Koran expressed only symbolically. 'In the doctrine 
of Averroes, ' writes Gilson, 'there is absolutely nothing that philosophy 
does not know better than simple faith.... '3 If a contradiction arose 
between the two, the Koran must be made to conform to philosophy since 
it was truth in the fullest sense. The highest philosophy, and thus 
the purest truth, for Averroes was Aristotle. 
Aquinas would have none of this. While the theologian may better 
understand and articulate the faith because of philosophy, what he believes 
is the same as the ordinary Christian. Philosophy does not make the 
theologian or philosopher a better Christian because he (somehow) comes 
to know what others simply believe. 
1. Colman E. O'Neil, Appendix It p. 216 in Swnma Theolo iae 
Vol. 50, The One Mediator, (London: Blackfriars, 1965)- 
2' Cf. ý" , III, 16,1. 
3. E. Gilson, History, of Christian Philosophy in the Middle s, 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1972), p. 219. 
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'This science (sacred doctrine) can in a sense depend upon 
the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need 
of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. 
For it accepts its principles not from other sciences; but 
immediately from God, by revelation. ' 1 
What God reveals in word and action is beyond finite reality and beyond 
man's normal ways of obtaining knowledge, and thus is verifiable not by 
a superior philosophic knowledge, but by God's authority. 
Thus when Aquinas treats the mystery of God and the Incarnation, 
one cannot help but notice his 'Christological logic' at work in the 
distinctions he makes in his linguistic and conceptual analysis. While 
he may be using Aristotelian concepts and language, what he is doing is 
following the pattern first used by the Fathers and sanctioned by Nicea. 
One may use and need to use non-scriptural philosophical concepts, yet 
one must give to them a meaning which conforms to the revelational truth 
contained in Scripture and the Church's tradition, and not vice-versa. 
By giving new nuances to Aristotelianism, Aquinas wishes not only to 
baptise Aristotle, and thus make Christianity intelligible to his 
contemporaries, but also clarify and enlarge the understanding of what 
is revealed. Through the use of Aristotelian concepts Aquinas never 
dissolves the Incarnation by making it intellectually knowable in itself, 
but rather clarifies and delineates exactly what the mystery is and in 
so doing developes the Church's traditional understanding of the mystery. 
2 
Thus Aquinas in his Christology does not say anything that is 
radically new and different from Chalcedon or Cyril, but rather wishes 
only to say what they said in a way that is intelligible and clear. 
His theological insights are insights in conceptual and linguistic 
expression and not in new doctrines. It is for this reason that Aquinas 
is treated here. Only in philosophy does a radical newness accrue and 
that, as is well known, revolves around his notion of esse. 
1. God: Actus Purus and Immutability and Impassibility 
From the Church's tradition Aquinas inherited the teaching that 
God is almighty, all=powerful, all-perfect, immutable and impassible. 
1. S. T., I, 1,5, ad. 2. 
2. On this point see E. L. Mascall, 'Guide-Lines from St. Thomas for 
Theology Today, ' St. Thomas Aquinas, (1274-1974), Commemorative 
Studies, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1974)9 PP. 489-501. 
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To give philosophical expression to this teaching Aquinas turned to 
his notion of esse to show hoer these adjectives can be applied to God. 
He in no way changes their traditional meaning, but rather clarifies 
exactly why, when applied to God, they have the meaning traditionally 
given. - 
A great deal has been written in recent years concerning Aquinas' 
notion of God. 
1 For this reason a full scale study is not necessary 
here. Nevertheless, the main features of Aquinas' notion of God and his 
immutability and impassibility must be stated in order to understand 
how he answers the Christological problem of God's becoming man and his 
passibility as man. 
To understand Aquinas' notion of God it is first necessary to grasp 
his notion of esse. This can be done only by seeing how esse pertains 
to finite creatures. In finite beings 
'every essence or quiddity can be understood without knowing 
anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a 
man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being 
or reality. From this it is clear that being is other than 
essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is a reality whose 
quiddity is its being. ' 2 
No finite being then is of such a nature that its nature demands that 
it be or exist. As Gilson states: 'The definition of no empirically 
given thing is existence; hence its'essence is not existence, but 
existence must be conceived as distinct from it. '3 There is then a 
distinction in finite creatures between what an ens is, its essence or 
quiddity, and that by which an ens is, its esse. It is at this point 
that one is able to grasp how Aquinas understands esse. 
While it may be stating the obvious, the first thing that must be 
recognized is that esse (to be) is a verb. It does not signify some 
sort of thing. Esse has no quiddity, but rather is an act, and thus 
1. For more complete studies see for example E. Gilson, God and 
Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). E. Gilson, 
The Christian Philosoi)hv of St. Thomas A uinas, (London: Gollancz, 
1957). E. L. Mascall, He Who Is,. London: Libra Book, 1966). 
E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analo , 
(London: Libra Book, 1966). 
H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, (London: Macmillan, 1971)- 
2. De Ente et Essentia, 4,6. Trans. On Being and Essence, Armarid 
Maurer, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1968). 
3. Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 71. 
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cannot be conceptually grasped by the mind. One cannot say what esse 
is because there is no 'whatness' about esse. Being a verb esse 
specifies, as do all verbs, action, but in this case what is specified 
is the act which is the very basis or ground of all subsequent actions 
(all subsequent verbs) in that esse is the act by which a being (an ens) 
is or exists: 'ens dicetur quasi esse habens. '' Thus Aquinas states: 
'Esse est actualitas omnium actuum. et vrorter hoc est nerfectio omnium 
rerfectionum. '2 Esse in an ens is the primordial act and perfection of 
all other acts and perfections for without esse an ens would not be 
at all. Phelan states Aquinas' understanding of esse well: 
'Things which "have being" are not "just there" (Dasein) like 
lumps of static essence, inert, immovable, unprogressive and 
unchanging. The act of existence (esse) is not a state, it 
is an act, the act of all acts, and therefore, must be understood 
as act and not as any static and definable object of conception. 
Esse is dynamic impulse, energy, act--the first, the most 
persistent and enduring of all dynamisms, all energies, all 
acts. ' 3 
Now it should be obvious that while Aquinas understands esse and 
essentia to be a real distinction in finite beings and not just conceptual, 
this in no way means that esse and essentia are distinct realities or 
things in themselves. 
4 As was seen above, esse as act contains no 
quiddity and, as is also evident from the preceding essence in itself 
contains no notion of esse, but purely denotes the quiddity of an ens. 
Only beings exist and the distinction of esse and essentia is made 
within the existing being. Esse and essentia are constitutive principles 
of an ens. 
5 Thus they are related to one another in an act/potency 
relationship, for 'that in which act is present is a potentiality, 
since act, as such-is referred to potentiality. Therefore, in every 
created substance there is potentiality and act. '6 Thus for Aquinas 
1. XII Metaphysica, lect. 1,2419- 
2, De Potentia, 7,2, ed. 9. Cf. De Anima, 6. 
3. Gerald Phelan, 'The Existentialism. of St. Thomas, ' Selected 
Papers, ed. A. G.. Kirn (Toronto: 1967), p" 77- 
4- Cf. De Veritate, 27,1.. Trans. Truth, Robert W. Mulligan 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Corp., 1952. Also I Sent. d. 13, q. 1, 
art. 3. 
5. Cf. E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, (Toronto: Pontificial 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 172. 
6. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 53,3. Trans. On the Truth of the Catholic 
Faith, Eds., J. Anderson, A. Pegis, V. J. Bourke, J. O'Neil 
(Garden City: Image Books, 1955-1957)" See also De Ente et 
Essentia, 4,8. 
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'dicitur esse itise actus essentiae. 1 
1 All created beings then are 
composite, 'For a certain composition is found in them by the fact that 
in them being is not the same as what is. '2 
Given all the above Aquinas argues that the esse of finite 
creatures must come from an extrinsic cause. 
'Whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles 
of its nature.... or comes to it from an extrinsic principle.... 
Now being itself cannot be caused by the form or quiddity of a 
thing (by "caused" I mean by an efficient cause) because that 
thing would then be its own cause and it would bring itself 
into being, which is impossible. It follows that everything 
whose being is distinct from its nature must have being from 
another. ' 3 
Since no finite reality contains within its nature the sufficient reason 
for its existence, Aquinas continues that 'there must be a reality that 
is the cause of being for all things, because it is pure being [esse 
tantum]. If this were not so, we would go on to infinity in causes, for 
everything that is not pure being has a cause of its being, as has been 
said. ' For Aquinas pure esse 'is the first cause or God. '4 
Whether Aquinas' argument as it appears in his early work De Ente 
et Essentia is a proof for God's existence and whether he understood it 
to be such is debated by scholars. That is important here is not so 
much these questions as the light the above gives to Aquinas' understanding 
of esse and God as pure esse. This seems to be his primary purpose as 
the above arguments are rendered in the two Summae. 
5 
In the two Summae Aquinas' interest is to ascertain not whether 
God is, but rather to explicate the nature of the God who is. (Since 
God is pure esse for Aquinas the question whether God is and the question 
what God is can be reduced to the same question, but only after they 
have been treated separately. ) Thus one sees frone the above that Aquinas 
1. I Sent., d. 33, q"1, art. 1, ad. 1. See also De Pot. 7,2, ad. 9. 
2. S. C. G., II9 52,1. 
3. De Ente et Essentia, 4,7. See S. T., It 3,4, and S. C. G., I, 22,6. 
4. Ibid., all of the above. 
5. S. C. G., 1,22,6. S. T., It 3,4.. For debate see A. Maurer, on 
Being and Essence, Introduction,. p. 20 and fn. 33. 
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argues to his understanding of God as pure esse from what esse is in 
creatures. Esse is the act by which a finite being is, but no finite 
creature is by necessity from what it is. Thus God must be pure esse 
for this is what finite beings lack and are in potency to and must be 
given if they are to exist. If the essence of God were not pure esse, 
he would be in the same circumstances as finite creatures where his 
essence would differ from his esse, and thus need an extrinsic cause 
to account for his being also. God's nature must be pure esse not so 
much to account for what specific things exist, i. e. horses, dogs, etc., 
but to account for the fact that things exist at all, that they possess 
esse. Thus while finite creatures are composite beings in which their 
essence and esse are in an act/potency relationship, God whose nature 
is pure esse is not composite, has no potency, and 'therefore his essence 
is his existence. 
" God as pure esse is iusum esse, esse subsistens, 
actus tiurus. 
To truly grasp what Aquinas means by God being pure esse, it must 
always be remembered that esse is act, that esse is a verb. Thus to say 
that God is pure esse means that God's essence is nothing other than 
to be. In creatures essence or quiddity denotes what a thing is and 
always is a noun. To say that God's essence is existence is also to say 
what God is, but it is not a noun. It is a verb. For the essence of God 
to be gypsum esse means that God is pure act. For God to be pure act then 
does not mean that God is something fully in act, but rather that God is 
act pure and simple. There is no-thinar, no essence (in finite sense) 
in God to be actualized, but just act or esse it-self. Likewise to say 
that God has no potency does not mean that God in some way fully 
actualized all his potential comparable to a man who has fully actualized 
all his potential, but rather God has no potency because there is no 
potency to actualize. He is actus nurus. 
God being actus uurus it is almost, if not completely, self-evident 
why God is all-perfect and being all-perfect why he is infinite, 
eternal, immutable, etc.. If 'esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et 
propter hoc est nerfectio omnium nerfectionum, ' then God as actus ourus 
'must needs to be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing 
is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that 
1. S. T., It 3,4. Cf. S. T., I, 3,1-3. 
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perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection. '1 While man, 
for example, is perfect or tends to perfection in so far as he actualizes 
his potential and talents (and this is due first of all to the fact. that 
he is), God is perfect not because he has reached some limit of perfect- 
ability, but being irsum esse he is perfection itself. 
Thus God is immutable. Finite beings are mutable in that they 
come to be and can cease to be. Likewise they can undergo substantial 
and accidental change. 
2 However, God being pure esse necessarily exists 
and cannot cease to be. Likewise, God being pure act is all-perfect 
and being all perfect it is impossible for him to acquire more perfection 
through change, that is, by actualizing some potential. 'Everything 
which is in anyway changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is 
evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. ' 
Being actus vurus God contains 'all the plentitude of perfection of all 
being. He cannot acquire anything new' through change, by actualizing 
some potential. 
3 Thus to say that God is immutable is to deny something 
of God that is inherent in finite reality. However, while it is a 
negative adjective, it is based on something positive which makes God 
unlike creatures, that is, the fact that God is pure act, being itself. 
4 
God is immutable then for Aquinas not because he is static, inert, 
or inactive, but precisely because he is so supremely active and dynamic, 
because he is pure act. He is so much in act that it is ontologically 
impossible to be more in act. Paradoxically God is supremely immutable 
because he is supremely active. 
One should not be misled into thinking that God's immutability 
is like the immutability of a rock only more so. What God and rocks 
have in common is only the fact that they do not change. The reason 
for their unchangeableness is for polar-opposite reasons. The Rock of 
Gibraltar does not change or changes very little because it is hardly in 
act at all, and the change that it does undergo is mainly from outside 
causes--wind and rain. God is unchangeable not because he is insert 
or static like a rock, but for just the opposite reason. He is so 
dynamic, so active that no change can make him more. active. He is act 
1. De. Pot, 7,2, ad. 9. S. T., It 4,1. Cf. S. C. G., It 28. 
2. Cf. S. T., I, 9t2. 
3. Ibid., It 991- 
4- Cf. Ibid., I, 13,2. Also S. C. G., It 30,4" 
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pure and simple. (By way of an aside, this should be kept in mind 
when Process Theology is treated later. Process Theology believes 
that a God who changes is more dynamic than traditional theism, such 
as expressed by Aquinas. However, just the opposite is true. In 
making God mutable process theology's notion of God has more in common 
with rocks than Aquinas' notion of God. ) 
A few words need to be said about the impassibility of God. 
Passibility for Aquinas pertains-to the will and to objects toward 
which the will tends. The object of the will is the end willed which 
is always understood as good, and the will tends to the good as an 
object loved. 
1 Now in man the will desires a good the more the good 
comes to be known as good. 
2 Man in knowing a thing as good arouses 
the sensible appetite, which in turn activates the will to desire the 
good out of love for the good as known. The arousal of the appetite 
by a loved, known good is called passion. 
3 Thus in man passion denotes 
a change in that the knowledge of a known good motivates and arouses 
the will to desire the good known and loved, and to seek ways to obtain 
the good. Again this is an act/potency relationship which denotes 
change. 
4 Now God being pure act knows, wills, and loves all good in 
the one act which he is himself. Thus there is no passion in God 
because, being pure act, there is no need for arousal to the good and 
desire for the good. 
5 Thus God loves himself and all things in himself 
in the one act which he himself is because in the one act he knows and 
wills himself as pure goodness. 
6 
A problem does arise however with sorrow and pain in God. If God 
is love and loves perfectly all creatures; does he not become sad and 
pained at sin and evil effected by man and which affects man? Is he 
not saddened by man turning from him and his love? If one understands 
sadness and pain as due to a lack of good and the presence of evil, 
then God is not sad in this sense.? For Aquinas sadness in this sense 
is predicated of God metaphorically. Because Aquinas sees sorrow and 
pain as due to a lack of good he cannot attribute sorrow and pain to 
God. Man's turning from God does not harm him by depriving him of good. 
1, Cf. S. T., I, 20,1 and It 82,2, ad. 1. 
2. Cf. ibid., I, 82,3, ad. 2. 
3. Cf. ibid., I, 20,2, ad. 1. 
4. Cf.. ibid., It 82,3, ad. 2. 
5. Cf. ibid., It 20,2, ad. 1. 
6. Cf. ibid., It 14 and 19. 
7. Cf. ibid., I-II, 1-2; It 20,1, ad. 2. 
8. Cf. ibid., I-II, 47.1, ad. 1; I-II, 73,8, ad. 2. 
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However, it would seem that because of God's love for men, it could be 
said that God is sad, not because he is deprived of a good, but 
because the man who sins is deprived of a good. Thus sadness could 
be predicated of God, not as a change in God, as the loss of a good 
possessed, but as an aspect of his almighty and all-consuming un- 
changeable love for his creatures. Aquinas hints at this, but unfortu- 
nately does not develop it in the Summa Theologiae when he states that 
sin injures man and such an injury 'redounds to God, inasmuch as the 
person injured is an object of God's providence and protection. '1 
By way of concluding Aquinas' notion of God it should be noted 
that because God is irsum esse, he is not one of many beings. While 
the esse of finite beings and God as pure esse are analogous in that 
both signify act, finite esse is related to and proportionate to the 
essence it actuates. Thus while finite esse does not belong to a genus 
itself, since it has no quiddity, the being of which it is the actuating 
principle always falls within a specific genus or species: animals, 
plants, etc.. Likewise finite beings then are substances in that they 
are individual existing things of a specific kind. However, God as 
pure esse transcends the order of finite reality, the order of beings. 
God as pure esse not only falls outside the order of genus by the fact 
that esse as such does not belong to a genus, but also by the fact that 
being pure esse he does not have a quiddity other than his esse, and 
thus unlike finite beings he does not have an essence that places him 
within a genus. 'Each thing, ' states Aquinas, 'is placed in a genus 
through the nature of its quiddity, for the genus is a predicate 
expressing what a thing is. But the quiddity of God is his very being. 
Accordingly, God is not located in a genus. '2 God does not even fall 
within the genus of substance for while substance denotes an individual 
existing thing in itself, unlike God its 'existence is not its 
essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance. 
3 
As ipsum esse God ontologically transcends the order of finite beings 
and thus cannot be numbered as one being among many. Mascall states 
Aquinas' position when he says: 
1. Ibid., I-II, 479 1, ad. 1. Cf. H. P. Owen, pp. 23-25- 
2. S. C. G., I, 25,5. Cf. S. T., I, 3,5. Also De Pot. 7,3. 
3. S. T., I, 395. Cf. S. C. G. , T, 25,9-10. 
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'We cannot lump together in one genus God and everything else, 
as if the word "being" applied to them all in precisely the 
same sense, and then pick out God as the supreme one. For if 
God is the Supreme Being, in the sense in which Christian 
theology uses the term, "being" as applied to him is not just 
one more instance of what "being" means when applied to anything 
else. So far from being just one item, albeit the supreme one, 
in a class of beings, he is the source from which their being 
is derived; he is not in their class but above it. ' 1 
Aquinas sums up his understanding of God when he states that the 
most proper name of God is the name revealed to Moses: 'He Who Is' 
(Ex. 3: 13-14). It is most proper 'For it does not signify form, but 
simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is his essence 
itself, which can be said of no other, it is clear that among the other 
sn 
names this one specially d4ominates God, for everything is denominated 
by its form-'2 To say that God is 'He who Is' signifies that the proper 
nature of God is 'to be, ' his existence is his essence, and thus the 
name, 'He Who Is' does not signify any knowable form for form in creatures 
signifies a specific knowable essence. Thus 'He Who Is' in signifying 
no form denotes that God transcends knowable finite reality for form 
in creatures is always of a specific genus. Now it is possible to say, 
as Aquinas does in his second usage of the word 'form, ' that God's form 
is 'to be, ' but in so saying this he does not mean that one properly 
knows what the essence or form of God is. To know that the proper name 
(form) of God is ipsum esse is not the same as knowing what ipsum esse 
is or means. Thus 'He Who Is' is the proper name of God precisely 
because while it denotes God's proper form as ipsum esse, it at the 
same time signifies that God as insum esse is unknowable, and thus that 
God transcends knowable finite reality. Thus Aquinas' metaphysical 
understanding of 'He Who Is' is totally in keeping with the Hebrew 
understanding. For both God in revealing his name as 'He Who Is' 
reveals himself as the unknowable. 
3 
With such an understanding of God, God can never be in a situation 
that would demand that he change. This is so not because it would be 
inappropriate, but because it would, be metaphysically impossible. Being 
1. E. L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 9. 
2. - 
S. T., I, 13,11. Cf. S. C. G., I, 22. Also De Pot. 2,1. 
3. Cf. Gilson, Spirit of Medieval Philosophv, Chapters 3 and 4. 
Also E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, pp. 12-15. 
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pure act, God, even if he 'wanted to, ' could not bring about change 
in himself, nor could he place himself in a situation which demanded 
change. This is not a hardship on the part of God, being pure act, 
containing all perfection, he needs nothing other than himself for his 
good and happiness. This is more easily understood by man once God 
revealed himself to be a Trinity of persons. 
The question arises though: Is not God in situations which demand 
that he change, and are not these situations due to the fact that God 
himself has brought these situations about? Does not God's creation 
and conservation of the world establish a situation which demands change 
in God? Likewise and more so, is not the Incarnation such a situation? 
In both instances there must be a relationship between God and something 
outside himself. If there were no relationship between God as Creator 
and beings as created, God would not be the Creator and finite beings 
would not be. If there were no relationship between the Logos and his 
humanity the Logos would not be man, nor would it be man that the Logos 
is. But does not the very notion of relation demand change in the 
terms related? Aquinas thinks not. 
2. Christ: God subsisting as Man 
Aquinas, like Cyril and Chalcedon before him, works out his 
Christology with three things in mind. Treating the question 'whether 
this is true, "God is man"? ' Aquinas states: 'Supposing the truth of 
the Catholic belief.... we say that this proposition is true and proper, 
God is man--not only by the truth of its terms, i. e. because Christ is 
true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication. 
" 
To 
uphold the truth of the Incarnation one must maintain that God truly 
is man, that it is truly God who is man, and that it is truly man 
that God is. One's conceptual understanding and linguistic expression 
must account for all the above for this is what has been revealed and 
handed down. 
This concern can be clearly seen in Aquinas' treatment in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles of the classic Christological errors. Against 
those such as Ebion, Paul of Samosata, and Photinus who held that 
Christ was a man only and in some way adopted by God, Aquinas points 
1. S. T., III, 16,1. 
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out that 'this position destroys the Incarnation's mystery. For, 
according to this position, God would not have assumed flesh to become 
man. ' Likewise the Manicheans and Valentine who deny that the manhood 
of Christ was reaal, but only phantasmal, Aquinas argues that 'they. 
reduce the whole mystery of the Incarnation to a fiction. '2 Believing 
that Apollinaris held that the Logos was changed into man, Aquinas 
protests that it is not only impossible for God to change since he 
is immutable, but to do so would so affect the manhood of Christ that 
it would 'follow that there was not in Christ true flesh or anything 
of the sort. '3 Aquinas uses this same argument for real and true manhood 
against Arius' and Apollinaris' denial of a human soul. 
4 When Aquinas 
comes to Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, his concern switches 
from guaranteeing the full divinity and humanity of Christ to the sub- 
stantial union of the two. No moral union will do for 'the indwelling 
of God's Word in man is not for God's Word to be made flesh.... this.... 
indwelling.... cannot be called incarnation. 'S It is only when 'God's 
Word and the man Christ are one supposit and consequently, one Person' 
that one can truly speak of the Incarnation. 
6 
Nevertheless, this 
substantial union cannot destroy the terms of the union, for to do so 
would mean that it is neither God who is man, nor man that God is. 
Thus against Eutyches, Aquinas protests: One cannot 
'say that the form of God in Christ is corrupted by this union, 
because thus after the union Christ would not be God. Nor 
again, can one say that the form of the servant was corrupted 
in the union, because thus he would not have received the form 
of the servant. But neither can one say that the form of the 
servant is mixed thoroughly with the form of God, for things 
mixed thoroughly do not retain their integrity.... If a mixture 
were to come into being, neither nature would be preserved.... 
but some third. ' 7 
Firm Aquinas's criticism of the classic Christological errors one sees 
that his primary concern is to give intelligible meaning to the fact 
1. S. C. G., IV, 28,3 and 4. 
2. Ibid., IV9 29,1. Cf. the whole of 29 and 30. 
3. Ibid., IV9 31,2. Cf. 5- 
4- Cf. Ibid., IV, 32-33. 
5. Ibid., IV9 34,3. 
6. Ibid., IV9 34,29. 
7. Ibid., IV, 35,4. Cf. 8. 
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that God became man. While the 'becoming' must be such that God can 
truly be said to be man, and thus substantial, it must not bring about 
a change in the terms, for it must really be God who is man and man 
that God is. A denial of a substantial union, or the immutability of 
God, or the completeness of the manhood destroys the very notion of 
the Incarnation. 
Aquinas' concern can be seen even more clearly in his treatment 
of the contemporary Christological theories. They came to be known as 
the 'assumytus-homo theory, ' the 'habitus theory, ' and the 'subsistence 
theory. ' The basic outline of these theories came to Aquinas and his 
contemporaries through the Sentences of Peter Lombard. 
1 
Peter Abelard is the source of the Assumntus-homo theory. In it 
he wished to maintain that while there is one person, there are two 
hypostases in Christ. Thus according to Aquinas 'they have held that 
the soul and flesh in our Lord Jesus Christ constitutes one substance, 
namely a certain man of the same species as other man. '2 While the 
union was in the person of the Logos, nevertheless because the manhood 
was a substance of its own, the union was one of the person of the 
Logos assuming the hypostasis of this man. Aquinas maintains that the 
distinction between person and hypostasis is merely verbal, but beyond 
that to hold that the manhood is a supposit of its own apart from the 
Logos demands that Christ be two beings and that the union between 
them must be moral and accidental comparable to that taught by Nestorius. 
'Things which are many in supposit, ' writes Aquinas, 
, are many simply, and they are but incidentally one. If, 
then, in Christ there are two supposits, it follows that he 
is two simply.... and this is "to dissolve Jesus" (1 Jn. 4: 3), 
for everything, in so far as it is, is one. ' 3 
Trying to avoid such a criticism some of Abelard's followers 
proposed that the soul and body were not united together, and thus 
there would not be a human person or supposit, but separately united 
to the Logos 'just as a man puts on his clothes. '4 While this 'habitus 
theory' solves the problem of the human person, Aquinas again believes 
1. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, III9 questions 6,7,10,21,22. 
For Aquinas' commentary see his III, Sentences. 
2. S. C. G. , N, . 38,1. 
3. Ibid., IV, 38,11. 
4. Ibid., IV, 37,1. 
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it to be Nestorian and even worse. 'For there is no difference in 
saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, 
as in a temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a 
garment.... rather it is something worse than Nestorius--to wit, that 
the soul and body are not united-" To deny that the body and soul 
are united is to deny the true humanity. 
2 
Aquinas' critique of these two theories brings out two priorities 
in his Christology. As Aquinas states both theories were motivated 
by the old Nestorian fear that it 'seemed impossible that one thing 
be substantial to another, yet not be of the nature which that other 
previously had, without any mutation taking place; and the Word, of 
course, is entirely immutable. '3 In order to uphold the immutable 
divinity of the Logos, they opted for a moral or accidental union. 
Aquinas, however, without belittling their concern, points out that 
'If the Word was united to the soul and body accidently.... the human 
nature was not the nature of the Word. '4 In other words, God is not 
man. For Aquinas it does no good to uphold the immutability of God 
with regards to the Incarnation if one does not hold that God is man, 
for the basic reason for maintaining God's immutability in the 
Incarnation is in order to hold that it is really God who is man. 
To deny that it is man that God is for the sake of the immutability 
is to undermine the very reason why God must be immutable in becoming 
man, that is, to hold that it is truly God who is man. Aquinas' 
concern here is primarily incarnational. It is a concern for the fact 
that God must be truly man if one is to uphold a true understanding 
of the Incarnation, and God must be immutable so that it is really 
God who is man. 
Aquinas' second priority likewise concerns the true humanity of 
Christ. The"habitus theory' not only denied a substantial union, but 
also in trying to uphold the'one person of Christ denied the union of 
soul and body. However this is to deny the true humanity. Again 
Aquinas would not . denegate their desire to maintain one person in the 
1. S. T., III9 2,6. Cf. S. C. G., IV, 37,6. 
2. Cf. C. G., IV9 37,10. For fuller studies of Aquinas' treatment 
of these theories see Walter H. Principe, 'St. Thomas on the 
Habitus-Theory Of the Incarnation, ' St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), 
Commemorative Studies, Ted. Armand A. Maurer, '(Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 381-418. See fn. 2. 
3. S. C. G., IV9 37,1. Cf. III, Sent., d. 6, q. 3, a. 1. 
4. S. C. G., IV, 37,6. 
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Incarnation, he criticises them precisely for not doing so, nevertheless 
to do so by undermining the true humanity defeats one's purpose. 'One 
will not be able to say that the Word assumed human nature if he did not 
assume a body united to a soul. 'I For Aquinas if the one person of the 
Logos is not truly man, then the whole point of it being the one person 
of the Logos is lost. 
Aquinas himself holds for the 'subsistence theory' which he believes 
is not 'to be called an opinion, but an article of the Catholic faith. '2 
The reason for this being that it maintains that the human and divine 
natures of Christ are united 'not by indwelling only, nor in an accidental 
mode..., but in one hypostasis and one supposit. '3 For Aquinas Christ as 
one being (ens) or supposit, must be the one person of the Logos existing 
both as God and as man. To deny this is to deny a true Incarnation and 
the Church's belief. But how does such an Incarnation come about? 
Following Cyril'a and Chalcedon's lead, Aquinas holds that 'the 
Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; 
while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed 
into one being inasmuch as this is of the nature.... but to one being 
inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. '4 In becoming man the 
Logos did not become a tertium quid being, one nature, but rather the 
Logos who existed as God from all eternity now exists as man. 
'Since the human nature, ' [writes Aquinas] 'is united to the 
Son of God, hypostatically or personally.... and not accidentally, 
it follows that by the human nature, there accrued to him no new 
personal being [esse Dersonal ] but only a new relation of 
pre-existing personal beýesse personale] to the human nature, 
in such a way that the person is said to subsist not merely in 
the divine nature but also in the human nature. ' 5 
'Become' means, as it did for Cyril, not that the Logos changed into a 
man, that he became a new person, but that the Logos took on a new mode 
or manner of existence, that is, as man. 'The mystery of the Incarnation 
was not completed through God being changed in any way from the immutable 
1. Ibid. , IV, 37,4. 
2. S. T., III, 2,6. 
3. S. C. G., IV, 39#1- 
4- S. III9 2,6, ad. 2. 
5, Ibid., III, 17,2. 
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state in which he had been from all eternity, but through his having 
united himself to the creature in a new way or rather through having 
united it to himself. 
' 
To fully grasp the meaning of this notion of 'become' and how it 
is truly an incarnational notion, special notice should be taken of 
Aquinas' stress that the human nature is united to the Logos and not 
vice-versa, and his use of 'esse personale. ' 
It is not by chance that Aquinas emphasises that the human nature 
'is united to' or 'accrued to' the Logos. The incarnational act is not 
one of local motion or change on the part of the Logos, as if he 
somehow 'left heaven' and 'came down' to earth, and changed himself 
into man. Rather the incarnational act, the 'becoming' is the uniting 
of a human nature to the very person of the Logos in such a way that 
the Logos exists as man. This union with the Logos then is not by way 
of some mediating act on the part of the Logos, but rather the human 
nature is united to the very person of the Logos as the Logos is, as he 
exists immutably as God, in his esse versonale. The Logos acquires no 
new personal being, as Aquinas states, (if he did, he would no longer 
be God); but rather he (as God) acquires a new mode of existing (as man), 
and this can be accomplished only if the human nature is united to him 
as he really is in his esse versonale as God. Aquinas' use of the term 
'esse personale' specifies that the union is in the Logos as he is as 
God, and thus does not change, thus assuring not only the immutability 
of God for God's sake, but also for the sake of the Incarnation, that 
is, so that it is really the Logos as God who becomes and is man. In 
so doing Aquinas likewise guarantees that the Logos is man and exists 
as man. Since the human nature is united to the very person of the Logos, 
the Logos must subsist in it and thus truly be man. 
'Whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether 
it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is 
not united to God the Nord, it is in no wise united to him; and 
thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with.... 
Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to 
him, which does not belong to his divine nature, it follows that 
the union took place in the person of the Word.... ' 2 
1. Ibid., III, 1,1, ad. 1. 
2. Ibid., III, 2,2. 
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While it may seem paradoxical, but nevertheless true, what Aquinas 
is pointing out is-that the union must be in the person of the Logos 
if it is to be really the Logos who is man, and thus the 'becoming' 
must be the uniting of the human nature to the very person of the Logos 
as he exists as God if it is 12 be really man that the Logos becomes. 1 
The heart of Aquinas' Christology has now been reached concerning 
God's immutability and his becoming man. It is fairly easy to under- 
stand how Aquinas sees the incarnational act from the above, and one 
can see that he argues from a 'Christological logic, ' that is, the 
incarnational act must be such because revelation demands it. However, 
can a rational philosophical underpinning be given to it, not only by 
way of apologetic, but also by way of clarifying and giving a deeper 
understanding. After all, is it not true, for example, that 'whatever 
acquires a new nature is subject to substantial change;... Then if the 
hypostasis of the Son of God becomes to subsist anew in human nature, 
it appears that it was substantially changed.? '2 Aquinas believes 
that such a criticism can be answered as well as giving a philosophical 
rational-to what faith demands if one understands the type of relation 
established in the Incarnation. 
Aquinas grants that 'become' usually implies change, but it can 
happen that 
'whatever is predicated relatively [by way of relation] can be 
newly predicated of something without its being changed, as a 
man may be made to be on the right side without being changed, 
and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. 
Hence in such uses, not all that is said to be made is changed, 
since it may happen by the change of something else.... Now to 
be man belongs to God by reason of union, which is a relation. 
. 
And. hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any 
change in him, but by a change in the human nature, which is 
assumed to a divine person. And hence when it is said, "God 
was made man, " we understand no change on the part of God, but 
only on the part of the human nature. ' 3 
Thus, 'This union, ' writes Aquinas 'is not really in God, but in our way 
of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the 
creature is really united to God without any change in him. '4 
1. For the difference of meaning between the concepts of 'assume' 
and 'unite' see Ibid., III, 2,8. 
2. S. C. G., IV, 40,3. See S. T., III, 16,6, obj. 2. 
3. S. T., III, 16,6, ad. 2. 
4. Ibid., III9 2,7, ad. 1. See M, 2,7, and ad. 2. Also 111,6,6, ad. 2. Also III Sent., c, q. 2, a. 2, so]. 3, ad. 2. Also III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, 
so1.1. 
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In placing the--incarnational act within the conceptual framework 
of relations, Aquinas has made an original contribution to Christology. 
However, on first reading the above, it seems to raise more questions 
than it answers. The obvious initial reaction is that such a relation 
is no relation at all. God may appear to be related, but really is 
not. It only seems so to our way of thinking. For this reason a short 
study of Aquinas' understanding of relations must be made before trying 
to explicate exactly what Aquinas is trying to say about the incarnational 
act as relational. 
3. Mixed Relations: e. g. Creation 
For Aquinas while relation is a genus, it is unique among other 
genera. Of all the genera ' 
'only in relations alone is found something which is only in the 
apprehension and not in reality. The other genera, such as quantity 
and quality, in their strict and proper meaning signify something 
inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning 
signifies only what refers to another [ad aliud]. ' 1 
Quantity and quality signify what pertains to the subject in himself, 
weight or whiteness, and thus signifies somethinaý. Relation, however, does 
not posit a new reality in the subject, rather it is apprehended as 
referring one subject to another. This does not mean that relations 
are mental constructs imposed on reality, rather relations are apprehended 
as an association between two subjects which in some sense exist. 
Relation by definition involves two extremes, terms or subjects. 
Now the relation between two subjects can be logical or real and it 
can be logical or real in three ways. Both terms can be logically related, 
really related, or the relation can be logical in one term and real in 
the other. This last can be called a mixed relation. Basically then 
for Aquinas there are three classes of relations. 
2 The first two must 
be briefly examined and the third at greater length. 
The first class is called logical relations (rationis relatio) or 
1. S. T., It 28,1. See De Vero 1,5, ad. 16. For a complete 
study of Aquinas' teaching on relations see A. Krempel, La 
Doctrine de-la-Relation Chez Saint Thomas, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952). 
2. S. T., It 13,7" 
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relations according to reason (secvndum rationis). Both terms are 
logically related when the relation 'is in idea only, -as when mutual 
order or habitude can only be between things in the apprehension of 
reason. 'I For example, when reason conceives a relation 'between 
being and non-being.... apprehending non-being as an extreme. ' Or a 
relation due to an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like. 
2 
Logical relations are established by the mind and its understanding 
of the terms and is not due to the terms themselves. This does not 
mean that there is no basis in reality for the relation, but that the 
relation does not exist in reality, but in the apprehending mind. For 
this reason logical relations are sometimes called 'unreal' relations. 
However, it must be kept in mind that to call such relations unreal 
is not to say that there is no relation between the terms. For unreal 
relations to mean that would be a contradiction of the very definition 
of relation. Moreover, when two terms are related logically, nothing 
in the reality of the terms undergoes change since the relation is made 
in the mind. To say that Pido is related to the canine species does 
9t not change Fido or the canine species. 
' 
Real relations 
'are realities as regard both extremes, as when for instance 
a habitude exists between two things according to some reality 
that belongs to both.... (such as) quantity: as great and small... 
and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and 
passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, 
and the like. ' 3 
Real relations are the most commonly considered and experienced. The 
relation is due to something in the reality of the terms themselves and 
what establishes the relation is due to something they have in common 
or brings about some change in the terms due to some causality. One 
person is relatively taller than another for both have height in common. 
A brother and sister are related because they have the same parents in 
common. A man is not a father until he has a son. 
Aquinas also maintains that besides having relations that are 
mutually logical or mutually real, it is also possible to have a relation 





a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme 
it is an idea only: and this happens whenever two extremes are not in 
the same order. '1 By 'order' Aquinas means ontological order. Such 
mixed relations exist between creator and creature, knower and know, 
and, as has been seen, between the Logos and his humanity. 
Besides the above examples of mixed relations Aquinas on a number 
of occasions gives the example of being on the right or the left. 
2 
For 
a man to move from the right to the left of a column only is a change 
as far as the man is concerned. The relation is real in him. However, 
it is only logical for the column since right and left is due to man's 
conceptual understanding of place and being on the right or left in no 
way affects the column. Aquinas in using the example of being on the 
right or left has caused a great deal of confusion in understanding what 
he means by a mixed relation. If Aquinas means this example to be a 
true and literal example of the case in point, i. e., a mixed relation, 
then he must change his definition of what a mixed relation is for being 
on the right or left has nothing to do with the terms being in different 
ontological orders as his definition claims they should be. It would 
seem that Aquinas uses this example not as a literal case in point, but 
as an example analogous to real mixed relations. Using this analogous 
example, which is taken from empirical everyday life, Aquinas can give 
some idea of two main features of a mixed relation, i. e., how one term 
(logical term) can be related to the other term (real term) only because 
the latter is related to the former, and thus also how and why the 
logical term remains unchanged. Aquinas seems to use this example only 
when he wants to convey these two points. However, it should be noted, 
and this is the main reason for treating this point, that in failing to 
be an example where the terms are in different ontological orders 
Aquinas gives the impression that to be a logical term in a mixed relation 
means there is no relation to the real term other than that man's mind 
so conceives it to be. Man's mind brings the relation about. In reality 
the logical term has no relation to the real term at all. If that were 
the case God would not in reality be creator, man in reality would not 
be a knower, and the Logos in reality would not be man, but only so 
conceived to be in man's mind. Those critics of Aquinas who take the 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., I, 13,7; III9 16,6, ad. 2. 
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right and left example as a true mixed relation can rightly criticize 
Aquinas if that is what he means with regards to God as creator, the 
Logos as man as well. However, it would seem that Aquinas does not 
mean that. In a true mixed relation the logical term is in a radically 
different situation as will be seen. Nevertheless, this ambiguity will 
keep appearing in Aquinas' treatment of mixed relations. 
In order to gain a true understanding of this type of relation and 
at the same time as a preliminary to fully understanding Aquinas' notion 
of the Incarnation it would be good to analyze the relation between 
creator and creature. 
In explicating Aquinas' understanding of God it was shown that God 
is ontologically distinct from finite reality. Thus while both God and 
finite beings exist, there mode or order of being is distinct. 
Nevertheless, if God as pure act is the cause of all other acts, and 
if God alone can be the only sufficient reason for the existence of 
finite beings, then some relationship is necessarily implied. 
1 
For Aquinas 'Creation signified actively means the divine action, 
which is God's essence, with a relation to the creatures. But in God 
relation to the creature is not real, but only a relation of reason; 
whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation.... '2 
Creation signifies action on the part of God, but being pure act creation 
signifies no other action than the act by which God is, that is, as 
ipsum esse. This does not mean that God by necessity creates, but 
rather God as pure act creates by no other action than the pure act 
that he is. 
To create then is to bring something into being. Creation pertains 
not to the fact that beings are of such and such a kind, what they are, 
but rather to the fact that beings of any kind are at all. 'To create 
is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things esse 
rerum]. 
3 Thus while a created being is always of a certain kind, it is 
called created 'because it is a being, not because it is this being. '4 
Thus to create is 'to produce being absolutely, [and] not as this or 
that being., 
5 This is why to create is to make something from nothing. 
1. Cf. S. C. G., II, 11. De Pot. 7,8. S. T., I, 28,1, ad. 3. 
2. S. T., It 45,3, ad. 1. 
3. Ibid., I, 45,6. 
4. Ibid., It 45,4, ad. 1- 
5- Ibid., I, 45,5. 
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If creation pertains to the being of things then there can be no-thing 
previous to creation. Thus one can only figuratively speak of 'before' 
creation since ultimate nothingness nullifies that there is anything 
to which something could be before. Nothing signifies the complete 
absence of being and all that flows from being. 
1 
Likewise then to create 
does not imply motion, change, or succession, for motion, change, and 
succession only take place in previous existing beings or state of 
affairs. As Aquinas states: 'In every change or motion there must be 
something existing in one way now and in a different way before, for the 
very word change shows this. But where the whole substance of a thing 
is brought into being, there can be no same thing existing in different 
ways. '2 One conceives of creation as a change only because one imagines 
a state of non-being previous to creation, but this is only imagined 
since there is nothing and 'no before' creation. 
3 
Mascall puts this 
nicely when he states that while 'creation does indeed "make a difference" 
to the creature, and the most radical of all differences, since were it 
not for creation there would be no creature at all; nevertheless, were 
it not for creation there would be no creature to which this difference 
could be made. '4 
Thus to create does not imply a change in the creature, but something 
much more radical and dynamic, the establishing of the creature itself 
as existing. The effect of creation in the creature is the creature 
itself, the fact that it is and was not. 'In creation it is not non- 
being that receives divine action, but the thing which has been created. '5 
The effect pertains not to the essence of the creature by way of change, 
but to the esse of the creature, and the effect is esse itself. 'Creation 
is not a change, ' writes Aquinas, 'but the very dependence of the created 
act of being upon the principle from which it is produced. ' 
6 
Thus 
one sees why the relation of creature to creator is real in the creature. 
It is more real than any other real relation that may exist between 
two creatures which implies change, for the real effect of the relation 
1. Cf. Ibid., I, 45,1-3. Also S. C. G., II, 11. Also De Pot. 3,1- 
2. S. C. G_, II9 17,4. Cf. S. C. G., II, 19" Also De Pot. 3,2. 
3. Cf. S. T., I, 45,3, ad. 2. Also S. C. G., II9 17. 
4. E. L. M. ascall, Existence and AnaloAY, p. 145" Cf. E. L. biascall, 
Via Media, (London: Longnans, Green and Co., 1956), P" 31ff. 
5. De Pot. 3,3, ad. 1. 
6. S. C. G., II, 18,2. 
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is nothing other than the fact that the creature is a creature, an 
existing being. As Aquinas states: 'Creation places something in the 
thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is 
not made by movement, or change.... Creation in the creature is only a 
certain relation to the creator as to the principle of its being. 
' 
It should be rather obvious now why for Aquinas God creates by no 
other act than the pure act that he is, and also why God's relatedness 
to creatures is logical. To produce being absolutely, which implies 
the complete absence of being of any sort, demands a being who absolutely 
is, whose very essence is to be, who is irsum esse. 
2 Thus to create 
demands that God acts by no other act than the pure act that he is as 
ipsum esse for no other act will do. But if the act of creation demands 
that God act by no other act than by the act that he is as ipsum esse 
then obviously creation does not change or effect God. The whole effect 
is in the creature precisely because it is in being related to God as 
ipsum esse that he comes to be. That God is only logically related to 
creatures is not something negative, but rather specifies and clarifies 
the exact nature of the real relation in creatures; that is, a relatedness 
to God as he is in himself as insum esse which effects the very coming 
to be and continued existence of the creature. 
3 Thus God as pure act 
must be immutable not only because he is pure act, but also, since 
creation demands a cause that is pure act, he must by necessity be 
immutable to be creator as well. If God changed or was affected by the 
act of creation, it would mean that he acted by some other act than by 
pure act, which is impossible both because God is pure act and can have 
no other act, and because no act other than pure act can create. 
It should be noted then that for God to be the logical term of the 
relationship does not mean that he is not closely related to the creature. 
Just as was seen above that to say'that creation does'not"mearr change, 
does not imply a lack of dynamism, but rather something more dynamic than 
1. S. T., I, 45,3" To be utterly dependent on the creator does 
not imply loss of independence, but rather the establishment 
of the creature's independence. See Gilson, Spirit of Medieval 
Philosophy, p. 30. 
2. Cf. S. T., I, 45,5. Also S. C. G., II9 21. Also De Pot. 3,4. 
3. For the fact that creation and preservation are the sane see 
S. T., I, 9.2; I, 8,1; I, 1040. Also De Pot. 591. 
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any change or movement could be, so now to say that God is logically 
related to creatures demands a closeness to creatures which isýfar 
greater than any mutually real relation. If in creation God creates by 
no other act than the pure act that he is, and if the creature is only 
by being related to the very act that God is, then God is present in 
the creature by his very essence, by the pure act that he is. For 
Aquinas 'God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed of the 
things-themselves, as if he were of their essence; but by his own 
essence; because his substance is present to all things as the cause 
of their being. '1 Even Pantheism falls short of such a close relationship, 
for in Pantheism God is never fully present as he is in himself, by his 
essence, but by some less 
emanation or divine spark of his being. 
At the start it was pointed out that a relation which is real in 
one term and logical in the other takes place when the two terms are in 
distinct ontological orders. What Aquinas means by this is now clear. 
The relationship is between two distinct ontological orders precisely 
because the relationship establishes one of the orders, i. e., the lesser 
order. It is not as if both terms existed prior to the relationship 
and then were related by some third mediating act, but the very relation 
is one of bringing into being the lesser of the terms, and the relation 
is real in that term precisely in that the term comes to be and exists. 
It is logical in the other term because the second term is totally 
dependent for its existence on being related to the first term as the 
first is in itself, and not by any other act. Thus one sees that to 
describe a relation as logical in one term and real in the other is to 
predicate a creative relationship, and one then that is supremely dynamic 
and intimate. 
It is at this point that the difficulty in Aquinas first alluded 
to in his example of being on the right or left can be solved. First 
however the problem must be accentuated. Aquinas consistently states 
concerning the logical term of a mixed relation such as God that 'the 
relation is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking. '2 What 
does Aquinas mean by this? Does he mean that God is not actually related 
to creatures as the column is not actually related to the man on its 
right, but only conceived to be related by man's conceptual understanding? 
1. S. T., I, 8,3, ad. I. 
2. Cf. S. T., I, 13,7; III9 2,7, ad. 1. Also S. C. G., II9 13,4" 
Also De Ver. 3,2, ad. 8. Also De Pot. 7,8-11. 
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If God's relation to creatures in purely due to our way of thinking, 
then in reality he is not creator nor in the Incarnation man. From 
explicating the creator/creature relationship it is impossible to think 
that this is what Aquinas means. Aquinas himself states that 'It cannot 
be said, however, that these relations exist as realities outside God. '1 
Moreover he himself gives this interpretation as an objection to his 
own position. 
2 
What Aquinas could mean is that 'to man's way of thinking' God as 
creator establishes a relation in which he acquires something new and 
thus is changed. To man's way of thinking God in creating not only is 
God in himself, but now because of the creative relationship receives 
a new note of being a creator. However, while this is man's way of 
thinking it is not true, for 'if a relation were predicated of God as 
really existing in him, it would follow that something accrues to God 
anew, and thus is changed either essentially or accidentally, ' which is 
impossible since God is ii)sum esse. 
3 While man may think this way, 
even though it is false, it would not seem to be what Aquinas means when 
he uses the phrase 'to our way of thinking. ' 
That Aquinas does mean is that we understand God to be related to 
man, not because of some effect or change in him, but solely and precisely 
because the creature is really related to God. It is only because the 
creature is related to God in a new way, such as a creature, that we 
understand God in a new way, as creator. God is creator not because we 
so conceive him to be, but we understand that he is creator because 
creatures are really related to him in a creative relation. 
4 
Thus God for Aquinas is in reality creator, but he is creator not 
because of a newness within his being, but because in reality something 
is newly related to him as he is, the creature. It is because the 
creature is really related to God as the source of its being, that God 
is actually related to him as creator. Thus one can say that while God 
is the logical term of a mixed relation in that he does not change, nor 
establishes the relation by some mediating act, but by relating the 
creature to himself as he is, he nevertheless is actually related to the 
1. S. C. G., II9 13,1. 
2. Cf. S. T., I, 13,7, obj. 5. Also De Ver. 3,2, obj. 8. 
3. S. C.., II9 12,5. 
4, Ibid., II9 13,4" 
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creature because the creature is really related to him. Such an 
interpretation of Aquinas is witnessed by what he himself states con- 
cerning the name 'Lord. ' 'Since God is related to the creature for 
the reason that the creature is related to him; and since the relation 
is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord [and thus Creator 
also] not in idea only, but in reality, for he is called Lord according 
to the manner in which the creature is subject to him. ' 
The basic confusion lies in Aquinas' ambiguous use of the expressions 
'logical term' and 'logical relation. ' He never explicitly distinguishes 
the difference between being a 'logical term' in a mutual logical relation 
and being a 'logical term' in a mixed relation. When he uses this concept 
in the two situations the distinction is evidently there, but he never 
devotes a' ueg stio' to it. The distinction is that the logical terms 
in a mutual logical relation are related by man's conceptual understanding. 
Man in his understanding relates Fido and canine species. The same is 
true of the example of being on the right or left. However, in a true 
mixed relation, the logical term is related not because man establishes 
the relation in his mind, but to the fact that in reality some second 
term is really related to it as it is in itself and not by any mediating 
action, and thus in reality the logical term is actually related. The 
logical term is understood in a new way because of the real effect in the 
second term. While in both instances the logical term remains unchanged, 
since nothing new adheres to its being 
(and this is why Aquinas uses the 
term in both instances), yet in a mixed relation a further note is added 
to the concept of 'logical term, ' that of actually being related to the 
second term because the second term is really related to it. 
The lack of this clear distinction between the different meanings 
given to the concept 'logical term' due to the different situations in 
which it is used, obviously can cause confusion and ambiguity. Giving 
'real relation' the meaning of a relation that denotes and effects some 
newness in the terms, Aquinas continued to use 'logical relation' to 
express a relation that does not denote or effect a newness in the term. 
One wonders if Aquinas in taking over Aristotle's terminology did not 
fail to realize how much he had changed Aristotle's understanding of 
mixed relations since Aristotle never dealt with such relations as 
1. Cf. S. T., It 13,7, a1"5. See ad. 1. Also S. C. G., II, 11,2. 
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creation and the Incarnation imply. However, that is another problem 
and another study. Ideally, there should be a different word to express 
the full truth contained in the use of 'logical term' in a mixed 
relation. Unfortunately Aquinas did not find one, nor does it seem 
that he thought he needed to; and no one has found one since. In the 
above 'actual relation' was used to express the reality of the relation, 
but only to give the full meaning to the concept 'logical relation' as 
used in a mixed relation. Real relations are obviously actual also. 
1 
Before closing this section on relations it should be noted that 
Aquinas also sees the relation between the knower and the known as a 
mixed relation. It must suffice to say that the effect of the relation 
is real in the knower in that the knower comes to be the known in a 
universal and immaterial way and thus is related to the known as the 
known is. The known object is logically related to the knower in that 
it remains unchanged, and yet actually is related to the knower since 
it is known. The interesting point being that unlike the creator/ 
creature relationship, an 'incarnational' aspect is present. The real 
effect in the knower is not that it makes a copy of the extramental 
object. If these were the case, he would not know the object as it is, 
but only the copy. Rather the knower in the act of knowing comes to be 
in a universal and immaterial manner, through the power of the intellect, 
the object known. For Aquinas then truth lies in the judgement that what 
the knower has come to be is what is or is not in reality. 
2 
4. A Mixed Relation: the Incarnation 
With the above exposition of a mixed relation exemplified by the 
creator/creature relationship, one can easily and quickly see now why 
and how Aquinas places the Incarnation in such a conceptual framework. 
Aquinas' reasoning seems to be twofold. Firstly, it gives a philosophical 
rational as to how one can conceive a true incarnation. While it is a 
mystery, such a relation as the Incarnation implies, while unique, is 
1. Kelly may be proposing an understanding of a mixed relation similar 
to the one delineated here. Cf. A. J. Kelly, 'God: How Near a 
Relation? ', Thomist, 34 (1970), pp. 216-219. Also A. J. Kelly, 
'Trinity and Process: Relevance of the Basic Christian Confession 
of God, ' Theological Studies, 13 (1970), pp. 412-413. 
2. For a fuller exposition see De Ver., 1. Also S. T., I, questions 
12,14,16,17,79,84,85" See also J. Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, 
ed. 4. (London: Geoffrey Blis, 1959), pp. 112-124. Also E. Gilson, 
Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 190-215. 
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not completely irrational. The creator/creature relationship and the 
knower/known relationship are of a similar type, and even being on the 
right or left is somewhat analogous. All of the above, except the 
last, as mixed relations demonstrate how the relation can be real in 
one term and logical in the other and yet both be actually related. 
Thus when applied to the Incarnation, one can in some measure grasp how 
the Logos can truly remain unchanged and thus be truly God, and yet at 
the same time be truly man. 
However, it was not only for apologetic reasons that Aquinas placed 
the Incarnation in the conceptual framework of a mixed relation. By 
so doing he also specified and clarified the nature of the 'becoming' 
in the Incarnation and the ensuing union. Previously, it was shown 
that Aquinas saw the 'becoming' as the uniting of the manhood to the 
Logos in such a way that the Logos subsisted in it. Looked at now from 
the conceptual framework of a mixed relation one can see the exact 
nature of the 'becoming'. The real effect in the manhood is both that 
it comes to be, not by way of change, but more dynamically that it 
comes to be or exist; and also that it is united to the Logos. It is 
a real and true humanity that comes to be and is related, and thus for 
Aquinas the real effect in the humanity is created. 
1 Moreover, by 
maintaining that the Logos is the logical term of the relation, and 
this is the main point, Aquinas specifies the closeness and depth of 
the real effect in the humanity. The grace of union or the created 
relational effect in the humanity is not 'ordained to (another) act, 
but to the personal being [ad esse -aersonale] of the Logos,. ' 
2 The 
humanity is not united to the Logos by some mediating act, but united 
to the Logos as the Logos is in himself, in what Aquinas calls, his 
esse rersonale. This makes it possible to maintain that it is really 
the Logos as God who is man. Because the Logos as the logical term 
remains unchanged, and thus in turn making it possible for the real 
effect in the humanity to be that of coming to be and being united to 
the Logos as he is, one can grasp how in the Incarnation it can really 
be god who is man, and truly man that God is. All this can be said 
briefly by stating that the real created effect in the humanity is 
nothing other than the eternal uncreated Logos subsisting in it. As 
1. Cf. S. T., III, 2, 8. 
2. Ibid.. III, 8, 6, ad. 3. 
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Aquinas says 'The grace of union [the created relational effect in 
the humanity] is the personal being itself [insum esse personale] that 
is given gratis from above to the human nature in the person of the 
Word. ' 1 
While the confusion and ambiguity of Aquinas' use of the concept 
'logical relation' is present in his Christology as it was in the 
creator/creature relationship, one can see now both from the previous 
study of the ambiguity and from the above how Aquinas conceives the 
Logos as the logical term, and what he means when he states that 'this 
union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God 
is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really 
united to God without any change in him. '2 Aquinas does not mean that 
the Logos is not actually related to the humanity and thus is not 
actually man, but only so conceived to be by our way of thinking. Nor 
is he just pointing out that such a relation concerning the Logos seems 
to us to imply change but really does not, although that may be true. 
What Aquinas does mean is that the Logos is understood to be related, 
and actually is related, not by some effect or change in him, but because 
the manhood is really related to him. It is because the manhood is 
really related to the Logos as he is that he becomes and is man, and 
man understands him in a new way: as man. 
It may be worthwhile mentioning in concluding this section that it 
is only within the conceptual framework of a mixed relation that one can 
understand Aquinas' teaching on the number of eases in Christ. For 
Aquinas Christ is one being, ens, by the esse personale of the Logos, but 
he is one ens by the esse personale only because the created relational 
esse, i. e., the real relational effect in the humanity, is that it comes 
to be and is united to the Logos in such a way that the Logos subsists 
in it. 
3 
5. The Passibility of God as Man 
Aquinas does not contribute anything substantially new to the 
Ibid., iii, 6,6. 
2. Ibid., III9 2,7, ad- 
l-3- Cf. Ibid., III9 2,8; III9 17,2. Also De Unione Verbi Incarnate, 
1, ad. 10; and 4" 
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Church's tradition on the communication of idioms. He closely follows 
the teaching and arguments of Cyril. 
Aquinas holds that 
'since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same 
hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus 
whether we say man or God, the hypostasis of divine and 
human nature is signified. And hence, of the man may be said 
what belongs to the divine nature, as of the hypostasis of 
the divine nature, and of God may be said what belongs to 
the human nature, as of a hypostasis of the human nature. ' 
It is because one and the same person is both God and man that one can 
truly predicate to each the attributes of the other. 'God's Word and 
the man Christ are one supposit and, consequently, one Person, and 
whatever is said of that man must be said of the Word of God, and 
conversely. '2 The attributes are not then predicated directly to each 
nature, but to the person who exists both as God and as man. 'With 
respect to the "about which" each class is predicated no distinction 
must be made, but unity is discovered. But with respect to "what" is 
predicated, a distinction must be made. '3 
As with Cyril, the basis for the above is the fact that God truly 
is man, it is truly God who is man, and it is truly man that God is. Only 
because of this can one say with any true intelligible meaning that God 
hungered, thirst, died, etc.. It is because the Logos is man that 
'every suffering that took place in the body of that man can be ascribed 
to the Word of God. So it is right to say that the Word of God--and 
God-suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried. '4 
That must be pointed out concerning Aquinas is not so much the 
above, but rather the incarnational relevance of the immutability of God 
to his passibility as man. 
It has been stressed that Aquinas in his Christology was motivated 
to uphold the immutability of the Logos not just for theo-logical 
reasons, but primarily for incarnational reasons. The Logos for Aquinas 
1. S. T., m, 16,4. Cl. S. T., III9 16,5. 
2. S. C. G., IV9 34,29. 
3. Ibid., IV, 39,2. 
4. Ibid., IV9 34,11. For all the human qualities that can be 
predicated of Christ cf. S. T., III9 14-15. 
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must remain immutable in becoming man, not only because he is God, but 
also to ensure the fact that it is truly God--who is man. The same 
incarnational motivation is present in Aquinas' treatment of the 
passibility of God as man. 
In ensuring that it is truly God who is man Aquinas ensured that 
it is truly God who is passible as man. While Aquinas does not say it 
explicately, what is present in his incarnational motivation for the 
immutability of God is the paradox that God must remain immutable in 
becoming man so that it is truly God who is mutable and passible as man. 
This motivation and concern in Aquinas' teaching can be seen not 
in his teaching on the fact that it is God who is man, since God's 
passibility as man is not at question there, but rather in his teaching 
on the fact that it is really marl that God is. Treating the question 
of 'Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body? ' Aquinas 
argues that if he did not, he firstly would not then be man, and secondly 
'if his body was not real but imaginary, he neither underwent a real 
death, nor those things which the Evangelists recount of him, did he do 
any in very truth, but only in appearance.... '1 'While the argument 
concerns the real humanity, the whole point of it is to guarantee that 
God is man. He who must really suffer, die, etc. is the Son of God. 
It is interesting to note that against the objection that this destroys 
the dignity of God, such as his immutability, Aquinas adroitly stresses 
that the incarnational act and union does not bring about a change in 
the Logos, but rather guarantees that it is really the Logos as God who 
is man, since 'he assumed a body to the unity of Person. '2 
While much of the above treatment of Aquinas may seem abstract and 
'lifeless, ' it is here where all that went before gains in meaning. 
Every human being thirsts, hungers, suffers, dies, and for Christ to be 
just another man added to the human race makes little difference. It is 
only if Christ is truly God who as man thirsts, hungers, suffers, dies, 
in time and history that time and history and every human life is 
changed and made new. 
1. S. T., III, 5,1. Cl. III, 5,2-4. Also S. C. G., IV9 29-32. 
2. S. T., III, 5,1, ad. 2. 
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CHMER 4 
KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS COMPOSITIONAL 
The jump from Aquinas to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
is quite large to say the least. Again this gap does not imply that 
Christological speculation stood still. However, as will be seen, the 
problems which culminated in Kenotic Christology arise as far back as 
Luther and the Reformation and continually surface between then and the 
turn of this century. Looked at from that perspective the gap between 
Aquinas and the Kenoticists is not so great. 
Because Kenotic Christology is the culmination of a long process this 
chapter will be introduced by a short study of Luther's Christology and 
the problems and speculations it spawned which lead to Kenotic Christology. 
However, the main concern of this chapter will be Kenotic Christology 
itself, and specifically Charles Gore and Frank Weston. These two Anglican 
bishops and theologians were chosen both because of the influence they 
exerted in their day, and because of the maturity of their Kenotic 
Christological theories. 
A. Luther and Lutheran Christolovr 
The most obvious feature of Luther's Christology is its soteriological 
orientation. This soteriological orientation has two repercussions. Firstly, 
Luther is not primarily interested in the ontological constitution of 
Christ as such, but rather in the functional or pro me aspects of his 
person. Because of this and secondly, Luther once more reverts to biblical 
categories of thought to express his Christology. The following 
exemplifies this perfectly: 
'Christ has two natures. What has that to do with me? If he 
bears the magnificent and consoling name of Christ, it is on 
account of the ministry and the task which he took upon himself; 
it is that which gives him his name. That he should by nature 
be both man and God, that is for him. But that he should have 
dedicated his ministry and poured out his love to become my 
saviour and my redeemer, it is in that that I find my consolation 
and well-being. To believe in Christ does not mean that Christ is 
a person who is man and God, a fact which helps nobody; it means 
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that this person is Christ, that is to say, that for us he 
came forth from God into the world; it is from this office 
that he takes his name. ' 1 
This does not mean that Luther sees no importance in whether Jesus 
is God and man, but rather the importance of this lies only in the function 
that Jesus performs as saviour and man's acceptance of him as such. As 
Congar states: 'For Luther, the incarnation is not only inseparable from 
the redemptive act; it is also considered only in the concrete exercise 
of the redemptive act; the metaphysical mystery of the hypostatic union is 
considered solely in the act of salvation of which it forms the very 
reality. '2 While this complicates the attainment of Luther's understanding 
of the ontological structure of Christ, the main aspects can nevertheless 
be ascertained. 
It is readily evident that Luther understands Christ to be both God 
and man, and yet one and the same person. Siggins very nicely lays out 
appropriate texts to show this. For Luther Christ is 'very God and very 
man'; 'two natures united to one person'; 'God and man in one person'; 
'essential, natural, true, complete God and man in one person, undivided 
and inseparable'; .... 'true God of true God, and true man of true man'; 
'begotten of the Father in eternity, and conceived by the Holy Ghost, born 
of the Virgin Mary in time. '3 There is no doubt that all this has a 
Chalcedonian ring about it. Luther himself maintains that Chalcedon was 
correct. Nevertheless, one can ask: How did Luther understand Chalcedon, 
and whether his understanding was the same as Chalcedon's? '4 
To obtain Luther's real meaning of the formulas it must be remembered 
that his Christology arises mainly from his scriptural exegesis and 
1. As quoted by Yves Congas, 'Considerations and Reflections on the 
Christology of Luther, ' Dialogue Between Christians, (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1966), p. 374. Cf. pp. 375-376. This article 
first appeared in French in Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geshichte 
und Ge nwart, Vol. III, ed. G. Grillmeier and H. Backt, Wurzburg, 
1954)t pp. 457-486. Cf. Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's 
Doctrine of Christ, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970T pp. 
197-1989 212" Also Paul Althaus, The Theoloav of Martin Luther, 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 190-192. 
2. Congar, P. 377. 
3. As quoted by Siggins, pp. 205-206. Cf. pp. 191-214- 
4- Cf. Siggins, p. 206. Also Cougar, pp. 272-273. 
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soteriology and not from theological speculation. Thus Luther in reading 
the Gospels sees the historical concrete personage of Jesus as speaking 
and acting sometimes as God and sometimes as man and always as pro me. 
In so speaking and acting he reveals both the divine and human natures, 
and yet since it is the one historical person who does both, he reveals 
that he is nevertheless one. 'First he speaks as God, then as man. So I 
learn my article that Christ speaks as God and man. ' Or again, 'If Christ 
were to speak as God all the time, we could not prove that he was true 
man; but if he were always to speak as true man, we could never discover 
that he is also true God. '1 The above is reminiscent of the Antiochene 
form of exegesis found especially in Theodore of Mopsuestia. The divine 
and human sayings and actions of the historical Jesus are juxtaposed to 
one another, and because of this juxtaposition one comes to grasp that the 
natures are distinct. One feels at this point that Luther's nominalistic 
background is also exerting influence. This, however, raises the old 
problem. If the natures are juxtaposed, how are they united? What is the 
nature of the 'incarnational becoming? ' How does God become man without 
compromising either the immutability of God or the integrity of the 
humanity? How is it that this one historical Jesus speaks and acts, at 
different times, as God and as man? The key to answering these questions 
lies in the answer to this question: Who is it who speaks and acts at 
different times as God and man? 
Because Luther sees the natures as juxtaposed and Christ speaking 
and acting at one time as God and at another time as man, one would normally 
expect that like the Antiochenes he would be accused of perpetrating a 
doctrine of two Sons. Depending on what was being said or done would 
depend on which nature, which person, which Son was doing the speaking 
and acting. However, just the opposite happened. Zwingli accused Luther 
in the Eucharistic controversy over the ubiquity of Christ of confusing 
the two natures and making them one. In other words, Zwingli believed 
that Luther saw the union between the two natures as bringing about change 
and mutation in each. He believed that Luther saw the union between the 
two natures as bringing about a tertium Quid being, that Christ was a 
combination of both. 
In response to Zwingli Luther maintains 'We hold Christ Our Lord as 
God and man in one person, non confundens naturas nee dividendo versonam 
1. As quoted by Siggins, p. 209. 
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(in such a way that we do not confuse the natures and do not divide the 
person). 
' It is evident from this that Luther did not wish to hold what 
Zwingli accused him of, and desired to maintain a Chalcedonian understanding. 
However, when Luther explains exactly how the natures are unconfused and 
yet one person, a different picture appears. 
Congar points out that Luther uses the German word Wesen both to 
mean 'nature' and 'person'. Thus when he wishes to make the distinction 
in Christ, he speaks of two Wesen; but when he speaks of Christ as one, 
he speaks of one Wesen. While this causes some ambiguity, one can nevertheless 
conclude that 'the "person" is the concrete whole constituted by the union 
of the divine nature with the human nature. He conceives it as a complete 
and concrete whole, an integral whole in the same way as the body and 
soul in man constitute a single person. '2 
For Luther then the person is the historical Jesus as a whole; the 
result or consequent of the union of the natures. Christ, as a being, is 
a composite of human and divine natures as man is a composite of body and 
soul. The person, the being, the whole existential reality of Christ is 
a divine/human person, being, existential reality. Thus Christ is not the 
person of the Logos existing as man, but rather the concrete existential/ 
historical being composed from and out of a divine and a human nature. 
It is because Christ is the coming together of both natures that he at 
one time speaks and acts as God, and at other times speaks and acts as man. 
Dorner summarizes Luther's Christology well: 
'it is therefore characteristic of Luther, that even at a later 
period, in speaking of the Person of Christ, he should have 
always said, not, "the person of the Son united within itself 
the two natures; " but, "the divine and the human natures were so 
united with each other, that Christ was but one single person. " 
The "Unto" he regarded principally as a "Unio" of natures, the 
result of which is the "Unio personalis"..... ' 3 
Luther does not wish to imply, however, that the two natures form a 
terium quid nature as Zwingli accused him of doing. While the union of 
natures forms the one reality and being of Jesus, they remain distinct. 
Jesus as a whole is a divine/human reality: a God-Ilan. 
1. As quoted by Congar, pp. 393-394. 
2. Congar, pp. 394-395" Cf. Siggins, pp. 221-228. 
3. J. A. Dorner, The Person of Christ, II9 ii, (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1839), P. 79. Cf. p. 99. Also Siggins, p. 224. 
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What must be remembered is, and this is where confusion arises, 
that while Luther uses 'nature' as an ontological category to express 
the distinct reality and non-confusion of God and man in Christ, in the 
concrete historical Jesus 'nature' takes on a functional or dynamic 
aspect as well. Thus 'divine nature' in the historical Jesus not only 
denotes the reality of God, but also has the added note of the reality 
of God working and acting to bring about salvation: divine nature equals 
God pro me. This is only in keeping with Luther's soteriological frame- 
work from which he views Christology. Thus while the natures are distinct, 
in the historical concrete whole Jesus they nevertheless dynamically 
interact with one another. 
This is well illustrated by Luther's use of the communication of 
idioms. Because the Incarnation is seen as the coming together of two 
natures to form the one reality of Christ the communication of idioms 
for Luther is not divine and human attributes predicated of the one person 
of the Logos, but rather the mutual interchange and communication of divine 
and human properties from one nature to the other. Luther can say 'Mary 
makes broth for God, ' 'Mary suckles God with her breasts, bathes God, 
rocks and carries him; moreover, Pilate and Herod crucified and killed 
God. ' Likewise, he can say that the man is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and creator. 
2 However, Luther does not mean that God as man is killed 
by Pilate, nor that man is creator in so far as the Person who is man 
is God, but rather because the natures form the one whole Jesus what one 
nature does or undergoes is directly communicated to the other. In 
Luther's words: 'guae uni naturae conveniunt, toti personae conveniunt in 
concreto': 'communicatio naturarum adducit etiam communicationem 
idiomatum': nrorter unitam coniunctionem et unitatem duarum naturarum 
fit communicatioidiomatum. '3 
Without contradicting the above, the formulas would seem to be 
reversable for Luther as well. The union of natures, the Incarnation, is 
brought about by the communication and interchange of properties. 
Dorner states: 
1. As quoted by Siggins, p. 232. 
2. Cf. Congar, p. 396. 
3. As quoted by Siggins, p. 232. Cf. p. 231. 
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'The sense he [Luther] tries to put on the formula, -- a sense it 
is true, different from its scholastic one, -- is the following: -- 
that the natures themselves, in their actuality, are so united, 
that the deity possessed humanity as a proper determination of 
its own being, and the humanity was omnipotent. In one word, he 
used the formula to denote a real mutual communication, not merely 
of attributes, but with the attributes, of the substance of the 
natures. ' [writer's italics 
In a following footnote Dorner points out texts in Luther where 'communication 
of attributes' is equivalent to 'union of natures. '1 
Whatever one thinks of Luther's Christology, one thing is evident: 
It is not 'an unexceptionable statement of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. '2 This 
is easily brought out by enunciating the problems contained in it pertinent 
to this study and which Chalcedon eliminated. 
The basic error in Luther's Christology resides precisely in his notion 
of the 'incarnational becoming. ' For Luther the Incarnation takes place 
because of a union of natures forming the divine/human reality of Christ. 
The 'becoming' is once more compositional, the coming together of natures, 
rather than existential and personal, the coming to be, the coming to 
exist of the person of the Logos as man. Like Nestorius and Eutyches before 
him, Luther conceives in his mind the natures as distinct and separate 
prior to the union and the 'becoming' as the union of the two. Because 
the 'becoming' is seen as a union of natures, of bringing them together 
to form one whole, Luther must either tend to Nestorianism if he does not 
see a substantial union between them or to Monophysitism if he does. Like 
Nestorius Luther's Christ is a divine/human person, but unlike Nestorius 
and like Eutyches and the Monophysites Christ is not just the union or 
interchange of appearances, but a substantial union of the natures with 
an actual intercommunion of properties. Luther's notion of 'become, ' 
though he would deny this as he did against Zwingli, always seems to be 
verging on meaning the natures mutually 'changing into' one another. Thus 
there is an irreconcilable tension in Luther's Christology. 'While he 
wishes to maintain the integrity of both natures, he nevertheless wishes 
them to form the whole existential reality of the historical Jesus. He 
wants Jesus to be ,a 
divine/human reality, a God-Man. 
1. Dorner, p. 104 and fn. 1- 
2. Siggins, p. 232. Althaus believes Luther to be completely orthodox 
as well. Cf. p. 191. Likewise Gustaf Aulen, Reformation and 
Catholicity (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1961), p. 69-69. 
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What is evident is that the Incarnation is not the Logos coming to 
be man and existing as man as Chalcedon proclaimed. Jesus is a divine/ 
human being, but not a being who is the divine Logos existing as man. For 
Luther the existential reality of Jesus is God as God in a substantial 
and dynamic union with a man as man, but God never is man nor does he 
exist as man. This tension demands resolution. Either the substantial 
union or the integrity of the natures must go. Luther opts for the sub- 
stantial union and the integrity of the humanity is sacrificed giving 
his Christology a definite monophysite flavour. This gives the appearance 
of protecting God's immutable and impassible nature, but only if one is 
willing to deny the reality of the humanity and human experience. None 
of which Luther wished to do. 
The tension and monophysitism is very easily seen and exemplified 
in Luther's understanding of the communication of idioms. If the attri- 
butes of each nature interact and interchange, then logic demands that, 
depending on which nature is acting or dominating at the time, one or the 
other of the natures must lose its integrity. For example, if Jesus is 
prophesying the destruction of Jerusalem, or revealing the mind of God, 
it is the nature of God which is acting in his omniscience, and thus 
overriding and compromising the human intellect. If Jesus is suffering 
or asking questions, it is the nature of man overriding and compromising 
the impassibility and omniscience of God. Because of Luther's soterio- 
logical Christology the tension always has a monophysite flavour since it 
is only God who saves, and thus it is God who dominates the humanity. 
This impossible tension with regard to the attributes is what will 
lead to Kenoticism especially when the notion of personhood changes from 
an ontological construct to a psychological construct concerning conscious- 
ness and knowledge, and the theological climate favours the humanity of 
Christ over the divinity. 
One further aspect must be noted. Because Christ for Luther is not 
the Logos existing as man, and because the attributes interact and inter- 
change between the natures and are not of the person of the Logos_. as-ha 
exists as God and man, it is never really God who is acting and experiencing 
as man nor is it really as man that he is acting and experiencing. For 
the attributes and properties of the natures to be exchanged means that 
God is acting as God and man as man with each affecting the other. When. 
God acts in Jesus, it is always as God, but never as man. God acts in 
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the humanity or in the man through the communication of his attributes, 
and since it is through God's attributes, it is always God as God acting, 
and never God as man, which a true incarnation demands. The manhood is 
but the sign, the expression, the exemplar of God acting as God. To put 
it another way, when the man Jesus acts in a salvatory or pro me manner, 
it is really God acting as God through the communication of his properties 
and attributes, but never God acting as man. The human expression is 
purely symbolic of what God is doing transcendently as God. 
' This is 
precisely because Luther's notion of the 'incarnational becoming' and 
union is the divine nature in a compositional and juxtaposed union with 
a human nature, and not the coming to be and existence of God the Logos 
as man. This is ultimately why Luther's Christology has a monophysite 
bent or as Congar more precisely states: 'There is monoenergism or mono- 
praxis, or if one will, "economic" monophysitism in this contention that 
God alone acts in the economy of salvation.... '2 
Luther's Christology contains too many irreconcilable tensions based 
on his false understanding of the incarnational notion of 'become' to 
1. This is totally in keeping with Luther's understanding of justifi- 
cation and sacramentalism. God never acts within and through finite 
reality, but finite reality is purely symbolic of what God is doing 
transcendently as God for us. Cf. Cougar, pp. 390-392. Aulen 
completely misses the point of Congar's criticism concerning this. 
Cf. pp. 68-70. Salvation for Luther is a divine/human action as Aulen 
says, but it is never an action of God as man, but an action of God 
as God in a man. This is clearly seen in Luther's hook/worm 
analogy for the crucifixion. God as God hooks the devil and over- 
comes him as God. The humanity plays no causal role other than that 
of bait. It is not God as man who conquers sin, death, and the 
devil, but God acting in the man Jesus. Cf. Congar. p. 383. 
In passing, it would seem that Luther has a modalistic under- 
standing of the Trinity. The Son is but the Rro me expression 
of the Godhead. Cf. Congar, p. 397 and In. 96. 
2. The basic problem is that Luther tried to forget 1500 years of 
Christology and return to pure biblical Christology. He tried 
unsuccessfully to avoid ontological speculations on the person of 
Christ. The Christological problems which forced him into a un- 
tenable Christology were precisely the ones that traditional 
Christology dealt with. Cougar quoting Aristotle very aptly sums 
up the affair: 'Rarely, perhaps, has Aristotle's saying in the 
Protreptius been more apposite: "If you are obliged to philosophize 
then you must do so, and even if-you are not obliged you will 
still have to philosophize. "' Congar, p. 400. 
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remain unresolved for long. But, as the following will show, the 
reconciliation will always be attempted within Luther's false understanding 
of 'become, ' and thus no real and true solution will be forthcoming. 
The first major controversy over coming to some sort of consistent 
understanding of Luther's Christology was that between the theologians 
of Giessen and those of Tubingen (1616-1624)- 
The Giessen theologians maintained that the simultaneous juxtaposed 
dualism of the God-Man in Christ ultimately destroyed the unity of person, 
and the doctrine of ubiquity the full integrity of the earthly manhood. 
They proposed a two state theory of the Incarnation. In the earthly Jesus 
the divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience were held in 
abeyance by God in order that the humanity would be real with real human 
attributes of growth and knowledge. However, in the resurrected Jesus 
the divine attributes are once more activated and the humanity becomes 
fully divinized. In so proposing this theory the Giessen theologians 
believed they maintained the oneness of person since the divine attributes, 
which were incompatible with the human personality, are inactive and thus 
no dual personality arises; and that the humanity thus remains truly human 
while on earth, and yet divinized and ubiquitous through the ressurection. 
1 
The Tubingen school believed that such a notion of the Incarnation 
denied the full divinity of Christ, and thus that God did not really 
become man. Contrary to the Giessen school, they proposed that the 
divinity was not restrained, but only hidden. Jesus contained the full- 
ness of divine nature with the fullness of attributes, but that the 
earthly humanity concealed them. Giessen believed this to be truly 
Docetic and Monophysite. Even though hidden, the divine nature nevertheless 
in reality destroys the humanity even while on earth. 
2 
What is important to note at this point is only that the respective 
1. The early Lutheran Christological controversies are always tied up 
with their Eucharistic doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ: How Christ 
is present in many places through the Eucharist. 
2. For the history of the controversy and the respective teachings see 
Dorner, pp. 281-307; Herman Bauke, 'The History of Christological 
Doctrine, ' Twentieth Century Theolo in the Making, Vol. II, ed. 
Jaroslav Pelikan, (London: Collins--Fontana Library, 1970), pp. 127- 
129; Francis J. Hall, The Kenotic Theory, (New York: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1898), pp. 13-15. Hall is excellent not only for 
his critique of the Kenotic theory, but also for his precise and 
clear statement of the Catholic tradition within the context of the 
questions raised by Kenotic Christology. 
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criticisms of each school by the other are correct. Giessen compromised 
the immutability of God and in so doing the fact that it is truly God 
who is man. Tubingen, on the other hand, is truly Docetic, destroying 
the integrity of the humanity, and thus the fact that it is truly man 
that God is. That both schools failed to realize is that they were both 
wrong for precisely the same reason. Both conceived the incarnational 
notion of 'become' as implying change and mutation due to the fact that 
they saw the Incarnation as a substantial compositional union of natures. 
The problems on the second Christological level concerning the communi- 
cation of idioms arises solely from a false understanding on the first 
Christological level concerning the union--'the becoming. ' This will be 
the case through-out. 
The controversy was obviously never resolved, but a modified form 
of the Giessen theory became the most popular. This modified form is 
exemplified by the nineteenth century Hegelian theologian, Dorner. 
Dorner's Christology can be seen as a gradual or progressive incarnation. 
The union between God and man is such in Christ that only gradually and 
progressively does the divinity exercise a complete possession of the 
humanity. This progressive take-over allows for human growth and only in 
the end culminates in a full-blown God-Man reality--a complete 
1 
Incarnation. 
While one sees in the above controversy a very marked tendency 
towards a Kenotic Christology due to Luther's understanding of the union, 
it was not until the nineteenth century that Kenoticism flowered both in 
Germany and England. In the meantime new factors and questions had 
entered the theological milieu. The rise of the nineteenth century 
historical movement caused renewed interest in critical biblical exegesis 
especially in trying to get back to the historical Jesus and his teaching. 
Thus the true humanity of Christ came to be stressed. Moreover, and more 
importantly for Christological speculation, the Kantian revolution turned 
philosophy away from the study of the ontological structures of reality 
to questions of the psychology of personal and subjective consciousness 
and thought processes. Thus the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus 
came under close scrutiny. These new influences added to the Lutheran 
1. Cf. Dorner, pp. 97-101,298. Also Hall, p. 14. Also J. M. Creed, 
The Divinity of Jesus Christ, (London: Collins--Fontana Library, 
1964)" pp. 84-85. 
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Christological framework (thought by many to be Chalcedonian and 
traditional) coalesced into a Christological question whose only possible 
answer could be Kenotic. Dawe proposes the Christological questions 
of the time: 
'How could a limited human consciousness coexist in a single 
person with the full actuality of the divine consciousness? 
Would not the presence of the infinite and impassible Logos 
vitiate the uniquely human personality which is limited and 
changeable?.... [How could a limited human person] be conceived 
if the integrative or personalising centre of Jesus' person 
was the Logos which by definition is omnipotent, omniscient 
and omnipresent? ' 1 
All of these questions take on the appearance of the divine vs. the 
human, and for the theologians of the nineteenth century in Germany and 
England these questions were real questions. In actual fact they are 
basically pseudo-questions, questions that arise only because of false 
presuppositions concerning the nature of the Incarnation. 
In Germany two schools of Kenotic Christology are evident. The 
most radical Kenotic theory is that proposed by such men as Gess and Godet. 
The main line of their thought consists in the fact that the Logos ceased 
existing in the form of God and took the form (changed into) a human soul. 
Unlike Apollinaris who held that the Logos took the place of the soul, 
these men saw a complete metamorphosis. Hall quoting one of them states, 
'The Logos "remains Who he was, though he ceased to be what he was. "'2 
During the incarnational period the Father takes over the Logos' divine 
functions of preserving and governing creation. 
Thomasius and others, on the other hand, are less radical. 
Thomasius wished to distinguish between the absolute and relative or 
economic attributes of God. The relative attributes of God are those 
which do not pertain to God as God, but to his relation with the world 
such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. The absolute attri- 
butes of God as God are truth, holiness, and love. It was God as God 
with these absolute attributes who became incarnate in Christ. The Logos 
1. Donald Dawe, 'A Fresh Look at the Kenotic Christologies, ' 
Scottish Journal of Theolo t, 15 (1962), 342. For an excellent 
and thorough study of the theological milieu of the time see 
John Stewart Lawton, Conflict in Christolovv, (London: SPCK, 1947)9 
pp. 1-110. 
2. Hall, p. 15. 
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emptied himself of his relative attributes in becoming man. In making 
this distinction Thomasius believed that he had isolated those attributes 
which were incompatible with a true human personality and intellect, 
and yet guaranteed that it was truly God in his love and holiness who 
1 
really was man. 
Criticism of these theories will be delayed until after Gore's and 
Weston's Christology has been given. What should be noted, however, is 
that Kenotic Christology directly confronts the subject studied here. 
How can God remain immutably himself as God, and yet really become man 
without change or mutation, and moreover, without destroying the integrity 
of the humanity, and thus the fact that it is really man that he is? 
Gess and Godet seem to hold that it is impossible, and Thomasius tries 
to find a way out. Gore and Weston will also, but whether any suceed 
is the question. 
B. English Kenotic Christology: Charles Gore and Frank Weston 
The theological atmosphere in England was basically the same as that 
already stipulated above. The catalyst of Kenotic Christology for Gore 
and for the subsequent movement in England was the question of Christ's 
knowledge. 
2 Gospel evidence showed Christ to be lacking in knowledge. 
For example, as to the authorship of Old Testament books, Christ thought 
that Moses was the sole author of the Pentateuch; but biblical scholarship 
has shown this to be false. Also Christ admits that he does not know 
when the end of the world will come. The question then arises how can 
Christ be truly God with omniscience, and yet be truly man with limited 
knowledge? Gore and Weston try to maintain both the true divinity and 
humanity of Christ, yet allow for the fact that Christ did have limited 
knowledge as the Gospels seem to demand. 
1. For these respective theories and others see Hall, pp. 15-20; 
Dave, pp. 343-344; Creed, pp. 80-81; Fredrich Loofs, 'Kenosis, ' 
Encyclonedia of Religion and Ethics, (Edinburgh: T. &-T. Clark, 
1914), ed. J. Hastings, 7: 680-687; A. M. Ramsey, From Gore to Temple, 
(London: Longmans, 1960), pp. 32-33. The last was published in the 
U. S. A. under the title, An Era in AnglicanTheolog!. 
2. Other examples of English Kenoticists are: A. M. Fairbairn, The 
place of Christ in Modern Theolomr, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1894)" P. T. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1909. In America, William Newton Clarke, 
An Outline of Christian Theolomy, (New York, 1899). 
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It is not surprising then that Gore first proposed his Kenotic 
Christology in his Lux Mundi essay 'The Holy Spirit and Inspiration' 
for it is in trying to guarantee that what God reveals is true, and yet 
subject to worldly and cultural conditions that the problem of Christ's 
knowledge and ignorance arises. 
1 It is in reaction to criticism that 
Gore formulates his mature Kenotic theory. 
In his Bamnton Lectures of 1891 Gore fully argues that there is in 
Christ 'real growth in mental apprehension and spiritual capacity, as in 
bodily stature. '2 Nevertheless, the Gospels also show that Jesus is 
conscious of his pre-existence and union with the Father, yet 'he does 
not appear to teach out of an absolute divine omniscience, but rather 
as conditioned by human nature. '3 The conclusion that Gore consistently 
comes to from his exegesis is 'Unmistakenly is our Lord there put before 
us as the eternal Son of the Father incarnate, but it also appears that 
the Son of the Father is living and teaching under human conditions. 14 
One would not wish to argue with the basic tenor of Gore's exegesis 
on these points. The historical Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels is 
obviously conscious of and reveals his divine nature and filial relation 
to the Father. Likewise it is obvious that, if he is man as the Gospels 
also demand, his consciousness and knowledge be human and thus subject 
to human conditions. The problem arises when one tries to answer: How 
can this be? 
'For this purpose, ' writes Gore concerning the above problem, 'it 
was necessary that He should be without the exercise of such divine pre- 
rogatives as would have made human experience or progress impossible. '5 
How is this done? Following St. Paul in Phil. 2: 5-11, while Jesus in 








'For love of us He adjured the prerogatives of equality with 
God. By an act of deliberate self-abnegation, He so emptied 
Himself as to assume the permanent characteristics of the human 
and servile life: He took the form of a servant.... Thus, remaining 
in unchanged personality, He abandoned certain prerogatives of the 
divine mode of existence in order to assume the human. ' 6 
Cf. Charles Gore, ed. Lux Mundi, (London: John Murray, 1889), pp. 
315-362, especially pp. 359-360. 
Charles Gore, The Incarnation of the Son of God: The Bam ton Lectures 
1891, (London: John Murray, 1898), p. 145. Hereafter referred to as B. L.. 
Ibid., p. 147. Cf. Pp. 147-150. 
Ibid., p. 149" 
Ibid., p. 157. 
Ibid., pp. 157-158. Since this is a dogmatic study, the exegesis of 
Phil. 2: 5-11 will not be studied. Suffice it to say that Kenotic 
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The Incarnation for Gore is a two-fold process: 1) the real self- 
emptying of divine prerogatives or attributes; 2) and the taking on 
of a human nature with its attributes. Gore stresses this when he 
states: 
'In a certain aspect indeed the Incarnation is the folding 
round the Godhead of the veil of the humanity, to hide its 
glory, but it is much more than this. It is a ceasing to 
exercise certain natural prerogatives of the divine existence; 
it is a coming to exist for love of us under conditions of 
being not natural to the Son of God. ' 1 
What should be noted in the above is that Gore in no way wants to 
deny that it is God who is man. As a matter of fact the whole theory is 
constructed to uphold the fact that it really is God who is man. In 
speaking of the Logos' 'self-emptying, ' and 'abandonment of certain divine 
prerogatives' Gore does not wish to say that the Logos ceased being God. 
Such expressions for Gore only imply that the Logos gave up those attributes 
which would viseeiate against it really being God who is really man, and 
in so giving them up guaranteeing that it is really-man that God is. 
2 
This is clearly seen in Gore's more scholarly treatment in 
Dissertations. There he states: It will not 
'suffice to say that the Son was limited in knowledge, &c., 
in respect of His manhood, so long as we so juxta-posit the 
omniscient Godhead with the limited manhood as to destroy the 
impression that He, the Christ, the Son of God, was personally 
living, praying, thinking, speaking, and acting--even working 
miracles--under the limitations of manhood .... The real Incarnation 
involves a real self-impoverishment, a real self-emptying, a real 
self-limitation on the part of the eternal Word of God. ' 3 
Christology primarily sprang from dogmatic issues, and the use of 
Phil. 2: 5-11 is more an isegesis than an exegesis. It seemed to 
back-up an already pre-conceived Christology. 
1. Ibid., p. 158 
2. Lawton seems a little unfair on this point. Cf. pp. 38-39. He 
seems to think that Gore is only concerned with the true humanity 
of Christ. Gore obviously was concerned, but for incarnational 
reasons. He wanted God to really be man. For a response to Lawton 
see James Carpenter, Gore: A Study in Liberal Catholic Thought, 
(London: Faith Press, 1960), pp. 181-182. 
3. Charles Gore, Dissertation of Subiects Connected with the 
Incarnation, (London: John Murray, 1907), pp. 203-204. Hereafter 
referred to as Diss.. 
150 
For Gore no juxtaposition of natures, consciousnesses or intellects 
will do, for such a juxtaposition denies that God really is man. However, 
to overcome such a juxtaposition, to make it possible for the Logos to 
really be man, demands a self-limitation of his divinity. It is the 
self-limitation that guarantees that it is really the Son who is man, 
that the Son really is man, and that it is really man that the Son is. 
The fact that Gore wishes to maintain the true divinity of the Logos 
can also be seen in that, unlike the Germans Gess and Godet, he does not 
see the Logos losing his cosmic functions during the Incarnation. As 
creator and sustainer of the universe he remains omnipotent and omniscient. 
2 
Weston, while sympathetic to Gore's theory, is uneasy about the 
real self-emptying on the part of the Logos that Gore sees as a necessary 
pre-condition for the Incarnation. 
3 
Weston has good reason to be doubtful 
about this as will be seen shortly. 
Weston himself maintains that no self-emptying is necessary, but 
only self-restraint. In becoming man God wished to reveal himself fully, 
but in becoming man he must reveal himself within the limits that manhood 
allows. 'Taking then, ' writes Weston, 'these opposite truths into 
consideration we can see that the Incarnate Son must at every moment live 
under the law of self-restraint as to all His divine powers, in some 
measure. The measure of self-restraint is the capacity of the perfect 
manhood to receive, assimilate, and manifest divine power. ' The Logos 
does not abandon any divine prerogatives or attributes, but rather he 
restrains 'whatever measure of divine power that manhood cannot mediate. ' 
The whole restraining process is dependent on the humanity. As Weston 
states: 'It would appear that the measure of His self-restraint was not 
one and the same at every period of His development. It varied as the 
capacity of his manhood varied. '4 If the Logos becomes man, he can never 
violate the capacity of the manhood, and thus the controlling principle 
of the restraining process is the capacity of the humanity. 'He it is 
who imposed upon Himself the perpetual law of self-restraint according 
to the measure of the capacity of the manhood that he should assume. '5 
1. Cf. ibid., pp. 93,206. 
2. For a good summary of Gore's Christology see ibid., pp. 94-95- 
3. Cf. Frank Weston, The One Christ, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1914, revised edition), pp. 124-127. 
4. Ibid., pp. 152-154. 
5. Ib id., p. 163. 
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Weston believes that, unlike Gore's real self-emptying, his notion 
of self-restraint helps one to grasp better how the Logos can maintain 
1 his cosmic functions while incarnate and also his immutability as God. 
The Logos in no way abandons his divine attributes, but merely restrains 
them in his incarnational relation with the humanity. He is then better 
able to guarantee that it is really God who is man. Likewise the 'law of 
self-restraint' guarantees that God is truly and really man with all 
that that implies. 2 
C. The Failure of Kenotic Christoloor 
Gore admits that his Christology has little or no support in Christian 
antiquity. He very honestly shows this to be the case in his essay in 
Dissertations. 
3 Nevertheless, he has 'no hesitation in claiming that the 
theological conclusion we have arrived at is wholly consistent with the 
actual dogmatic decisions of ecumenical councils.... '4 Is Gore as con- 
sistent with the councils as he thinks? 
All of the above Kenoticists from the early German Lutherans to 
Weston make the possibility of a true Incarnation dependent upon some type 
of limitation of God as God. Depending on whose Christology it is the 
Logos either has to 'abandon, ' 'empty, ' 'limit, ' or 'restrain, ' some 
aspect of his nature in order for him to truly become man. In other words, 
the Logos as he exists in himself as God cannot become incarnate. Thus 
as incarnate, Jesus is not the Logos as he exists personally as God who 
is man, and exists as man; but the Logos in some lesser degree or expression. 
Some sort of change is demanded. While most Kenoticists, and this is 
especially evident in Gore and Weston, want it to be God the Logos who is 
man, they nevertheless feel that it cannot be the Logos as he fully exists 
as God without destroying the manhood. The Logos in some manner has to 
gear himself down to a human level if he is to become man. 
The basic concept used by the Kenoticists, whatever it may be, be 
it Gore's 'real self-emptying' and 'abandonment' of certain divine pre- 
rogatives, or Weston's 'self-restraint, ' destroys the immutability of God. 
1. Cf. ibid., pp. 149-150. 
2. For a good summary of Weston's Christology see ibid., p. 325- 
3- Cf. Gore, Diss., pp. 98-207; especially p. 202. 
4. Ibid., p. 207. Cf. p. 212. 
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The Logos must cease in some way being as he is in himself as God and 
thus change. The change required is not only impossible since God is 
immutable, but even impossible to conceive. How can an omnipotent being 
give-up or restrain his omnipotence? How does an omniscient being give 
up or restrain his omniscience? Likewise hard to conceive is how a being 
who is said to be God because he is omnipotent and omniscient give them 
up or restrain them, and yet remain God? Even on a human level this is 
ontologically impossible. How can a man remain man if he gives up or 
restrains his rationality; and how could he possibly do it? Rationality 
is an essential element of what it means to be a man. 
1 Even harder to 
conceive is the distinction between relative and absolute attributes. 
Is it not because God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent that he is 
all-loving and all-holy, and vice-versa? The attributes of God are not 
accidental parts or diverse elements of a complex substance that can be 
lost without his ceasing to be God. They signify what it means for God 
to be God, what he is'in himself as God in the simplicity of his absolute 
being. Hall sums it all up: 
'To lose Divine attributes is to cease to be God, for that is 
not God which does not possess the Divine nature, and the Divine 
nature is that and that only which possesses all Divine 
attributes. Kenoticists undoubtedly sacrifice the truth of 
Divine immutability. ' 2 
However, this study is not just interested in the immutability of 
God for God's sake, but also for the sake of the Incarnation. God must 
be immutable not only because he is God, but also because the Incarnation 
demands that it really be God who is man. Any change in the Logos as God 
in the incarnational process, i. e., if the 'becoming' implies or demands 
that the Logos as God change, then it is no longer really God who becomes 
and is man. The Kenoticists, while trying to maintain that the Logos, 
despite his kenotic state, is nevertheless Son of God, cannot maintain, 
because of his kenotic state, that he is homoousion with the Father as 
incarnate. In Kenotic Christology the Logos as he is in himself as God 
is not man, but always some reduced 'species' or expression, and therefore 
one cannot truly say that it really is God who is man, nor then that it is 
man that God is. The Kenoticists completely miss the inoarnational aspect 
1. Cf. Lawton, pp. 149-150- 
2. Hall, p. 234. Cf. pp. 97-105. 
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of the Logos' immutability. This is clearly seen in Gore. 
Gore argues that 'the fathers of the Council [Nicea] had only moral 
alterability in view in their ecclesiastical decision.... '1 In other 
words Nicea was not concerned with the Logos' metaphysical immutability 
in condemning Arius, but only with God's 'unchanging redemptive purpose. '2 
Gore's ignorance of the doctrinal questions and implications raised by 
Arius and answered by Nicea is surprising, but his ignorance forces him 
to miss the whole point of Nicea. Even though Nicea only spoke of moral 
alterability, Gore continues, 'even in regard to metaphysical alteration, 
it must be remembered that in the view here presented the limitation of 
which the incarnate Son is the subject is regarded 1) as not affecting 
His essential being or operation in the universe, 2) as not imposed from 
without but an act of His own power.... '3 Comment has already been made 
on the possibility of Gore's second point, but what is important is that 
he maintains that the Logos must be immutable, no metaphysical alteration, 
for the sake of God, in 'His essential being or operation in the universe. ' 
But that is not the point nor the question Nicea answered. Nicea was not 
primarily concerned with the fact that the Logos is homoousion with the 
Father for the sake of his being God apart from the Incarnation, in his 
cosmic functions. The whole point of Nicea was to proclaim that the Logos 
as man is homoousion with the Father. The homoousion is to guarantee 
that the Logos as incarnate is nevertheless, fully God as the Father is 
God, and not just God as the Father is God apart from the Incarnation. 
The apologetic for the immutability guaranteed by the homoousion was 
motivated not solely for the sake of God as God, but mainly for the 
Incarnation, to guarantee that it is really God who is man. It is precisely 
here as incarnate that Gore and Weston (with his concept of 'self-restraint') 
and all Kenoticists deny the homoousion. They always and only maintain 
that the Logos is immutably and perfectly God, homoousion with the Father, 
outside the Incarnation, but not within the Incarnation. It is within 
the Incarnation that Nicea proclaims its homoousion. Arguing again Gore 
1. Gore, Diss., p. 208. 
2. Ibid., p. 209. Gore maintains that 'self-accommodation' of the 
Logos is 'not mutability, ' but 'self-adaptiveness. ' Cf. p. 209. 
This seems to be a perfect example of a distinction without a 
difference. Actually for Gore if God is completely metaphysically 
immutable, the Incarnation could not take place. Cf. Diss., 
pp. 131,173. 
3. nä, pp. 208-209. 
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states: 'The view expressed above involves no limitation of the divine 
activity of the Word absolutely in Himself or in the world, but only 
within a certain area. '1 It is precisely within that 'certain area' as 
man that Nicea's homoousion doctrine falls, and where Kenotic Christology 
fails. The Logos must be immutable in becoming man for he must be 
homoousion with the Father as man. The Logos as incarnate in Kenotic 
Christology is never homoousion with the Father, for in Kenotic Christology 
the Logos as incarnate is always 'self-emptied, ' abandoning his 'divine 
prerogatives, ' or 'restraining' his divinity. 
2 
It may be good to mention that one should not get the impression that 
because the above criticisms were made that sanction has been given to the 
opposite extremes feared by the Kenoticists. Apollinarianism or Mono- 
physitism is not the answer to Kenoticism. As was stated in the beginning, 
the questions that the Kenoticists tried to answer were pseudo-questions. 
Thus the possible answers open to them were pseudo-answers: Kenoticism 
or Monophysitism. This will be evident in the end. 
For the Kenoticists the self-emptying or restraining of the Logos 
was necessary in order to guarantee both that it is really God who is man 
and really man that God is. While the above shows that the self-emptying 
renders it impossible to say that it is really God who is man, the irony 
is that it also renders it impossible for it to be really man that God is. 
The whole Christological problem for the Kenoticists revolved 
around the problem of Christ's consciousness and knowledge. In order to 
guarantee that Christ had a human consciousness and intellect, the 
Kenoticists thought it necessary for the Logos to empty or restrain his 
omniscience. However, what one ends up with in the Kenotic Christ is 
not a real human consciousness or knowledge, nor a real humanity, but 
rather an adapted divine consciousness and knowledge tailored to a human 
level. Lawton sees this clearly. 
1. Ibid., p. 210. 
2. Cf. Hall, pp. 147-148. Mascall's observation is very pertinent here: 
'The real source of objection would seem to be an assumption that 
the divine nature, considered as distinct from the divine Person, 
can be excluded from the sphere of the Incarnation altogether, as if 
in the Incarnate Lord there were simply a divine Person united to a 
human nature. Thus there seems to be an implicit denial of the truth 
that the divine Person and the divine nature are really identical and 
only logically distinct;.... ' E. L. Mascall, Christ, The Christian 
and the Church, (London: Longmans, 1946), p. 24. 
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'According to Gore, it is the Logos himself who constitutes 
Christ's human consciousness; it is his will which is restricted, 
-it is his mind which is limited. Surely this is nothing less 
than a modern Apollinarianism; for all that is left is a truly 
human body; the portions of the Lord's psychic make-up which in 
olden times were regarded as elements in human nature are not 
regarded as constituents of individual personality, and hence 
in Christ's case belong to the Deity. ' 1 
This can be clearly exemplified in two ways. 
In his later work Belief in Christ, Gore rejects the fact that Christ 
has two consciousnesses, two intellects, and two wills, believing that 
such a theory demands the destruction of the human consciousness, intellect 
and will. He maintains instead that the Logos emptied his divine con- 
sciousness, intellect, and will in such a manner so as to be the conscious- 
ness, intellect, and will of the humannity. 
2 
The upshot is that in doing 
this Gore ends up being what he feared the most--Apollinarian or Monophysite. 
The consciousness, etc. of Christ is not really human, but merely the 
divine consciousness, etc. brought down to a human level. Christ has no 
real human psychological functions, but truncated divine psychological 
functions taking the place of the human. 
The second way the problem is exemplified is in the resurrection. 
Because the earthly Jesus ijii a retarded Apollinarian Christ at the resurrec- 
tion logic demands that Jesus become a full fledged Apollinarian Christ. 
The only other alternative is to hold that the Logos is still self-emptied 
after the resurrection, and thus still not fully God. 
3 
Gore, while wishing to maintain that Christ is both God and man 
after the resurrection, nevertheless has to refer to the affects of the 
resurrection in Apollinarian or Monophysite terms. 
'Before His resurrection, He, very God, is acting under conditions 
of manhood; since His glorification He, very man, is living under 
conditions of Godhead. First the Godhead exhibits itself under 
conditions of manhood, and then the manhood is glorified under 
conditions of Godhead. 4 
1. Lawton, p. 154. Cf. Mascall, p. 12. Also Dawe, p. 341- 
2. Charles Gore, Belief in Christ, (London: John Murray, 1922), p. 
227. Hereafter referred to as Belief. 
3. Cf. Hall, p. 153. Also D. M. Baillie, God was in Christ, (London: 
Faber & Faber Ltd., 1961), p. 97- 
4- Gore, B. L., p. 163. Cf. Diss., p. 95; Belief, p. 227. 
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This is even more evident in the German Kenoticists who univocally 
predicate divine omnipotence, etc. to the glorified Christ. Weston, 
however, sees in the post-resurrected Christ the Logos as 'yet still in 
some sense limited. ' 
1 
It is because the Logos takes the place of a real human consciousness, 
intellect, and will that Kenotic Christology always gives the impression 
that the Incarnation is a pure pagan mythological metamorphosis. God 
turns into a man. 
2 
From the above one must conclude with Hall that no Kenoticist 
'can acknowledge consistently that our Lord, during His earthly 
life was, as the Council of Chalcedon defines, "perfect in Godhead 
and also perfect in M. anhood.... the distinction of natures being 
by no means taken away by the union, but rather the propriety of 
each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one 
subsistence. ' 3 
The question is why were the Kenotic theologians forced into a Kenotic 
position? Why did they feel it necessary to limit in some way the divinity 
of the Logos in order that it might really be the Logos who is man and man 
that he is? Above all why were they doomed to failure, necessarily 
undermining everything they wished to guarantee and profess? There are 
two basic reasons both of which should be evident. 
The first reason is that the Kenoticists presume that the nature 
of the incarnational union -- 'the becoming' -- is compositional. The 
divine and human natures are distinct and separate before the union and 
come together in a substantial and compositional manner. Whenever the 
union is conceived in this manner, the union always implies and demands 
change in the natures, compromising either or both the divinity or 
humanity. If one wishes to guarantee the immutable divinity and the 
integrity of the humanity, the only alternative is to deny the substantial 
union, which is of no real help since that means that God is not man. 
The basic problem is one of conceptuality. The Kenoticists, under the 
influence of Luther who himself has affinities with Nestorius in con- 
ceiving the natures as separate prior to the union, and with Eutyches 
1. Weston, p. 195. 
2. Cf. Baillie, pp. 96-97; Creed, p. 82; Hall, p. 232; Loffs, 
p. 687- 
3. Hall, pp. 228-229. Cf. Lawton, p. 148. 
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in conceiving them as substantially united after the union, conceived 
the 'incarnational becoming' as the bringing together of two incompatible 
modes of being and making them one. 
It is because the Kenoticists conceive the 'becoming' as compositional 
that the questions they try to answer are pseudo-questions. The questions 
always take the form of the divine vs. the human. Would not infinite 
divine consciousness and knowledge obliterate the limited and finite 
consciousness and knowledge? Of course it would, if one sees the union 
as compositional. The more powerful being always devours the weaker being 
if they are fused together. The only way out, if one sees the union as 
compositional, is to lessen or restrain the more powerful being. This is 
precisely what the Kenoticists did. The point is that the problem -- 
divine vs. human consciousness and knowledge -- is a , false problem based 
on a false notion of the incarnational union -- 'the becoming. ' 
As soon as one sees the incarnational act, the 'becoming, ' not as 
the substantial compositional union of natures forming a new being, but 
as the person of the Logos taking on a new manner or mode of existence, 
of coming to be, coming to exist as m. an, the question and problem as 
asked and understood by the Kenoticists disappears. The 'becoming' no 
longer threatens the immutable divinity of the Logos, nor the integrity 
of the manhood; but just the opposite. It establishes and guarantees 
that it is the Logos, in his unqualified divinity, who now is and exists 
as man. Thus as man the Logos, without any change in his divine nature, 
possesses a human intellect and will, and thus human consciousness and 
knowledge. It is only because the Kenoticists understood the union as 
compositional that they believed the duality of wills and intellects, as 
sanctioned by the Councils, demanded the obliteration of one or the other. 
It is only in a compositional framework that they become mutually exclusive. 
However, there is another false presupposition in Kenotic Christology 
which is both an example and precipitating cause of the above. The tension 
in Luther's Christology was felt primarily in his use of the communication 
of idioms. The union of the natures which gave rise to the one person/ 
reality of the God-Man demanded that the attributes of each nature were 
directly communicated to the other. In itself this is an impossible 
situation, but tolerable because of the ontological framework from which 
Luther worked. The attributes ontologically resided in each nature and 
are communicated to the other. However, once a psychological framework 
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is put in its place and the attributes no longer reside ontologically 
in the nature, but are seen as what constitutes a person as such, the 
situation becomes intolerable as well. To define personhood as psycho- 
logical self-consciousness makes Luther's use of the communication of 
idioms impossible to conceive. How can one person, who is defined by 
his self-consciousness, have two self-consciousnesses, two intellects, 
two wills without destroying the person? Only a negative answer can 
be given. A person can have only one self-consciousness etc. since that 
is how he is so defined. This is precisely what happened in Kenotic 
Christology. Seeing the incarnational act as compositional, plus the 
nature of personhood as psychological self-consciousness demanded that, 
if the Logos was man, then the Logos as man must lose his divine self- 
consciousness and knowledge. The result of the compositional union of 
natures demanded that the person of Christ have only one set of psycho- 
logical attributes for that is what defines a person as a person. Lawton 
clearly states this: 
'A being who possessed two sets of psychological functions, 
two wills, for example, would to these thinkers have been not 
simply one person, but two. Person was no longer a principle 
of individualization, an ego, but a set of psychological 
functions... *nothing but a monophysitism in modern dress was 
intelligible; for the two natures even if separated in but 
the slightest degree as regards psychical operation would 
have dissipated the unity of Christ's person. ' 1 
The upshot is that in men like Gore and Weston in denying the Logos 
his divine 'psychological' functions as incarnate, and yet wishing to 
maintain them for the Logos as divine in his cosmic functions end up 
proposing a dual Logos. In defining 'person' in terms of what Christian 
tradition and early Councils defined as 'nature' the Kenoticists were 
forced to hold some sort of duality of person rather than a duality of 
natures. Lawton again states this well. 
'Perhaps the chief intrinsic objection to the theory is the fact 
that on the given psychological presupposition of the age, it is 
difficult to see how one can avoid speaking of the Logos having 
become by the Incarnation two persons. ' 
'In the ancient system there is a duality of a sort: two natures 
are believed to be possessed by a single substantial Person; what 
1. Lawton, p. 117. Cf. pp. 114-117,255. Cf. Mascall, pp. 41-42. 
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has here happened is that the duality has been pushed back a 
stage--instead of a duality of natures we have a duality of 
Logos consciousness.... ' 1 
Once one ceases to define personhood in purely psychological 
constructs of self-consciousness and knowledge and gives to it the status 
of ontological individuality, the problems and questions as conceived and 
understood by the Kenoticists disappear. It is no longer a question of 
divine self-consciousness vs. human self-consciousness, but the one person 
of the Logos ontologically existing as God coming to be and existing as 
man and as man conscious of himself and knowing. The Logos does not lose 
his divine consciousness, intellect, or will; but in becoming man 
possesses all that pertains to man because he is man. The question is 
no longer divinity vs. humanity, but one of how the divine Logos acts and 
functions as man, as incarnate. 
This is not the place to give a thorough discussion of the topic of 
Christ's human consciousness and knowledge. Let it suffice to say that 
since the Logos, remaining immutably himself as God, exists as man, then 
as man, in a totally and truly human way, hebcomes conscious of and knows 
himself to be God and man; and in a human ways knows, wills, experiences, 
and interacts with reality. It is God the Logos as man who can say in 
a human manner 'I am God, ' and likewise 'I am man. ' The 'I' is always 
that of the divine Logos, but it is the 'I' of the divine Logos conscious 
of and knowing himself as man. As man the Logos knows himself to be 
God and man, and not just as God. 
This is wholly in keeping with the main principles of this study, 
as well as with all the Counciliar statements. If God truly is man, if 
it is truly God who is man, and truly man that God is, then it must be 
truly God who is conscious of himself and knows himself as man. This is 
but a further and contemporary application of the communication of idioms. 
The attributes of human consciousness and knowledge are not predicated 
of God as God, but to the divine person of the Logos who exists as man. 
As for the problem of divine omniscience obliterating the human 
intellect, again this ceases to be an impossible dilemma. If the 
incarnational act -- 'the becoming' -- is the Logos coming to be and 
existing as man, if the 'becoming' guarantees not only the substantial 
1. Lawton, pp. 153 and 155. 
160 
union 'without division and separation, ' but also the distinction and 
full integrity of the natures 'without confusion and change, ' then as man 
the Logos cannot be omniscient in any univocal sense of God being 
omniscient. It is an impossibility both from God's side and man's side. 
However, the effect in the humanity, of its coming to be and being related 
to the Logos as the Logos is in himself as God so that the Logos as God 
subsists in it and is man, demands that the humanity be perfect, that 
the Logos as man be a perfect man. Such an effect in the humanity would 
imply a literally unimaginable and unspeakable mystical union and know- 
ledge, but one that does not compromise the humanity, but perfects it. 
Even in the resurrection the humanity of Christ does not cease to be truly 
human, and thus neither does his consciousness and knowledge. The 
resurrection is the everlasting glorification of Jesus -- the Logos as 
incarnate -- and thus it is the quintessence of the Incarnation, and with 
it the fruition and effulgence of God's love for man as a man. 
The Kenoticists can be said to be the first modern Christologists 
since the questions they dealt with are still those of contemporary 
theologians: Christ's consciousness and knowledge. Their failure to 
arrive at a suitable solution resided not in their good will, but in their 
uncritical and unknowing acceptance of Luther's understanding of the 
incarnational union -- 'the becoming' --, and their reducing the Incarnation 
to psychological concepts. Whether contemporary theologians have learned 
from their mistakes and have given up their false presuppositions and 
notions is another question. 
161 
5 CHMVER 
PROCESS CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS PREHENSION 
When one approaches Process Christology with the questions treated in 
this study, one immediately becomes aware that the questions vanish. To 
confront a process theologian with the question how God can remain 
immutable in becoming man and be passible as man is to ask him a non- 
question. In denying that God is immutable and proposing that God's 
nature is one of change Process Christology completely and utterly 
dissolves the questions. 
It should be noted then in the very beginning that because the questions 
treated in this study vanish in Process Christology much of the discussion 
in this chapter may seem unrelated to the questions at hand. This chapter 
will bear little resemblance to discussions in previous chapters. However, 
what must be kept in mind is that much of the discussion will be the 
analysis of the reprecussions due to the absence of the questions studied 
here. Moreover, unlike previous challenges to traditional Christology, 
Process Christology denies the very premises on which traditional Christ- 
ology is based. In its complete denial of God's immutability Process 
Christology is the ultimate challenge to the Christological position 
proposed by traditional Christology and maintained here. For these 
reasons this chapter is of the utmost importance. 
In order to do justice to Process Christology this chapter will be 
divided into three sections. The first will deal with the process theo- 
logians' critique of traditional theism since much of what they say is 
in reaction to it. Secondly, an exposition of the main features of Process 
Theology and Christology will be given. The third section will examine 
the philosophical and theological viability of that position. 
Because Process Theology and Christology has accumulated such a 
prodigious bibliography it is impossible to treat all of the literature 
here. This chapter will emphasize the thought of three men: Norman 
Pittenger, David Griffin, and Schubert Ogden. 
1 They have been chosen 
1. The primary works of these men used in this chapter are: Norman 
Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1959). 
Hereafter referred to as W. I.; God in Process, (G. P. ), (London: SCM 
Press, 1967); Process-Thought and Christian Faith, ZP. T_ C. F_), 
New York: Macmillan Com ., 1968); Christologv Reconsidered, (C. R. ), 
(London: SCM Press, 1970). David Griffin, A Process Christolomy, 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). Schubert M. Ogden, The 
Reality of God, (London: SCM Press, 1967). 
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primarily because of their substantial contributions to Process 
Christology. Nevertheless, reference to other process theologians 
will be made, especially when they make a point more clearly than the 
above. However, it is safe to sanction Pailin's comment: 
'Process theologians such as John Cobb, Schubert Ogden, Norman 
Pittenger, P. N. Hamilton, J. E. Barnhart, and Danial Day 
Williams [add D. Griffin, T. W. Ogletree, R. E. James, J. A. T. 
Robinson, and Pailin himself] seem basically agreed in their 
way of interpreting the mode of God's incarnation in Jesus. 1 
A. The Critique of Classical Theism 
The religious motivation behind Process Theology is to make belief 
in God and Christ viable for secular man. However, it is the old 
classical supernatural theistic notion of God and Christ which makes it 
impossible for secular man to take Christianity seriously. Ogden 
explains why this is the case. 
'For one thing commitment to secularity entails acceptance of 
logical self-consistency as one of the necessary conditions for 
the truth of any assertion. And yet, as some three hundred years 
of careful criticism have shown, the main assertions of classical 
theists are utterly incapable of satisfying this condition. ' 2 
Because classical theism understands God 'as actus t)urus, and thus 
as statically complete perfection incapable in every respect of further 
self-realization, God can be neither increased nor diminished by what 
we do and our action, like our suffering, must be in the strict sence 
wholly indifferent to him. '3 Implied in the metaphysics of classical 
theism is the false Platonic presupposition that to change is bad. For 
God to be actus purus, and thus immutably and impassibly perfect, means 
that he is a static and inert substance. He is so unlike creatures 
that he can have no concern for them. 
The reason the God of classical theism can have no concern for 
1. David A. Pailin, 'The Incarnation as a Continuing Reality, ' 
Religious Studies, 6 (1970), pp. 318-319. For Christological 
references to the above mentioned see the bibliography. 
2. Ogden, p. 17- 
3- Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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creation is because, as actus gurus, he can have no relation to creation. 
'He is said to be a reality which is in every respect absolute 
and whose only relations to the world are purely nominal or 
external relations of the world to him...: Accordingly, the 
attributes or perfections by which the nature of God is 
classically defined--pure actuality, immutability, impassivity, 
aseity, immateriality, etc. --all entail an unqualified negation 
of real internal relationship to anything beyond his own wholly 
absolute being. ' 1 
While traditional theism tries to speak of God knowing and loving the world 
'the cash value of such speaking.... is that God is the metaphysical 
absolute, nothing more. The fully justified assertion that God is not 
literally related to the world (if by "literal" is meant in the same way 
as we are related to it) proves on examination to mean that he is 
literally not related to the world. '2 
The heart of the problem lies in the fact that classical theism is 
supernaturalistic. Christianity in becoming supernaturalistic was not true 
to the Biblical notion of God, but fell into the snare of Greek philoso- 
phical concepts of 'substance' and 'beings-in-them-selves, ' thus forcing 
God to be unrelated to the finite world. 
3 To say that he is related 
highlights the fact that 'supernaturalism, at best, is a maze of 
inconsistencies' unacceptable to the rationality of secular man. 
4 The 
cry that there is a mystery present 'has been unmasked as logical 
confusion. '5 The supernaturalistic and wholly transcendent conception 
of God forces God to be 'as Camus has charged, 6the 
eternal bystander 
whose back in turned to the woe of the world. ' 
Ogden states well the main objections to classical theism which 
process theologians as a group hold.? Only one further criticism needs 
1. Ogden, pp. 48-49- 
2o _, p. 50- 
3- Cf. ibid., pp. 57 and 118. 
4. Ibid., p. 50- 
5- Ibid., p. 51- 
6. Ibid. 
7. Cf. Norman Pittenger, 'Process Thought: A Contemporary Trend in 
Theology, ' Process TheoloPr, ed. Ewert H. Cousins, (New York: Newman 
Press, 1971), pp. 26-28. Also W. I., pp. 147-1499 176-180. Also C. R., 
pp. 15-179 136-137. Also ., pp. 14, 18. See also Evert H. Cousins, 
'Process Models in Culture, Philosophy, and Theology, ' Process 
Theoloy, pp. 14-15. See also Griffin, pp. 161,163-164,186-188, 
224-225. See also Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 15-17. See also Ralph James, 
The Concrete God, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Comp., 1967), pp. 83-86. 
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to be made which is common among them. 
Pittenger makes this criticism well when he states that because 
classical theism sees God as all-powerful, almightly and all-perfect, 
etc. 'the usual picture has been of an external ruler who pushes, thrusts, 
twists, moves his subjects at will, with little or no regard for their 
own capacities and little or no concern for their own self-realization. 
God is a dictator. '1 The God of classical theism is an 'aloof and 
distant deity.... [the] static Absolute and the all-powerful monarch.. .. '2 
Classical theism and 'the Church gave unto God the attributes which 
belonged exclusively to Caesar. '3 
This is indeed a devastating array of criticisms. The only problem 
is finding someone or some position to whom or which they refer. One 
knows to who they are meant to refer--the Fathers and scholastic theo- 
logians, especially Aquinas--but as Gilkey states: 'What process 
philosophers of religion call "classical theism" is a strange hodgepodge 
that bears little historical scrutiny.... '4 The first three chapters 
of this study bear out Gilkey's comment. However, a few brief remarks 
seem in order. 
The desire for logical self-consistency may be an admirable trait 
in secular man, but it is dubious whether he is the first one to see its 
importance, or that it is any more a part of his make-up than it was in 
the cave man of pre-history, the early Christian, the medieval scholar, 
or the nineteenth century historian. Truth, and not secularity, demands 
logical self-consistent arguments, and everyman of every age, be he 
secular or not, has understood this. 
What the argument of logical self-consistency on behalf of secular 
man comes to is that certain men in contemporary society find it hard 
to logically reconcile their world-view with the traditional notion of 
God and Christianity. This is not an uncommon occurrence in any age. 
Christ himself seems to have met such people. To presume however that 
unlike the non-believers of previous generations, secular man's world-view 
1. Pittenger, C. R., p. 137. 
2. Cousins, p. 15- 
3- Albert North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 
1969), p. 404- 
4- Langdon Gilkey, 'A Theology in Process: Schubert Ogden's 
Developing Theology, ' Interpretation, 21 (1967), p" 449" 
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is correct is to beg the question. 'Traditional 
theism and Christian 
doctrine may be illogical within secular man's world-view, but then his 
world-view may not be as self-consistent as he thinks. Moreover, to 
accept willynilly secular man's world-view as true may be doing him a 
disservice by letting him persist in his ignorance. Such a disservice 
when it pertains to the knowledge of God and Christ is great indeed. 
To answer fully the criticism that classical metaphysics deals in 
static 'substances' and 'natures' would carry one far afield. Suffice 
it to say that Aquinas did not understand 'substance' and 'nature' to be 
some kind of material stuff. There is no such thing as a block of human 
'substance' in every human being. Substance for Aquinas usually denotes 
a being of a certain nature or kind. To have the substance of human nature 
is to be a rational animal. Moreover, as was seen, Aquinas himself says 
that strictly speaking God is not a substance. It is difficult to see 
where the process theologians received this notion. It would seem to be 
1 
close to Berkley's or Locke's notion of substance. 
As for the criticism that the scholastics and the Greeks considered 
things as 'beings-in-themselves, ' one only needs to ask if it is possible 
to metaphysically consider reality in any other way without denying its 
existence. As will be seen, Process Philosophy itself speaks of beings- 
in-themselves -- actual occasions. The only difference between actual 
occasionsand such 'beings' as men and elephants is that actual occasions 
are smaller. The real question then is whether it is more true to speak 
of men and elephants existing in themselves, or of actual occasions? 
The core criticism is that classical theism in making God supernatural, 
immutably perfect and impassible, has made him static, inert and totally 
unrelated to the world and man. The first three chapters of this study 
show this to be a totally false understanding of the Christian tradition. 
For the Fathers, and even more so for Aquinas, to say that God is immutable 
and impassible is to predicate of God complete perfection, which perfection 
does not make him static or inert, but supremely active and dynamic. 
Process theologians, when criticising classical theism, always equate 
perfection with being static and inert, as if the more perfect a being is, 
the more static it becomes. Such a notion is a contradiction of terms, 
1. It is interesting to note that Ogden (p. 57) and Griffin (p. 170) 
quote Descartes as a case in point. Descartes' understanding of 
'substance' is hardly Aquinas'. 
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and the most common of human experiences bears this out. A man who is 
the most free from psychological problems, and even more so from sin, who 
actualizes his talents and becomes more perfect does not become static 
on inert, but the most dynamic and creative of men. As will be seen, 
in spite of their criticism of classical theism, process theologians 
maintain this common sense view of perfection in their own notion of God. 
One feels that process theologians when speaking of the static 
perfection of God are thinking of something like the static and immutable 
perfection exemplified in Michaelangelo's 'David. ' Michaelangelo freezes 
in marble the perfection of David. However, the perfection of David is 
immutable and static precisely because it is expressed in a statue made 
of marble. If David had the perfection portrayed in Michaelangelo's 
statue, he was anything but static. Process theologians seem to be reading 
into classical theism their materialistic notion of substance: that to be 
a 'substance' is comparable to being a hunk of marble. 
Classical theism then, -unlike Plato, does not see change as bad, 
but for what it really is: part and parcel of being finite. Change as 
change is neither good nor bad, but it can be good or bad depending on 
whether it increases or decreases the perfection of the creature. Not 
to predicate 'change' of God in no way degrades changes in creatures; 
but rather posits that, unlike creatures, God is wholly perfect and 
actual. God does not change because it is bad, but because it is im- 
possible. The real problem lies in the fact that process thought equates 
change ipso facto with good, and thus has 'a problem grounding that belief 
since it is obvious that not all change is good. 
Moreover, the criticism that the theistic notion of God means that 
God as transcendent and supernatural is not 'literally' related to the 
world, but only nominally or externally related does not hold up. Process 
theologians attribute to classical theism the Platonic notion of trans- 
cendence where God is not only other than the finite world, but apart 
from it. While the early Fathers did have trouble with this, Nicea 
broke this understanding of transcendence. Also while there may be some 
ambiguity in Aquinas' use of the concept 'logical term' when applied to 
God as related to the world, it is fairly easy to see that he does not 
mean that there is no relation as Ogden maintains. Ogden's remark that 
God is not literally related to the world 'if by "literal" is meant in 
the same way we are related to it, ' is true. However, it does not follow 
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that God is then 'literally not related to the world. ' As was noted, 
Aquinas' understanding of God's logical relation to the world means that 
he is in a real sense more intimately related to the world and man than 
a man is related to the world and other men. Men must relate themselves 
by mediating acts, by real relations, but for God to be logically related 
to the world means that he is related, not by a mediating act, but by 
the very act that he is in himself. 
Ogden's distinction between external and internal relations is very 
revealing. It is fairly easy to grasp what an internal relation is. 
It is one where two 'things' are constitutively related to form a being, 
such as body and soul. (This will be looked at more closely later. ) 
However, it is difficult to conceive exactly what an external relation is. 
It seems to mean that one thing is related to the outside of another 
thing but not to the inside, as a TV antenna is related to the outside 
roof of a house. This seems to be a rather narrow scheme for classifying 
relations. Beyond that no classical theist would ever think of conceiving 
of an outside and inside of God much less that the world is related only 
to the outside of him. What the distinction reveals is that for process 
thought only internal relations are possible, and to speak of any other 
type must mean that they are external or non-existent. Such a conclusion 
is highly dubious, or at least not applicable in criticising classical 
theism's view of the relationship between God and the world. 
It is true that classical theism and Christianity are super- 
naturalistic. God and the world are in different ontological orders. 
philosophically this distinction is based on classical theism's notion 
of creation. Theologically it is rooted in the traditional notion of 
revelation. Whether Process Philosophy can maintain a viable understanding 
of reality without such a notion of creation, and thus a supernatural God; 
and whether Process Theology can remain in any real sense Christian 
without such a notion of revelation will be judged later. 
In concluding this section the question must be asked: How can the 
God of traditional theism, at one and the same time, have no relation to 
the world and man, since he is the 'eternal bystander'; and yet be a 
dictator, monarch, and Caesar who 'pushes, thrusts, and twists' etc. all 
his subjects? In criticising classical theism the process theologians 
have given to the theistic notion of God a 'mystery' far greater than 
any proposed by its defenders. 
168 
B. Process Theolopv and Christologv 
While process theologians do not have a good grasp of classical 
theism and scholastic philosophy, this in no way implies that they do 
not have something better to offer of their own. Whether they do or not 
must be judged on its own merits. Thus their basic position must be 
given. 
Philosophically process theologians follow the lead of A. N. Whitehead 
and C. Hartshorne. Their philosophy grew out of the basic principle that 
change is the universal element of reality. Thus, as a philosophy, 
elements of process thought can be traced all the way back to Heraclitus 
through such men as Hegel, Leibnitz, Spinoza, and even Plato. 
' There 
is also an affinity between Process Philosophy and the Eastern Philosophies, 
especially Buddhism. From a scientific perspective, Process Philosophy 
leans heavily on the theory of biological evolution for moral support. 
The fundamental units of reality in Process Philosophy are what 
Whitehead calls 'actual entities' or 'actual occasions. ' They are atomic 
not only in space, but in time. Each actual occasion lasts but a moment. 
The essence of an actual occasion is to experience, and thus it can also 
be called an 'occasion of experience. ' This does not mean that each 
actual occasion is conscious. Rather as Griffin states: 
'Every entity is a pulse of experience which is "something 
individual for its own sake. " It is a throb of emotion, a 
brief moment of self-enjoyment. This means that every 
occasion is a subject, something for itself, not merely an 
object, something for others. ' 2 
What it means for an actual entity to experience is summarized in the 
concept 'prehend. ' This is a key concept for understanding the process 
notion of God and the Incarnation. 'To prehend' is for one actual occasion 
to take into itself previous actual occasions. 'Thus each successive 
actual occasion prehends a multiplicity of past actual occasions. However, 
it prehends them only as objective since each occasion adds its own sub- 
jective novelty in the prehension. In turn this subjective actual 
1. Cf. Larry Azar, 'Whitehead: Challenging a Challenge, ' The Thomist, 
30 (1966) pp. 80-87. Also Edward Parley, The Transcendence of God, 
(London: Epworth Press, 1962), pp. 140-142. 
2. Griffin, p. 168. 
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occasion passes away becoming an object to be prehended by successive 
actual occasions. 
I 
What should be noted here is that prehension is a relational 
concept, the relation of actual occasions to one another. It is an 
internal or constitutive relation in that the prehension of past 
occasions are constitutive of the reality of the present occasion. Thus 
'to prehend' is not an epistemological concept, but primarily an 
ontological concept. 'To prehend' is not primarily a present occasion 
coming to know a past occasion and taking it into account, but rather 
the present occasion in prehending is at least partially constituted in 
its ontological reality by the past. It is because the past occasion is 
ontologically constitutive of the present occasion that, as will be seen, 
the past in some conscious complex society of present occasions comes 
to be known. Furthermore, what must always be kept in mind is that this 
relation is always, by its very nature, one of past to present. No two 
actual occasions are simultaneously present to one another. If they were 
simultaneously present, each would lose its subjective reality since 
each occasion is a subject only because it is a moment of experience 
in itself. Prehension then is the dynamic basis of all becoming, and why 
the whole of reality is in process. 
A whole myriad or society of actual occasions whose prehensions 
follow a pattern discernible in experience is an 'enduring object. ' 
Thus, for example, 'things' like trees and rocks are not things-in- 
themselves, but millions or billions of actual occasions successively 
prehending each other in a 'tree-like' or 'rock-like' way. The term 
'tree' is applied to the enduring pattern of this prehending series and 
not to somethinýc that endures over a period of time. 
Some societies of actual occasions are complex enough to be called 
'living persons. ' This is due to the fact that they have a soul or mind 
which is a society of dominant enduring occasions that are conscious 
and which centralize, control, and order all other occasions of experience 
(the body). It is not that something is 'living, ' but that the society 
of occasions are such as to be said 'to live, ' and this is due to the 
'soul' which is not one entity or principle of life,. but a dominant series 
of occasions complex enough to be said to be 'conscious'. A human person 
then is not some one who has experiences, rather it is the special type 
ý. Cf. ibid., pp. 168-169. 
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of experiences that give rise to the person. 
1 
Thus a person's self-identity is not that one and the same being 
called John exists over a period of time, but rather that IJohn1 is an 
enduring society or pattern of occasions which are able to remember 
through successive prehensions the past actual occasions that make him 
an enduring pattern or society. It is not 'I' in the present who remembers 
'me' in the past, but rather it is the present prehending occasions which 
remember the 'me' of the past and in so doing give rise to the 'I' of 
the present. 
2 
An actual occasion in prehending a past actual occasion does not just 
prehgnd it solely as it is, but in making it a part of itself conforms it 
to its own subjective aim -- that is, makes it conform to the present 
occasion's end. 
3 An actual occasion receives its subjective aim, which 
is a value or good to be actualized, from God. For Process Philosophy 
then God is necessary in that without his ideal aim or lure present to 
and active in each prehending occasion the world would be chaotic and 
lacking in novelty. This does not mean that an occasion loses its freedom, 
since God gives a multiplicity of values 
(some better than others) to 
each prehending occasion from which the occasion can choose. 
4 Now each 
actual occasion in prehending the past occasion, along with the divine 
lure and making them its own in the subjective prehending immediacy of 
its subjective aim is also, in that one act, giving a lure to the future. 
it is determining in some way the content of the future prehending 
occasion which will prehend it as past. 
5 
With this basic structure of reality in mind, it is necessary to take 
a closer look at the process notion of God. The motto behind the process 
notion of God is Whitehead's remark that 'God is not to be treated as an 
exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. 
He is their chief exemplification. ' 
6 
While Whitehead maintained that God was one actual occasion or 
entity, such men as Ogden, Griffin, and Cobb follow Hartshorne. They 
1. Cf. Pittenger, P. T. C. F., pp. 59 and 60. 
2. Cf. John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, (London: Lutterworth 
Press, 1966), pp- 71-79- 
3- Cf. Griffin, pp. 171-172. 
4. Cf. Pittenger, C. R., p. 141. 
5. Cf. Griffin, p. 177- 
6. Whitehead, p. 405. 
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see God as a society of actual occasions comparable to the society of 
actual occasions which form a man. In doing this they believe, that it 
is more in keeping with the basic structure of Whitehead's thought and 
more easy to see why God can be called a person or personal. 
1 
Within process thought God is dipolar in that he has a primordial 
or abstract pole or nature and a consequent or concrete pole or nature. 
The abstract pole of God is God in his pure potential. It defines and 
grounds what God is and could be. Thus God as primordial has for all time 
the potentiality to relate himself to all actual occasions, to prehend 
all that occurs. Also as primordial God contains in abstract all the 
possibilities of what may occur in reality, and as such then God is related 
to all that happens as the source and ground of good. As Pittenger 
states: 'As "primordial"--abstract and in this sense "eternal"--God may 
be said to "contain" all that might ever be. '2 God is absolute then in 
his supreme relativity. It is this potential which establishes God as 
God, and thus in his potential he is unchangeable, immutable and absolute. 
It is with regard to God's abstract pole that one can call God omniscient, 
omnipotent, infinite, and transcendent. These attributes refer not to 
God as he exists, but to his absolute potential, i. e., his ability to 
be related to, influence and prehend all that occurs. 
3 As will be seen 
shortly, in the concrete pole the above attributes cannot be attributed 
to God. 
Because God in his abstract pole contains all the possibilities for 
good and value his subjective aim or lure is to have these actualized in 
reality by actual occasions. In so doing he is able to take them into 
himself through prehension, and thus establish himself as concrete. In 
turn he can plough them back into reality opening up new possibilities 
for the actualization of further goods and values which his abstract pole 
potentially encompasses. 
4 
God is creator then not in the sense of bringing 
beings into existence in the traditional sense. Rather, containing in the 
abstract the potential of all good and value, God through his subjective 
1. Cf. Hartshorne, p. 31. Cf. Griffin, p. 181. Cobb, pp. 176-192. 
Ogden, pp. 141-142. 
2. Pittenger, P. T. C. F., p. 28. 
3. Cf. Griffin, pp. 182-188. Griffin maintains that God cannot be 
omnipotent in the strict sense for 'if God had all the power, he 
would be the only actual being', (pp. 186-187). For response 
see p. /IroA,. J 
4. Cf. Pittenger, P. T. C. F., p. 29. 
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aim or lure is 'the necessary ground of whatever exists or is even 
possible. '1 Thus while it is impossible for God to exist without the 
world, he nevertheless is the source of all creative advance since each 
occasion in some way actualizes the abstract potential of God by pre- 
hending his subjective aim and making it its own. 
God in his concrete pole is God as he actually exists at any given 
time in the process. 'Therefore time--or succession as the world 
exemplifies it--is real to God. ' God constantly changes with each 
successive prehension of all actual occasions. He ever increases and 
actualizes his abstract potential in the concrete. Thus literally 
'What happens matters to God. ' He is dependent on other actual occasions 
for providing him both with 'material' out of which to actualize his 
potential and also for future novelty in the world. 'History, historical 
occurance in time, are real to him, for him, and in him. '2 
God then in his concrete pole 'is more important' or has 'a priority' 
over his abstract or primordial pole since it is God as he exists in 
reality. While the abstract pole defines his nature, he exists as so 
defined only in the concrete. 
3 
Thus process thought terms itself 
Panentheistic. while God is always potentially more, yet, as concrete, 
the world is in God, not in its subjective immediacy, but in its objective 
past. 'The world is in God, but only in his experience, not in his 
essence. Hence God includes everything, but everything is not God. '4 
God's essence is not exhausted by the world or his prehension of it. 
While God as dipolar exemplifies the basic structure of reality 
nevertheless being the chief exemplification he is 'categorically unique. ' 
Unlike other actual occasions which prehend only a partial number of 
previous occasions, 'God prehends completely; i. e., he fully prehends all 
the actual entities there are. '5 Being absolutely relative both in his 
subjective aim, which all occasions in some way prehend, and in his own 
prehension of all occasions God can be said to be the most personal of 
all beings. Persons are constituted and defined by their relations (the 
complexity of their prehending society). Thus God, since he is prehended 
1. Ogden, p. 62. 
2. Pittenger, P. T. C. P., pp. 29 and 30. 
3. Ibid., p. 31- 
4- Griffin, p. 188. 
5. Ibid., p. 184. 
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by all and prehends all, is the most related, and thus the most fully 
personal. 
Likewise, in prehending all occasions in the full value and good 
which they express God prehends them with the subjective form of love. 
To love is to share in and be affected by the joys and sorrows etc. of 
another. God in prehending absolutely each occasion takes into himself, 
internally as constitutive of his nature, all the joys and sorrows etc. 
of every occasion. 
Moreover, unlike other occasions which only influence a part of all 
future occasions, God's influence through his subjective aim 'extends 
over all areas equally. ' Also, unlike other occasions and enduring objects, 
which cease to exist, God because of his absolute potential of being 
related to all occasions through prehension 'has always existed and 
always will. '1 The dipolar notion of God shows him to be, in Hartshorne's 
words, 'supreme, yet indebted to all; absolute, yet related to all. '2 
It is precisely his ability and potential to be indebted and related 
to all that makes him supreme and absolute. 
Now it may seem that all of the above has little to do with 
Christology, but just the opposite is the case. Everything said in the 
above is literally Christological. How God becomes man is no problem. 
There is only one possible way for him to do so -- prehension. Again 
Griffin states it clearly: 
'Hence the problem for Christology based on Whitehead's 
philosophy will be understood, not how God could be present 
in Jesus, but how God could be present in him in a special way, 
so that Jesus would be especially revelatory of God's nature. ' 
3 
God does not make himself present in Jesus in a way different from the 
way he is present in any other actual occasion. The presence of God in 
Jesus may be to such a degree that it highlights in what way he is present 
in every other occasion, but it is metaphysically impossible for him to 
be present in an altogether new way. Jesus is 'the chief exemplification.... 
of those "principles" which are required to explain, make sense of, and 
give the proper setting for whatever goes on in the entire process of God 
1. Ibid., p. 185- 
2* Hartshorne, titles of chapters One and Two. 
3. Griffin, p. 180. 
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in relationship to man and man in relation to God. '1 If Jesus is the 
chief exemplification, then 'the Incarnation is not confined only to the 
historical person of Jesus Christ, but is also the manner and mode of 
all of God's work in the world. That is to say, God is ever incarnating 
himself in his creation. '2 How then is Jesus special? 
Working from within Process Philosophy Pittenger identifies the 
Logos with the self-expressive activity of God in the world. 'The whole 
cosmic system is informed by a Divine Activity (the Logos) who is 
realizing the increasing adequate expression of God in his creation. '3 
Following the pattern of Panentheism, he also writes: 
'Through the Word (the Logos) God informs every grade and level of 
being; but he is not identified with the universe, which is 
created and derivative. And he is never exhausted therein, but 
is present and active in widely differing degrees of intensity 
and significance. ' 4 
It must be remembered then that the term 'Logos' does not signify 
a divine person who exists as Son and personifies the whole divine nature 
as such, but rather it is that expression of God which is the purpose, 
order and aim that he wishes to incarnate and actualize in the world. 
5 
The Logos as God's self-expression in the world is not something new 
added to Process Philosophy. The Logos is just God's 'subjective aim, ' 
'initial aim, ' 'divine lure, ' and 'persuasion' for each actual occasion 
to prehend. 
It is in the historical Jesus that the Logos is the most fully 
6 
present. 'He is the classic instance of the Divine Activity in manhood. ' 
1. Pittenger, C. R., p. 68. 
2. Pittenger, G. P., p. 19. 
3. Pittenger, W. I., p. 263. That Jesus does not have a human nature, 
but is a 'rooting of occasions' like all other men see C. R., p. 57. 
Pittenger states that 'God's activity in Christ [is] through 
initial aim, divine lure, and mutual prehension' just as it is in 
every other creature (C. R., p. 145)" Cf. pp. 139-141- 
4- Pittenger, W. I., p. 166. -Cf. p. 180. Also C. R., pp. 88-91. 
5. Cf. Pittenger, W. I., pp. 215-235. Pittenger denies that the Logos can 
be properly called 'Son, ' but only the man Jesus (W. I., p. 186). 
Griffin's notion of the Logos is basically the same as Pittenger's: 
Cf. pp. 231-232,190-192. Griffin does have the novel idea that 
'whereas before revelation God was present in man as Holy Spirit, after- 
wards God can begin to be in him as Logos' (p. 242). This does not 
seem to be in keeping with how Jesus understood their respective activity, 
but one would imagine that this is another case where what Jesus thought 
and said was not in keeping with what Process Philosophy really knows 
to be the case. Cf. p. 225. 
6. Pittenger, G. P., p. 29. 
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The Incarnation then is not an intrusion of God by some supernatural 
miracle, but 'Jesus Christ, seen as the focal self-expression of God the 
Word in human terms, in a world which is itself also the Word's self- 
expression in varying manner and degree, ... [is] the "emergence, " within 
a continuity of God-man relationships, of a new fullness which is a 
real novelty. '1 In the man Jesus then 
'the Word who is present and active in the lives of men in their 
historical situation, is actualized or "en-manned" in such a 
decisive and distinctive fashion that we are enabled to say here, 2 
as nowhere else, we are in the presence of the Word "made flesh". ' 
Ogden and Griffin are in substantial agreement with Pittenger on the 
nature of the Incarnation. However, they use as an analogy the relation 
between the mind and the body to explain and clarify how God acts in the 
world and especially in Christ. 
For Griffin a person's acts 'in the primary sense are the psyche's 
acts of self-constitution in each moment' while the acts of the body are 
'the acts of the person in a secondary sense. '3 The action of the hand, 
for example, is a secondary expression of the mind's primary action of 
wanting it moved. Now while 'the mind's action in relation to the body is 
formally always the same, ' some external actions express the personality 
of the person more than others. A Acts of charity or selfishness are 
AEThose external acts which express a person's character and 
purpose to an especially high degree can be called his special 
acts. For they are really "his" acts in a way that most of his 
bodily acts are not, for they especially express that character 
and purpose which constitutes his deepest selfhood.... ' S 
thus special acts for they reveal one's character more than tieing one's 
shoes. Moreover, 'the intention behind it 
[the action] must be such that 
the act really does ex-press .... the person's character and purpose. '6 
1. Pittenger, W. I., p. 242. 
2. Ibid., p. 180. One should not be confused by Pittenger speaking of 
the 'enmanned Logos' or 'Love enmanned' (C. R., p. 153, and G. P., p. 
24). It is the same incarnational principle at work: the prehension 
of God's subjective aim. 
3. Griffin, pp. 208-209. 
4. Ibid., p. 210. 
5. Ibid., p. 212. 
6. Ibid. 
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An action may be seen externally as charitable, but the person's sole 
intention may be selfish. Finally, the body must conform to the mind's 
aim. Since 'the mind's causal control over the body is only persuasive, ' 
the body may not do what the mind desires because it is 'weary, drugged, 
or injured, ' and thus the body would not express the person's true self. 
1 
The above can be applied analogically to God in relation to man, 
especially in Christ. God like the mind acts in both a primary and 
secondary sense. 
'God's acts in the primary sense are those in which he responds 
to the world, receiving its experience and making decisions for 
the next stage of the creative advance on the basis of his 
characteristic response to these experiences and his eternal 
subjective aim.... Hence, God's acts in the primary sense are 
formally all the same. ' 2 
The events in the world (analogous to the body) are 'God's acts in the 
secondary sense. '3 The relation between God and the world is not what 
Ogden would call an external relation, but internal. God and the world 
are constitutively related to one another through prehension, each bringing 
about and expressing the other's being like the body and soul. 
4 
Following then the mind/body analogy Griffin states: 
'A special act of God would be a human act (1) in which a new 
vision of reality is expressed, (2) for which God's aim was a 
direct reflection of his eternal character and purpose, and 
(3) in which God's aim was actualized to a high degree. ' 5 
In other words, a special act would involve the revealing and exemplifying 
of the God/world relationship due to the fact that God had given a certain 
event a special aim which would highlight his general aim or way of acting, 
and that such a special aim was actualized in a supreme way. Because all 
three points were actualised in an 'unsurpassable degree' in Jesus 'he 
was God's supreme act. '6 
1. Ibid., p. 213. 
2. Ibid., p. 214- 
3- Ibid., p. 215- 
4- Cf. Ogden, p. 178. 
5. Griffin, p . 216. 
6. Ibid. 
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'Jesus was not only one who had a special insight into the 
nature of things; his special activity was based on the impulses 
given him by God. He was not merely a teacher about God, he 
was a special act of God. And he was a special act of God not 
merely in the sense of having actualized possibilities which 
were open to all men, so that Jesus' specialness would have been 
rooted only in his own decisions. Rather, Jesus' specialness 
can be understood as rooted first of all in God's aim for him, 
the content of which was different for Jesus than for all other 
men. ' 1 
On the one hand, Pittenger believes that his Process Christology is 
close to that of the classical Antiochene position. Following Theodore of 
hopsuastia and Nestorius, Pittenger sees Process Christology as God 
dwelling in Jesus 'as in a son. ' What takes place in Jesus 
'is the crowning and completing of all that is implicit in 
humanity from its very beginning.... God dwells in Jesus as in 
a Son, as the Antiochenes said: His indwelling in the rest of 
us is of a sporadic and spasmodic nature, a partial self- 
expression, a broken relationship. ' 2 
Using an Antiochene analogy Pittenger sees the union as a 'personal union 
such as we know in, say, human marriage or love of a lover and his beloved. '3 
Griffin)on the other hand, believes that within the classical Christo- 
logical categories his Christology 'would most likely to be considered 
Ebionite since it does not identify Jesus' self-hood with a pre-existent 
divine person-' 
4 
While Griffin does not treat the issue, Pittenger nevertheless believes 
that while his Christology may not be traditional or 'orthodox' it is in 
keeping with 'the doctrinal aims' of Nicea and Chalcedon. 
5 Seeing Jesus' 
1. Ibid., pp. 217-218. Ogden's Christology is basically the same as 
Griffin's and Pittenger's. Cf. Ogden, pp. 164-187; 199-205" 
However, it should be noted that Griffin believes he has taken the 
'Pelagian quality' out of their Christologies by maintaining that 
Christ did not just actualize God's general aim in reality, but that 
God gave to Christ a special aim. Cf. Griffin, pp. 218-220. Also 
fn. 3,6,7 (pp. 262-263). Griffen may be a little unfair to 
Pittenger since he does speak of God's special vocational lure or 
aim for Jesus. Cf. C. R., p. 143. 
2. Pittenger, W. I., p. 131. 
3. Pittenger, C. R., p. 12. Cf. p. 143. 
4. Griffin, p. 143. 
5. Cf. Pittenger, C. R., pp. 1-21. 
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divinity 'as God's act in manhood, ' means that like Nicea's homoousion 
'what we know of God in Jesus Christ is of a piece with, of the "same 
substance, " as whatever there is of the divine operation anywhere else 
in creation.... '1 Nicea in proclaiming the Logos homoousion with the 
Father against Arius meant that "in Jesus "very God, " the true deity 
himself,. had been met in this historic event. No created deity was 
involved; this was nothing less than God himself. '2 However, it should 
not be supposed that Jesus incarnated God absolutely for 'there is 
"something of God left over" after incarnation; a deity exhausted in 
"incarnation" would not be God, transcendent and ultimate. '3 Likewise, 
Pittenger believes that his notion of the union of God and man in Jesus 
is true to what Chalcedon proclaimed. 
'The union which we are seeking here to define is a union in 
which the organon of the Word (Jesus) is so integrally one 
with the Word who thus energizes in it, through it, by it, with 
it, that the two are indeed (as Chalcedon rightly insists) 
inseparable and indivisible, even while they are also unconfused 
and unchanged in essential nature which is proper to each. ' 4 
While the above shows that Jesus as divine and as he is related to 
God differs only in degree from how all men are divine and related to God, 
Pittenger, Griffin and Ogden nevertheless believe that he is unique, 
diffinitive, and decisive with respect to God's self-expression and relation 
to man. 
5 Pittenger uses Vhitehead's notion of 'importance' to elaborate 
this. 
'An occasion may be called "important" when it occurs within 
the continuing process of events, provides illumination of what 
has gone before, speaks to us now with a special impressiveness, 
and offers new ways of understanding what is happening in 
consequent history. ' 6 
1. Ibid., p. 2. 
2. Ibid., p. 8. 
3. Pittenger, W. I., p. 226. He believes that Nicea upholds his view: 
Cf. C. R., p. 42; W. I., p. 237. 
4. Pittenger, W. I., p. 188. 
5. Pittenger seems confused over what 'difference in kind' means. He 
seems to think that difference in kind means that Jesus would be a 
different kind of man, or some different kind of being, sui r-eneris. 
Cf. W. I., pp. 236-244; C. R., pp. 111-113. In traditional Christology 
'difference in kind' refers to the fact that Jesus, as the Logos 
incarnate, is Son absolutely and not by adoption. He is not some 
teztium quid being, but man like us in everything but sin. 
6. Pittenger, C. R., p. 100. 
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Jesus as the supreme revelatory event is of supreme 'importance' because 
he gives to man 'the clue' to what 'God is up to in this world. '1 
Likewise for Griffin because Jesus is God's fullest act he 'is the 
decisive factor in their [men's] cognitive approach to reality. In 
terms used here, this means that their basic model or vision of reality 
is ultimately derived from Jesus. '2 For a person to accept Jesus in 
faith means that he 'takes that which was revealed in him as the Logos 
of reality, as the clue to what the truly divine reality is, and what 
it is leading us toward. '3 
Griffin and Ogden see the revelation brought by Jesus as 'pre- 
conceptual' or 'mythical. '4 Thus, while the vision of reality revealed 
by Jesus is cognitive, it is not self-verifiable, but can only be verified 
'in terms of the philosophical criteria of consistency, adequacy to the 
facts, and illuminating power. '5 A Christian philosophy would be one 
which makes explicit and embodies the Christian vision of reality revealed 
in Jesus, and at the same time, verified it by purely philosophical 
criteria. This is precisely what Process Philosophy has done. Unlike 
earlier and traditional theology, which tried to reconcile a foreign 
Greek philosophy with the Christian faith, process thought explicates 
and delineates its philosophy from within the Christian vision of reality. 
b 
'It is the formal thesis of this present essay that Whitehead's 
metaphysics provides us with a conceptuality never before 
equaled in its combination of appropriateness to the Christian 
faith and intrinsic excellence as measured by the normal 
rational and empirical criteria. ' 7 
Griffin points out that while Jesus is God's supreme revelation and 
established God's kingdom, nevertheless he 'probably conceived the final 
arrival of the Kingdom of God in completely supernaturalistic terms.... 
8 
While Jesus thought and believed the above, Griffin maintains that the 
actual vision of reality he revealed through his ministry presupposes 
1. Ibid., p. 84" Cf. W. I., pp. 251 and 263- 
2. Griffin, p. 220. Cf. pp. 199-205- 
3: Ibid., p. 238. 
4. Cf. jbid., pp. 152-156. Ogden, pp. 185-186. 
5. Griffin, p. 157" 
6. Ibid., pp. 157-165. 
7" Ibid., p. 165. Cf. Ogden, pp. 185-187. Also Ogden, Christ Without 
Myth, (London: Collins, 1962), pp. 170-192. 
8. Griffin, p. 203. 
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that God is present and active in a way that is more in keeping with 
1 
Process Philosophy. 
Pittenger, Griffin and Ogden are also in basic agreement concerning 
soteriology. Christ does not establish an entirely new relation between 
God and man, but makes it possible for the God/man relation which already 
and always existed to become more fully actualized. 'The only change 
in the God-man relation is man's attitude. Through revelation he comes 
to know things about God that were already true, and this knowledge 
affects the subjective form of his experience. '2 Since Jesus gives the 
clue to the God/man relation, he 'provides new occasions for creative 
advance--for it is in terms of that which is taken as 'important' that 
action in the direction of fulfilment of subjective aim or purpose will 
be undertaken. '3 Because of Jesus God can strengthen his subjective aim. 
He can act in ways more in keeping with his eternal purpose and this 
'increases the possibility that the aims proffered will be actualized 
to a high degree. '4 Because Christ is the past active in the present, 
through prehension, man can follow more easily his example and fulfil 
God's purpose and aim. Pittenger summarizes process soteriology well 
when he states that it is 'exemplarism.... with an ontological grounding. '5 
In concluding this section it should be noted that since process 
thought makes miracles, in the strict sense, impossible, such events as 
the resurrection of the body are 'absurd and incredible. '6 The resurrection 
simply means that the goods and values actualized by man are completely 
prehended by God and 'live on' forever in his concrete nature. Knowing 
that God prehends all of one's actualized values is one's ultimate peace.? 
C. The Viability of Process Theoloptr and Christolo&v 
It is hoped that the above exposition of process thought is fair, 
clear, and sufficiently complete. The following critique will first 
1. Cf. ibid., p. 225- 
2. Ibid., p. 236. 
3. Pittenger, G. P., p. 21. Cf. Griffin, p. 241- 
4- Griffin, p. 242. 
5. Pittenger, G. P., p. 62. 
6. Pittenger, C. R., pp. 23-24. Cf. pp. 123-126. 
7. Cf. Pittenger, G. P., pp. 18-19. Also Griffin, p. 234" Also Ogden, 
pp. 206-230. Pittenger does seem to think that there may be some 
personal survival after death even though this would contradict his 
above stated views: Cf. P. T. C. F., pp. 75-84; G_ P., pp. 86-95. 
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treat the philosophical viability of process thought, and secondly its 
theological and Christological relevance. It should be noted that since 
Process Christology is nothing other than Process Philosophy applied to 
a unique and particular instance, all criticisms of process thought in 
general apply equally as well to its Christology. 
The most obvious philosophical defect of the whole system is that 
it is impossible for Process Philosophy to account for why anything exists 
including God. It may account for why God is the way he is and how he 
works, and why the world is the way it is and how it works, but why God 
or the world exist at all is completely unaccounted for. Neither can 
account for its own existence, and neither can account for the other's 
existence. It is impossible for God to give 'being' since his being as 
an actual concrete reality is totally dependent on the world; and thus, 
if anything, the world exists chronologically and logically prior to God. 
God in his abstract pole does not help since that is God as pure un- 
actualized potency, and as such obviously has no power to bring something 
into existence. Even to say that God and the world were never without 
one another does not help. Since neither can account for why the other 
exists this question would be left unanswered even if the process never 
had a beginning. 
1 God's creativity in process thought is his ability to 
give order and influence reality, and not his ability to bring it into 
existence and conserve it. There is no need to belabour this criticism 
since it has been made so often. 
2 
The basic reason why process thought 
cannot answer this question is because God is not immutable. Only if God 
is wholly perfect, i. e., irsum esse, and thus immutable in his dynamic 
actual perfection, can he establish others as existing. 
3 
1. This is Aquinas' whole point on the fact that the world can be 
'eternal, ' and yet must necessarily be created: Cf. S. T., I, 46,1. 
2. Cf. H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, (London: Macmillan, 1071), pp. 
52-53" E. L. Mascall, He Who Is, (London: Libra Books, 1966), pp. 
157-159" James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy, (Chicago: Gateway 
Edition, 1967), p. 323. Robert Neville, God the Creator, (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 78. Robert Neville, 
'Whitehead on the One and Many, ' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
7 (1969-1970), pp. 388-389. P. -Drescht 'The Transcendence of God in Whitehead's Philosophy, ' Philosophical Studies, 11 (1961-1962), p. 14. 
John Wild, 'The Divine Existence: An Answer to Mr. Hartshorne, ' Review 
of Metaphysics, 4 (1950), p. 62. What is surprising is that process 
men seem oblivious to this criticism or completely miss the point of 
it. Cf. Gene Reeves and Delwin Brown, 'The Development of Process 
Thought, ' Process Philosophy and Christian Tho ht, Eds. Brown, James, 
and Reeves, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971)9 p. 47. 
3. Griffin's belief that for God to be all-powerful means that he would 
have all the power and thus nothing else would exist is to think in 
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While God is defined as potentially containing all perfection, it 
is interesting to note here that it is better for God to exist in a less 
perfect state as concrete than not to exist at all in his absolute 
potential. In other words, there is in process thought an ontological 
priority of the concrete pole of God over the potential pole. This betrays 
the fact that process theologians, despite their criticism, have the same 
notion of perfection and dynamism, based on esse, as classical theism. 
What is hard to understand is why they do not follow that notion through 
and say that a God, who is ipsum esse, containing all perfection, is 
supremely dynamic instead of continually concluding that he would be 
static and inert. 
The fact that God is not creator leads to a second philosophical 
defect within process thought. It is evident that Process Philosophy 
wishes to solve the problem of the One and the Many. However, since God 
is as much a part of the ontological process of becoming as any other 
being, he is not ontologically ultimate; and thus the problem of grounding 
the oneness is still present. Being one of the many beings in the process, 
he is neither the source nor the end, but merely the recorder of the uni- 
versal and ultimate principles of reality. Thus there is no existing being 
who establishes the universal principles operative in the process--whether 
it be the process itself, prehension, creativity, etc.. 
1 Thus the whole 
system hangs in an ontological vacuum. Since God is only the supreme 
prehender of all past occasions, 'the conclusion to draw is that the cate- 
gory of the ultimate 
[in Process Philosophy] does not genuinely address 
the ontological question, but only records the ontological situation. ... '2 
For God to ground the universal principles and the ontological oneness 
would demand that he transcend the world, in so far as he would be onto- 
logically other than the finite world; and thus he would contain the 
principles in the pure and perfect immutable actuality of himself as ipsum 
esse. To do that however would shatter the whole of Process Philosophy. 
purely materialistic concepts. Being, power, and perfection are not 
limited material commodities (such as oil) that must be in some 
way shared if more than one being is to have some. It is because 
God is all-powerful, and not in spite of it, that he is able to 
establish others as existing, containing within themselves not some 
of his power or perfection, but their own. Cf. E. L. Mascall, 
He who Is, pp. 102-103. 
1. Cf. James Richard, 'God, Time, and Process Philosophy, ' The=, 
68 (1965), p. 240- 
2. Robert Neville, 'Whitehead on the One and Many, ' The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy, 7 (1969-1970), p. 391. 
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This raises another philosophical defect. Because God does not 
establish the existential reality of beings, and thus does not ground 
the universal principles contained in reality, there is likewise then 
no ground for good and value. For Whitehead the eternal ideas or ideals 
were in a sort of Platonic heaven to which God had access through his 
primordial nature. That is problematic in itself, but to make the ideals 
part of the potential pole of what it means to be God, as abstractly 
defined, as Hartshorne, Cobb, Ogden, and Griffin do is to compound the 
problem. In Whitehead one could conceive of good and value as 'existing' 
in some sense, but as the pure potential of God they have no ontological 
ground at all. If no one contains them per se in actuality, who establishes 
them either in God's potential, or in his concrete pole, or in the world? 
It is impossible to ontologically ground such things as justice, good, 
love, etc.; rather than hate, jealousy, evil, etc.. Thus when process 
men say that God contains in his pure potential all goods and values, 
and that he is ever luring and persuading others to actualize them, they 
are making pure gratuitous statements with no ontological basis. What 
process men have done is to take the obvious fact that it is better to 
be good than evil and added to it the old classic theistic notion that this 
is due to the fact that God grounds the good. However, since God is not 
ontologically ultimate within process thought, containing all good and 
perfection in his immutable actualized self, there is no reason to presume 
that either of the above is obviously or necessarily the case. 
' 
In the end, the God of Process Philosophy is an imitation of Plato's 
demiurge, God's role is purely functional in that he is to bring order 
to finite reality. Moreover, he is a poor imitation. While Plato's 
demiurge could use the One or the Good to guide and bring order into 
finite reality, the demiurge of Process Philosophy can be grounded by no 
set of values. Likewise, he is unable to do his job properly since he 
is always one step behind in the process, forever condemned to trying to 
catch up in his ordering role. 
Thus another difficulty raises its head. To read Process Philosophy 
and Theology one would think that its notion of God was the most dynamic 
ever conceived. However, moving behind the words one finds that action 
pertains to God in two ways. 
1. In Process Philosophy, God, if even in a small way, is directly 
involved in evil actions. Cf. Griffin, p. 216. 
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Action first pertains to God as the prehender of all past actual 
occasions. This is a self-constituting action. It is the coming to be 
of God in each successive state of the process. It has nothing to do 
with his action within the world. The only relationship is that in 
prehending one's past one necessarily prehends God since he is partially 
constituted by one's past. Thus while God is always changing, it does 
not imply any dynamic action in the world on his part, but the lack of 
action since every change in him is one of actualizing some potential 
within himself. 
Secondly, he acts as the divine lure or influence on reality. He 
'persuades' all other actual occasions to actualize further good or value. 
However, one should not think that this is God acting in some dynamic 
way, or for that matter that it is God acting at all. All that 'lure, ' 
'influence, ' and 'persuade' means is that further potential goods are 
available for actualization because previous goods were actualized in 
the past. His lure and influence is not a dynamic action on his part, 
but the mere presence of his pure potential, that 'part' of him which is 
undynamic, unactualized, and non-existent. 
1 
While the motto of process thought concerning God has been that 
'God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, 
invoked to save their collapse, but their chief exemplification, ' it is 
interesting to note that the only reason God is relevant to Process 
Philosophy is precisely to save the collapse of the metaphysical 
principles, and he does this by being an exception. 
2 Functioning in 
the role of demiurge God saves the principles of 'creativity, ' 'becoming, ' 
etc., from chaos by being the only 'being' who prehends all occasions 
in his consequent nature, and the only one who influences all occasions 
through his absolute potential, and thus is the only one who is 
guaranteed everlasting existence. 
3 
Because God is an exception to the principles in that he prehends 
and influences all worldly occasions, he loses his freedom. He does not 
choose what he will prehend or what he will influence, but must do so by 
necessity, and his nature is defined, or better, constituted, by that 
necessity. Both from a philosophical and theological perspective the 
1. Cf. Colin Gunton, 'Process Theology's Concept of God, ' The 
ExDositorv Times, 84 (1973), pp. 294-295- 
2. Cf. Griffin, p. 174- 
3. Cf. Collins, p. 321. Mascall, p. 155. Robert Jensen, God After 
God (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 150. 
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whole process is wrapped in necessitarianism as Neville and Gunton have 
aptly pointed out. 
'God's action relative to the world, for neoclassical metaphysics, 
is necessitated; there is metaphysical necessity that God prehend 
everything perfectly (necessary redemption), and that everything 
prehend his influence (necessary creation).... Neoclassical meta- 
physics cannot escape necessitarianism. ' 1 
Prehension is the heart of process thought in that it makes the 
process truly a process. As was seen it is a relation/ontological concept. 
Each actual occasion is constituted in its ontological subjective present 
by being internally related-to the past which in turn is a lure to the 
future. Prehension is the philosophical basis not only for creativity and 
novelty, but also for personhood, and for interpersonal relations involving 
love, knowledge, freedom, foregiveness, etc.. From a theological point of 
view it is incarnational as well. 
What must be realized and realized in all its fullness is that no two 
actual occasions or society of occasions are ever related to one another 
in each of their respective 'presents. ' At the moment of subjective- 
present-actuality, i. e., when an actual occasion actually exists in reality 
as an entity, it is literally 
(to use Ogden's word) not related to 
anything at all. 
Hartshorne is aware of the problem, but does not seem to realize 
the full implications. 
'This brings us to the very difficult problem, for me the problem, 
of relations between contemporaries:... Two men could readily 
know each other, for a man is not one particular but a stream or 
system of actual and potential experiences 
[What Hartshorne means 
is that knowledge is always the past as present in a stream of 
prehensions, and thus prehensions can include data of the past 
experience of another in one's present conscious prehensions. ] 
But two experiences, two momentary or irrudicible "subjects" 
could not, according to our principles--unlestsome subtle qualifi- 
cations of them is possible--each know the other. ' 2 
1. Robert Neville, 'Neoclassical Metaphysics and Christianity: A 
Critical Study of Ogden's Reality of God, ' International Philosophical 
Quarterly, 9 (1969), p. 620. Cf. p. 623. Also see Gunton, p. 293. 
2. Hartshorne, p. 98. 
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Hartshorne attempts a solution, which is more a restatement of the problem, 
and in the end admits that 'the topic of contemporary relations bristles 
with difficulties, and I shall only say that if I could find a consistent 
analysis of it, I should be able to die content, so far as philosophical 
achievements are concerned. '1 Until Hartshorne realizes that all finite 
reality is founded on an ever present contemporary relation--creation-- 
which establishes beingsas existent, and thus capable of relating to others 
as contemporaries since all exist in the present, he will not 'die content. ' 
The repercussions of this position are pertinent to this study and 
the viability of Process Theology in general. 
Firstly, while process men continually emphasize how closely God 
and man are related within their system, they are never related in their 
respective subjective presents, when they are 'I's. ' God is only related 
to a person as the past in the person's present with a lure to the future. 
Man is related to God as the past in his present with a lure to the future. 
They are never related as 'the present' in 'the present. ' God and man 
are never contemporaries! 
2 
Secondly, because God and man are never present to one another in 
their respective subjectiv+lyas 'I's, ' 'this is a disastrous consequence 
for the religious applicability of the neoclassical concept of God, since 
it means in effect that God knows only ideas of things, not things 
themselves. '3 God and man never know each other as subjects, but only 
the objective past idea of the other. Thus man worships, adores, and 
prays to a past idea of God, but is never in communion with God as he is 
in himself. 
4 
Moreover, since prehension is a relation of the past in some way 
1. Ibid., p. 99. 
2. Cobb proposes that it may be possible for God and man to prehend 
one another as contemporary. However, that is not the problem. God 
may be contemporary in each present, but he is present only as the 
past with a lure to the future. Cf. Cobb, pp. 162-163. One should 
realize that this is not only the case between God and man, but 
with every relation: husband and wife, parent and child. 
3. Neville, 'Neoclassical Metaphysics...., ' I. P. ., 9 (1969), p. 618. 
Cf. John Wild, 'Review of Charles Hartshorne's The Divine 
Relativity, ' Review of Metaphysics, 2 (1948) pp. 75-76. 
4. Bernard Loomer, himself a process theologian, realizes that the 
God of Process Philosophy is not worshipful. Cf. Loomer, 'Empirical 
Theology within Process Thought, ' The Future of Empirical Theology, 
ed. Bernard E. Meland, (Chicago: University Press, 1969), pp. 
168-169. 
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ontologically constituting the present, it is difficult to see how such 
a relation is personal involving such notions as love, persuasion, mutual 
sympathy, suffering and joy. For God to prehend all actual occasions 
means that he is constituted in his consequent pole by them, but such a 
relation is not a relation between two persons involving love, etc.. 
This is very clearly seen from process thought's analogy between the 
relation of the body and soul, and God and man. If one takes their under- 
standing of the relation between the body and soul literally, the most 
radical of dualisms is conceived. To say, as Griffin does, that the mind 
'persuades' the body to act implies that the body has a mind of its own, 
that some how a person and 'his' body have a personal relation involving 
mutual love, sympathy and joy. Obviously, that is not how process thought 
conceives the relation. The mind and body are not two distinct existing 
entities related to one another in their distinctness. The mind does not 
'persuade' the body in any normal sense of the word, nor do they have a 
personal relation involving love etc.. The relation between the mind and 
body is one of prehension, that of constituting one another through pre- 
hending each other's past which in turn will be data for each other's 
future. The same is true of the relation between God and man. Because 
God prehends all actual occasions, it does not follow that he is therefore 
absolutely personal and loving. For God to prehend all actual occasions 
means only that he is necessarily constituted ontologically as an actual 
reality by everything that takes place in the world. It cannot be a 
personal relation since God and man are never related in their subjective 
immediacy as 'I's. ' Moreover, there is no relation of love, joy, etc. 
since the relation is totally an internal and self-constituting affair. 
1 
Thus to speak of God suffering with man or sharing man's joys is at 
best a euphemism. All that that means is that God records in his present 
consequent nature that a man suffered or that a man was happy, but when 
God prehends it, it is not present to him as the contemporary pain or joy 
of a man. It is merely the objective past idea. God then literally lives 
in the past. As Gunton states: 'He plays the essentially passive role as 
2 
a cosmic memory. ' 
1. Cf. John Wild, 'Review of Charles Hartshorne's...., ' Rev. of Meta., 
2 (1948 64. Also 'The Divine Existence:..., ' Rev. of Veta., 
4 (1950 , 68. 
2. Gunton, p. 294. 
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Since trees, persons, God etc. are not beings-in-themselves, but 
only enduring societies and patterns of actual occasions which give rise 
to trees, persons, God, all of these are purely phenomenological 
abstractions. what is really real as existing are only actual occasions. 
1 
This has two important repercussions. 
Firstly, while process thought continually speaks of the creativity 
and novelty which their understanding implies, there is none whatsoever. 
Creativity and novelty is only on a phenomenological or abstract level. 
If one looks beyond the appearance of a tree, a person, or God, one finds 
that it is not a tree, or a person, or God at all, but only actual 
occasions prehending one another in a 'tree-like, ' 'person-like, ' or 
'God-like' way. Reality appears to be creative and novel in process thought, 
but actually there has never been anything really new nor will there 
ever be. 
2 
Secondly, any use of language which implies beings-in-themselves and 
as related to one another as selves, such as 'love, ' 'persuade, ' is a 
mis-use of language. For example, to say that 'God prehends' or that 
'man prehends, ' as process thought continually does, and as has been done 
throughout this study, is completely misleading. Only actual occasions 
prehend. Beings as subject themselves, such as God and man, do not prehend 
since they do not exist. With regard to such statements as 'God prehends' 
Neville is correct when he states: 
'My suspicion is that a sense of Aristotelian substantiality 
has been smuggled into the conception of God so that the particular 
actual occasions of his experience and his abstract necessities 3 
are taken to be parts of a more concrete transtemporal reality. ' 
It is only because process theologians are unaware of their own 'smuggling' 
that they continually see the union between God and man, especially in 
Christ as moral. The union can only be moral if God and man are beings-in- 
1. qýTbid. pp. 293-294. 
2. Cf. Dresch, p. 25. Since persons are mere abstractions of enduring 
objects or patterns of occasions, all personal language must be the 
same. Thus, to bolster the above argument, since persons are mere 
abstractions so also is love, suffering, joy, etc.. Like the person 
they have no ontological content as acts, since the only real acts 
by real beings are actual occasions prehending one another. 
3. Neville, 'Neoclassical Metaphysics..., ' I. P. ., 9 (1969), p. 620, 
In. 15" 
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themselves, which they never are in process thought. 
Turning to Process Christology then the above must be kept in mind 
and the repercussions made evident. Since a person is not a being in 
himself containing within himself human values and goods, it is difficult 
to see how process thought can uphold the integrity of the human person. 
1 
Within process thought, while God and man are not related in their 
subjective immediacy, nevertheless man's value or worth is due not to the 
fact that he is a man with his own ontological integrity, but to the fact 
that he actualizes the goods and values which reside potentially in God. 
Man glorifies God not by perfecting and actualizing human potential, but 
by helping God perfect and actualize his divine potential. Because of 
this the whole of reality, and especially man, takes on an Apollinarian 
or Monophysite flavour. p'lan's value and worth is in direct proportion 
to the extent that God's potential dominates him and which he actualizes. 
Every man is to a greater or lesser degree a monophysite being and his 
value increases the more monophysite he becomes. Jesus as the perfect 
actualizer of God's potential is the most thoroughly monophysite. 
When one puts the above in the context of prehension, it becomes 
even clearer. If one incarnates God by ontologically being constituted 
by his potential good and value through prehension, then all men are 
to a greater or lesser degree Apollinarian or Monophysite beings depending 
to what extent they are ontologically constituted by God's value through 
prehension. Jesus as the ultimate prehender of God's value is the most 
fully monophysite. Jesus is the Christ not because he and God are 
contemporaries to one another and united to each other through love 
(Pittenger's professed Antiochene position), nor by God adopting Jesus 
in a special way (Griffin's professed Ebionite position), but because he 
is ontologically constituted as a being by supremely prehending the divine 
potential. It is God's potential which dominates Jesus' being and his 
existence. 
Pittenger, without seemingly realizing it, professes the above when 
he defends his so-called Antiochene position against the charge of being 
simply a moral union. Remembering that 'love' in process thought is to 
be internally related to a past actualized good through prehension, and 
thus being partially constituted ontologically by it, Pittenger states: 
1. Cf, ibid., pp. 611-612,615. 
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'If this [his Antiochene position] be said to be a moral union 
and condemned on this ground, then one can only reply that in 
this respect the moral is the metaphysical--once we have come to 
see that love is not simply a matter of desirable human behavior 
but is the very basis of the universe and the grounding of 
reality in all creative advance [one could add "through 
prehension']. I myself should say this is the Christianization 
of ontology. ' 1 
To ontologize the Antiochene position, to make God's love or potential a 
constitutive metaphysical principle of man's being is to make one's 
Christology Apollinarian or Monophysite. As Pittenger states on a number 
of occasions, for Jesus to be 'the Incarnate Word of God' means that God 
'energizes [him] in a degree unparallelled elsewhere, with an intensity 
that is unique. '2 Apollinaris would feel very much at home with that 
concept of 'energize' even though he may have difficulties with Pittenger 
on other grounds. 
The basic problem is that when process theologians treat and classify 
the union between Jesus and God they forget three basic elements of Process 
Philosophy which they nevertheless profess are the most important for 
Christology. Firstly, they forget that within process thought Jesus and 
God are not beings in themselves, and thus cannot be united in their 
respective distinctness. Secondly, they forget that prehension is not 
primarily an epistemological concept expressing a moral union, but an 
ontological concept expressing an internal constitutive relation. Thirdly, 
they forget that the value of man does not reside in his self-possessed 
integrity as an ontological being in himself, but in actualizing the goods 
and values which are part and parcel of God's potential. If process theo- 
logians would recognize the true nature of their Christology and the 
full repercussions of their Christological principles, they could not 
help but see that Process Christology is highly Apollinarian or Monophysite 
in nature, and is such by necessity. 
What process theologians mean then by the Logos being present in 
Jesus in a supreme way becomes evident. Jesus supremely constitutes within 
his being the divine potential which is ever present in and to reality 
and which is the sole value, purpose or reason (Nous or Logos) of reality. 
What is divine in Jesus is the divine potential, the Logos of reality, by 
1. Pittenger, C. R., p. 143. 
2. Pittenger, G. P., p. 24. Cf. W. I., pp. 188,202,240. 
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and through which he is ontologically constituted. This is hardly what 
Nicea meant when it proclaimed that the Logos is homoousion with the 
Father. Process Theology's notion of the Logos is more akin to Platonism 
than to Nicea. 1 
Likewise to speak of God giving Jesus a 'vocational lure' or 'special 
aim' is misleading. What that means is that God is always, by his nature, 
present as the best possible good to be actualized given the circumstances. 
2 
When it comes to Jesus, God is present to him as the greatest possible 
good to be actualized, not because he actually acted differently in a new 
kind of way, but because the past and present circumstances which make up 
Jesus' life are unique. Because of his biblical ancestory, his family 
background, the present apocalyptic milieu, his own personality, etc., 
God by necessity was present as the greatest possible good to be actualized. 
The aim differs not by an act of God, but by a change of circumstances. 
Thus Griffin does not escape Pelagianism. While God may be present to 
Jesus in a way not before experienced by man, God was only able to be so 
present because of prior and present circumstances. In process thought 
God always does the best he can, but the best he can is always dependent 
on man. 
Turning briefly to process soteriology and the decisiveness of Jesus 
1. It is rather fascinating that while Pittenger continually criticizes 
the Fathers for being Platonic, he quotes some of the most Platonic 
of them (Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen) to back-up 
his own position. He quotes them on precisely the points where they 
are the most influenced by Platonic thought. Cf. W. I., pp. 166-167, 
216; C. R., p. 91. 
The argument is sometimes advanced: 'Allowing for the different 
metaphysical systems.... process christology can be considered faithful 
in intent to the Christian tradition regarding the person of Christ 
as divine.... Within the limits offered by the metaphysical system 
involved, it can be held that the divinity of Christ was dealt with 
in the maximum manner open to process categories of thought', Mary 
T. Rattigan, Christoloptr and Process Thought: The Decisiveness of 
Jesus Christ in the Thought of Bernard E. Meland W. Norman Pittenger, 
Daniel Day Williams, (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, New York, Fordham 
University, 1973)9 p" 265. Such an argument begs the question. Arius, 
Nestorius, Eutyches, etc., within their metaphysical systems, expressed 
the reality of the Incarnation in the maximum manner open to the 
categories of their thought. However, their systems did not allow 
them to express the Incarnation as it really is. One may try to 
express the Incarnation the best as one can, but the best one can may 
not be good enough, and may even be wrong. 
2. Cf. Griffin,. p. 218. 
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one finds that the function which Jesus fulfills in process thought is 
that of being a revelation in act. Through word and deed he gives the 
clue to what reality is all about. He is the mythical expression of what 
Process Philosophy knows to be the case. He changes the God/man relation 
not by establishing an entirely new and different kind of relation, but 
by making the old relation more workable. He does this by making it 
known, at last mythically. Thus Jesus is a mythical gnostic redeemer 
and Christianity is gnosticism. Reality is not ontologically changed or 
made different by the salvation Jesus brings, but only gnosologically. 
One is not saved by faith but by knowledge. The gnosological change makes 
it possible for the already established ontological constitutive relation 
between God and man, through prehension, to be more fully actualized. Jesus 
as a person then loses all existential and contemporary importance. Having 
fulfilled his task of imparting the 'secret' or 'clue' of reality he is 
relegated to being the mere historical founder of a philosophical sect. 
The basic problem here is that Christianity's understanding of 
salvation, of the establishment of God's Kingdom, has always been under- 
stood as God establishing a radically new and different kind of relation 
between himself and man based on the Incarnation, effected through Christ's 
death and resurrection, and continued through the living personal presence 
of Christ in his Church and sacraments. God's mode of action and relation 
to man after Christ differs in kind and not just in degree. God is 
present and active in a new and different kind of way. Reality itself 
has been changed and made new. 
In the end one wonders why process theologians concern themselves 
with Jesus and Christianity to begin with. Even by their own criteria 
Jesus cannot possibly be God's supreme act. He is supposed to be the 
most divine manifestation of God, yet his revelation is merely a clue, a 
myth. He is the revealer of a vision of reality that only comes to be 
fully known and clearly systematized through Process Philosophy. Griffin 
maintains that Jesus gives the supreme cognitive relevation of God, yet 
he says that Jesus had a faulty understanding of how God acts. How can 
Jesus be God's supreme cognitive revelation when he himself did not have 
a full and complete understanding? 
If one follows the logic inherent in process thought, the full and 
supreme revelation would only come about when soneone would combine in 
himself the moral goodness of Jesus and the philosophical knowledge of 
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Whitehead, Hartshorne, or any number of process theologians. Cognitively 
Plato, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and even Buddha are much closer to giving the 
1 
clue to process thought than Jesus ever was. 
This chapter is in a sense very negative and critical. However, 
the negativity and criticism is for very positive reasons: The desire 
to maintain the truth that God is supremely dynamic and intimately related 
to the world and man, and that in the Incarnation God really does become 
man and act as man in time and history. While Process Theology and 
Christology desires the above also, it completely fails in its attempt. 
As stated in the beginning, this chapter bears little resemblance 
to previous chapters and the topic of this study may seem to have been 
lost. However, the topic of this study has always been present, but its 
presence is one of seeing and grasping what happens when it becomes 
absent. The denial of God's immutability and proposing instead that his 
nature is one of change may dissolve the question of how God can remain 
immutable and yet become man, but its dissolution, as this chapter hope- 
fully shows, brings nothing but philosophical and theological chaos. 
In closing, credit should be given to the process theologians for 
bringing to the fore many important questions. They have forced traditional 
theism and Christology to stress and elaborate truths which have laid 
dormant over the years. This study would not have been made if it were 
not for their challenge. It is only saa that while they have asked the 
important questions, they are unable to answer them satisfactorily. One 
feels that they could have done better if they would have followed 
Pittenger's advice, which he himself has not done: 'All I am saying is 
that we should not let ourselves be so enamoured with words, that we 
become exponents or defenders of a simply verbal orthodoxy. '2 
1. Hartshorne very clearly sees the relationship between Buddhism 
and Process Philosophy. Cf. 
Hartshorne, 'The Development of Process 
Philosophy, ' Process Theology, ed. Ewert Cousins, pp. 47-64. 
2. Pittenger, W. I., p. 18. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOLt AS DYNAMICALLY PRESENT 
The adjective 'Catholic' in the title is ambiguous. It could denote 
Christology proposed by theologians who profess to belong to the Catholic 
Church, or it could specify Christological thinking that is in conformity 
with the Catholic tradition and teaching. Unfortunately these two under- 
standings are not necessarily one and the same. The primary meaning of 
'Catholic' here is to specify Christological studies proposed by theologians 
who profess to be Catholic. 'Whether 'Catholic' can also be used des- 
criptively of their Christology as well will be judged in due course. 
The number of possible Catholic theologians who could be treated in 
this chapter is too great for the space allowed. Thus this chapter will 
concentrate on three: Piet Schoonenberg, Karl Rahner, and Jean Galot. 
1 
A. Piet SchoonenberR 
Although Schoonenberg's The Christ is a comparatively small work, it 
nevertheless expresses, along with Process Christology which Schoonenberg 
endorses, the tenor and direction of much contemporary Catholic Christologyr 
in theological circles. 
2 
For this reason a short study is necessary. 
The chief overriding principle of Schoonenberg's thought is: 'God 
does not compete, God does not alienate. '3 By this he means that while 
ý. Some other possible authors are: A. Hulsbosh, 'Jesus Christus, gekend 
als mens, beleden als Zoon Gods, ' Tiidshrift voor Theologie, 6 (1966), 
pp. 250-272. This article is followed by critical comments by E. 
SchillebeeckX and P. Schoonenberg. For a rather complete English 
summary see R. North, 'Soul-Body Unity and God-Man Unity, ' Theological 
Studies, 30 (1969), pp. 27-60. Also R. North, 'Recent Christology and 
Theological Method, ' Continuum, 7 (1969), pp. 63-77. Also Robert C. 
Ware, 'Christology in Historical Perspective, ' He thro Journal, 
15 (1974), PP- 53-69. Also Hans Kling, Menschwerdung Gottes, (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1970). J. Alfaro, A. Grillmeier, R. Schulte, Ch. Schätz, D. 
Wiederkehr, Mysterium Salutis 1 --Do ti ue de L'Histoire de Salut: 
Christologie et Vie du Christ. (Paris: Les itions du Cerf, 1975 " 
The Christology of Teilhard de Chardin could also be treated. 
2. Piet Schoonenberg, The Christ, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). 
For Schoonenberg's endorsement of Process Christology see pp. 8, 
83-86, fn. 16. 
3. Ibid., p. 7. 
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the world and man are dependent on God for their being and fulfilment 
('His providence says precisely that he leads the world for us to the best 
advantage.... '), God nevertheless, 'realizes nature according to its own 
course and laws, but he does not intervene in it, he does not intercede, 
he does not take over the work of a worldly cause, he supersedes nothing, 
he eliminates nothing. '1 Thus with regard to nature, evolution, and 
history God never acts contrary to the inherent principles and laws 
contained in them, but gives 'to each being the being and doing proper 
to that being as its own. God does not compete; on the contrary, everything 
he does he gives us to do. '2 
What Schoonenberg wishes to point out, and rightly so, is that 
creation with its own inherent laws contains within itself its own dignity 





W, efor 4 
as to d tr yd g 
hý; of human history., 
This would be both unbecoming of God and denigrating to the whole created 
order. 
However, there is in Schoonenberg's analysis of the God/world 
relationship not only the above, but also the added notion that any and 
all direct and radically new 'intervention, ' and 'interceding' by God 
must of necessity be of such a kind as to denigrate the created order, to 
rob it of its dignity, to override man's freedom. He sees any new and 
direct action of God in the world as an action which 'supersedes' and 
'eliminates' some created value or good. For God to act in a radically 
different way in time and history other than through the normal created 
laws of nature and evolution, or through the free decisions of men would 
of necessity make God an unbecoming intruder and competitor of man. 
While he castigates the Molinists and Ban zians Thomists in the freedom/ 
grace controversy for setting up a false 
dilemma ('The supposition common 
to both [is] that God and world, God and man "compete".... '), he 
nevertheless holds the same presupposition 
in the very elimination of 
the dilemma by denying all intervention of God. 
3 The Molinists, Bane'zians, 
and Schoonenberg presuppose that if God breaks into time and history in 
new ways he must of necessity compete with man. The only difference 
Ibid., p. 25- 
2. Ibid., p. 26. 
3. Ibid., p. 31. Cf. pp. 13-15" 
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among the three is that while the former theologians see God as 
nevertheless acting, Schoonenberg denies such action. 
The upshot of this whole presupposition is not just that it limits 
God's ability to act, but also that it undermines the very thing it 
wishes to protect--the inherent worth and value of man and the created 
order. By denying that God can act in new and special ways in creation 
without 'eliminating' some good or value of creation ultimately means 
that one of the goods and values of the created order and especially man 
is not that of being possible mediators of God's special actions. Yen 
do not contain within their inherent and selfpossessed dignity as creatures 
the ability to mediate and express God's revelation. Instead of creation 
and man being the prologomena and presupposition for God's new revelation 
in word and act, which is their greatest dignity not in spite of their 
creaturehood, nor by way of addition to their creaturehood, but precisely 
because of it, they become an impediment against it. In traditional 
terminology man for Schoonenberg does not contain within his very creature- 
hood the good of obediental potency. This means not only that he is 
unable to receive God's special acts without destroying his dignity as a 
creature, but also that he is unable to mediate and express God's special 
action without God in some way eliminating his creaturehood. While 
Schoonenberg wishes to defend man against unbecoming intrusions by God, 
the basic problem is that man only needs such a defence if one under- 
estimates man's dignity and worth as a man to begin with. Once one sees 
man, in his self-possessed freedom and worth as a man, as the possible 
receiver and mediator of God's special acts, then man needs no such 
defence. God's direct intrusion in time and history is not the elimination 
or degradation of man's inherent worth, but the actualization of man's 
greatest inherent potential. 
This false presupposition is common in contemporary theology. The 
implications of such a presupposition not only affect one's understanding 
of grace, sacraments, and the Church, but also and rudimentarily one's 
understanding of the Incarnation. 
Using this principle as the basis of his Christology it is not 
surprising that Schoonenberg has difficulties with the traditional under- 
standing of Christ. In a sense this false presupposition turns the topic 
discussed in this present study up-side-down. Instead of asking how God 
can remain immutably himself and yet become man, Schoonenberg must ask: 
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how can a man be God without ceasing to be a man? This is easily seen 
in the following. 
Firstly it must be noted that Schoonenberg understands the Christology 
of the New Testament and the Councils as being expressed in 'patterns of 
thought. ' Schoonenberg's use of this concept is rather ambiguous. On 
the one hand it seems to mean man's ability to objectively grasp and 
express the way reality is, but not to the fullest extent. Reality is 
always more than one's conceptual and linguistic expression of it. On the 
other hand Schoonenberg also sees 'patterns of thought' as man's ability 
to subjectively read into and impose on reality intelligible patterns which 
more or less approximate reality but never really grasp it. In other words 
for Schoonenberg 'patterns of thought' has both a realistic and idealistic 
epistemological sense. With regard to interpreting biblical and conciliar 
Christology this ambiguity is of enormous help to Schoonenberg for it 
allows him to hold as really the case that which is in conformity with 
his primary presupposition, using 'patterns of thought' in its realistic 
sense; and also to deny what is not in conformity with the presupposition 
claiming that what is said is a 'pattern of thought' imposed on and read 
into the reality of Christ in the idealistic sense. In short, Schoonenberg 
uses the ambiguity of the concept 'pattern of thought' as a methodological/ 
epistemological construct to affirm and deny what is and is not in 
conformity with his false presupposition that God cannot directly act 
in time and history without degrading man. 
Schoonenberg has one major criticism of traditional Christology as 
expressed by Chalcedon. The crux of the Christological problem today is 
the pre-existence of the Logos as a distinct person and ultimate subject 
of Christ. Nicea was not so much influenced by John as by the thought 
pattern of Middle Platonism brought into Christology via Origen. 
2 After 
Nicea 'the pre-existence of the Son came to control christological belief 
and thought. '3 It is because of the pre-existence of the Logos that 
Alexandrian Christology always tended to undermine the full humanity, and 
Antiochene Christology always tended to sacrifice the union. While 
Chalcedon brought the two Christologies together, it 'did not reconcile 
1. Cf. ibid., pp. 51 ff. 
2. Cf. ibid., pp. 54-55- 
3. Ibid., p. 56. 
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them. ' 1 
'This pattern [Chalcedonian] absorbs all the divine and human 
that is acknowledged by scripture to Jesus, but adds something 
unknown to scripture: the distinction of natures. This has become 
necessary precisely because the pre-existent person was posited 2 
and came into Antiochian thought to stand beside the man Jesus. ' 
While Schoonenberg does not believe that Chalcedon makes explicit mention 
of the pre-existent Logos and holds that Chalcedon sees the historical 
person/reality of Jesus as the result and consequence of the union of 
natures, the pre-existent Logos actually does enter 'the Chalcedonian 
pattern through later theological exposition, especially that under 
Alexandrian influence. '3 
Schoonenberg's lack of understanding concerning the questions and 
answers surrounding Patristic and Conciliar'Christology is surprising, 
but it leads him to conclude that traditional Christology of the Chalcedon- 
ian and neo-Chalcedonian pattern brings into question the full humanity of 
Christ precisely because the person of Christ is the Logos. 
4 This is 
Schoonenberg's major criticism and for the most part the subsequent 
criticisms are elaborations of this. 
5 
Returning to the New Testament picture of Christ Schoonenberg 
6 
concludes that 'Jesus Christ is one person. He is a human person. ' 
By this he means not only that Jesus has full human psychological and 
intellectual functions, but also that he is a being in himself ontologically 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 57- 
3- Ibid. For the fact that Schoonenberg sees the person as a consequence 
and result of the union of natures see pp. 62-63,75. 
4. Cf. Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
5. It should be noted that three of the objections are totally irrelevant 
and unfair. To criticize Chalcedon for speaking only of the Person 
of Christ in himself and therefore that it 'detaches Christology 
from soteriology, ' and that it 'says nothing on Jesus' place in the 
history of salvation, ' and that it makes no distinction between 
'Jesus' earthly and glorified life' is completely uncalled for. 
Granted Chalcedon did not write a soteriology, nor a history of 
salvation, nor a history of Christ's life, but then they were not 
the questions at hand. However, if Christ is not the Word become 
man as Chalcedon proclaimed there would be no need of the above. 
Cf. pp. 63-64. For a good critique of Schoonenberg on this point see 
Jean Galot, Vers un Nouvelle Christolo ie (Glembloux: Duculot- 
Lethielleuwc, 1971)9 pp. 41-49-- 
6. Schoonenberg, p. 74" Cf. 66-74. 
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distinct, containing his own human personal identity. That then of the 
divinity and the pre-existence of the Logos? 
As a hermeneutical principle to get behind and to the true meaning 
of the Greek thought pattern of the pre-existence of the Logos Schoonenberg 
formulates the principle: 'What is said of the pre-existent divine person 
can never nullify this one and human person. I' From this Schoonenberg 
holds that since man only knows God to be a Trinity at a certain time 
in history, it is impossible to conclude that God pre-existed as a Trinity 
before he came to be known as such. 'While he does not deny that the 
Trinity could eternally pre-exist, Schoonenberg favours the view that God 
becomes a Trinity through and because of revelation. Thus the Word 
becomes the outward and historical expression of the Father, and that 
with Christ 'whoever thinks that we can affirm nothing over the pre- 
existence of the Word will say that this Word is person in Jesus through 
its being man, that it is divine person through being a human person., 
2 
What Schoonenberg is saying is that the Word, as the outward expression 
of the Father, is personified in the human person of Jesus. 
'Our concept could now be called the theory of the enhvnostasia 
of the Word. Or in other words: of the presence of God's Word, 
or God through his Word, in Jesus Christ, and indeed in such a 
way that this Word enters him wholly, that it becomes in him a 
historical person, that it becomes flesh. ' 3 
Where before in prophets and saints God only partially dwelled as Word, 
in Christ the 'Fullness of the Godhead.... dwells wholly in him' to such 
an extent that the human person of Jesus personifies, makes personal, 
God's Word as Son. 
4 
Schoonenberg feels that his Christology overcomes the difficulties 
inherent in the Chalcedonian pattern and actually states, and states 
better, what Chalcedon wished to say but could not because it was trying 
to impose the Greek thought pattern of the pre-existent Logos as a distinct 
person over against the human reality of Christ. He feels that he has 
overcome the competitive duality in Christ due to the two nature pattern 
without destroying the distinction between God and man 'for now it is not 
1. Ibid., p. 82. 
2. Ibid., p. 87- 
3. Ibid., p. 89. Cf. P. 93. 
4. Ibid., p. 90. 
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the fullness of his own person, but that of his God and Father, who 
dwells in Christ. It is then a matter of superseding the two natures 
in the person by a paramount presence of God in this human person. 
" 
From Schoonenberg's Christology it is evident that his false pre- 
supposition is at work: if God acts in time and history in new ways in 
and through man, he must denigrate man. The whole of his criticism 
against the person of Christ being the pre-existent Logos revolves 
around this point. It is also evident from the fact that he conceives 
Chalcedon's use of 'two natures' in Christ as demanding a competition 
and/or a supremacy and degradation of one or the other. Schoonenbergj 
as many before him, has not grasped the fact that for the Person of the 
Logos to become man is for the Logos to be man, and precisely because of 
this it really and truly is man that the Logos is. Nothing in the man 
Jesus is eliminated, superseded, or lost. That is affirmed is only that 
who it is who is this man is the Logos. As Lonergan states in criticism 
of Schoonenberg: 'There is in Christ, God and man, only one identity; 
that one identity is the identity of the Word; the man, Jesus, has an 
identity but not in himself but in the Word-' 
2 
Part of the difficulty throughout resides in Schoonenberg's basic 
confusion over Chalcedon's ontological notion of personhood and the modern 
psychological understanding of personhood. He thinks that the pre-existent 
Logos eliminates the human intellect and will. As should be evident from 
this study such is not the case. The traditional Christology demands 
only that he who humanly knows and wills be the Logos. 
Likewise one can easily see Schoonenberg's ambiguous use of the 
concept 'patterns of thought. ' He never sees the New Testament and 
Conciliar statements on Christ being one person and truly man as thought 
patterns imposed on and read into the reality of Christ, but really 
expressing the way he is. However, he consistently sees statements con- 
cerning the divinity of Christ and the pre-existent Logos as the ultimate 
subject in Christ as Greek thought patterns read into and imposed on the 
Christological data. While he sees such statements as approximating the 
truth and reality of Christ, he never grants that they really grasp and 
1. Ibid., p. 92. 
2. Bernard Lonergan, 'The Origins of Christian Realism, ' A Second 
Collection, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), p. 259" 
Cf. pp. 251-260. 
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express who Christ is in himself. 
As for Schoonenberg's own Christological reconstruction, anyone 
acquainted with Patristic Christology gets the distinct impression of 
de ja vu. Kelly quoting a sixth-century author writes: 
""Paul did not say that it was the self-subsistent Word who was 
in Christ, but applied the title 'Word' to God's commandment 
or ordinance, i. e. God ordered what He willed through the man, 
and so did it.... He did not say that Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
are one and same, but gave the name God to the Father,... that 
of Son to the mere man, and that of Spirit to the grace which 
indwelt the apostles. " What this amounts to is that he was 
prepared to use the officially accepted Trinitarian formula, 
but only as a veil to cover a theology which is markedly 
unitarian. ' 1 
The author is not referring to Paul the Apostle, but to the Bishop of 
Samosata; and the Trinitarianism and Christology described is that of 
dynamic monarchianism or adoptionism. It is a very apt and accurate 
description of Schoonenberg's Christology as well. 
As with Paul, the Logos for Schoonenberg is not a pre-existent 
subsistent divine Person but the expression of God in the world which 
so fully resides in the man Jesus that he is said to personify it and 
thus become God's Son. It is pure adoptionism. The only difference 
is that while the motivation behind Paul's adoptionism is to protect the 
immutable transcendence of God, Schoonenberg wishes to uphold the 
integrity of the man Jesus. However, both motivations spring from the 
same source: a true Incarnation must destroy either God or man. One 
should not think then that Schoonenberg's 'enhvnostasis of the Word' to 
the man Jesus is something new. It is merely a new way of saying that 
God adopted the man Jesus to such a degree that he personifies God's 
Word to such an extent that he can be said to be Son. 
While Schoonenberg differs from Paul in that he sees God as changing 
and becoming in relation to the world and through his expression being 
fully personified by Jesus, this is no way alters the adoptionism, but 
clarifies how and why God's 'Word' is more fully present in Christ than 
in anyone else. God changes in that he 'pronounces his Word totally in 
order to comprise and bear Jesus in all his dimensions. '2 However, like 
1. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 118. Cf. pp. 158-159. 
Cf. Grillmeier, pp. 177 f. 
2. Schoonenberg, p. 85, fn. 16. 
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Paul then, God is unitarian and the Word and Spirit are but his impersonal 
manifestations in the world. 
Schoonenberg above all else wished to maintain the full and real 
human Jesus, but what he forgot to take into account is the most important 
reason why this must be so. Jesus must be man because that is what the 
Logos has become and is. If Jesus is not the Logos existing as man, then 
the whole point of Jesus being a man is lost. The same is true of Jesus' 
human freedom, knowledge, suffering, etc.. One must agree with 
Schoonenberg that these must be real, but the true importance of their 
being real lies in the fact that it is the Logos as man who really is free, 
knows, suffers, etc.. 
B. Karl Rahner 
When one comes to Rahner, one finds the topic of this study in the 
forefront of his Christology. The basic problem however, as is so often 
the case with Rahner, is not to discern the problem treated, but the 
answer given. Rahner's answer to the present question is open to differing 
interpretations. Nevertheless, the following will try to clarify and 
explicate his true position and show that it is in complete conformity 
with the Catholic tradition. Before proceeding to the heart of the matter 
one preliminary point must be made. 
Unlike Schoonenberg, Rahner sees man's greatest value and good (he 
even terms it the mystery of man), as the capacity to receive and express 
God's revelation of himself outside of himself. This is the case not 
only with regards to God's pre- and post-incarnational action through 
prophets, faith, grace, and the Church, but also the central mystery of 
God's gift of himself--the gift of himself as he is in himself--the 
Incarnation. Man is what comes to be when God wishes to express and reveal 
himself as he is in himself. This does not mean that each and every man 
is an incarnation of God, but rather being created in the image of God 
man is the 'grammar' by which God is able to reveal and express himself 
to the point of expressing and revealing himself as he is. Man and God 
then are never competitors nor is there any fear of God eliminating or 
degrading man's value and worth as a man. Man's reception and expression 
of God's special action in time and history even to the point of a man 
being hypostatically united to the Logos is not the destruction of man, 
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but the fulfilment of man's greatest inherent potential. The obediential 
potency in man is not then in contradiction to nor 'one potentiality 
along with other possibilities in the constituent elements of human 
nature: it is objectively identical with the essence of man. '1 
Rahner admits that to define man as such is to argue for an 
anthropology in light of Christology, but to do so is not illegitimate 
'now that this has been revealed to us. '2 This is totally in keeping 
with Rahner's Transcendental Method: given the fact that God really became 
man what is the a priori presupposition contained in the very nature of 
man as man for him to do so? The presupposition is that man is what comes 
to be when God wishes to reveal and express himself as he is in himself 
in time and history. 
3 
What should be noted in the above is that since Rahner argues for 
his understanding of man from a Christological basis, the whole argument 
is incarnational in motivation, i. e. defining man as he does he wishes 
to stress and maintain both the full divinity and humanity in Christ. 
Both incarnational stresses spring from the fact that man is defined as 
that which God becomes when he reveals himself as he is in himself in time 
and history. For Rahner only if both are maintained can one say that 
'what Jesus is and does as man, is the self-revealing existence of the 
Logos as our salvation among us. But then we can [also] really say, 
in the full sense of the words; here the Logos with God and the Logos 
with us, the Logos in the immanent Trinity and the Logos of the economy 
of salvation, is one and the same. '4 This dual stress that Christ is 
1. Karl Rahner, 'On the Theology of the Incarnation, ' Theological 
Investigations, 4, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966 p. 110. 
Cf. pp. 109-116. (Hereafter Theological Investigations will be 
referred to as T. I* plus volume number. ) Rahner makes this point 
many times. For example, Cf. 'Theology and Anthropology, ' T. I., 9, 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), pp. 28-45. All subsequent 
footnotes are to Rahner in this section unless otherwise stated. 
2. 'Current Problems in Christology, ' T. I., 1, (London: Darton, Longman 
and Todd, 1961), p. 184. 
3. Rahner uses this same type of argumentation in proposing that only 
the Logos could become man and not the Father or Holy Spirit. Cf. 
'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate", ' T. I., 4, pp. 
77-102. Also The Trinity (New York: Herder and. Herder, 1970). 
4. 'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate", ' T. I., 4, 
p. 94" Cf. 'Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic 
Dogmatics, ' T. I., 9, p. 130. 
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really the Logos as he exists as God who truly exists as man 
is evident throughout Rahner's Christology as the following will show. 
What follows from this is that the incarnation act, the 'becoming, ' 
must be such as to preserve the immutability of God if it really is to 
be God who is man, and also the real and true manhood if it is really to 
be man that he is. If the 'becoming' undermines either for Rahner, 
Christology becomes mythology. 
'If we say "God is made man" in the ready-made patterns of our 
everyday speech, we either think automatically of God being 
changed into a man or else we understand the content of the word 
"man" in this context as an outer garment.... But both inter- 
pretations of this statement are nonsensical and contrary to 
what Christian dogma really intends to say. For God remains God 
and does not change, and Jesus is a real genuine, and finite man 
with his own experiences.... ' 1 
What is also evident in all the above is the fact that while the 
'becoming' must uphold both the full unchanged divinity and true humanity, 
it must nevertheless terminate in the fact that God is man. Without a 
true ontological union of the whole point of Christ being fully God and 
an is lost. 
'God is man: this does not mean that he has ceased to be God in 
the unconfined fullness of his divine majesty. God is man: this 
does not mean that the "human" in him is something which does 
not really concern him at all.... God is man, this really tells us 
something about God himself. Because the human itself, affirmed 
by the fact that he pledges himself to us, is really and truly 
affirmed of him himself,... This human nature is thus his very 
own reality in which he himself and not merely a human nature 
different from him comes out to meet us, so that, when one grasps 
this humanity, one has in very truth understood and grasped 
something of God himself.... When God manifests his humanity, 
then.... it always meets us in such a way that he himself is 
there.... ' 2 
For Rahner when one meets the man Jesus one is truly encountering the 
Person of God in himself for that is the manner of his existence, what he 
has come to be, what he is. 
'Become' for Balmer then has the meaning ascertained long ago by 
Cyril, approved by Chalcedon, clarified by Aquinas, and emphasized in this 
1. ""I believe in Jesus Christ", ' T. I., 9, p. 166. Cf. p. 169. 
Also 'On the Theology of the Incarnation, ' T. I., 4, pp. 117-118. 
2. 'Thoughts on the Theology of Christmas, ' T. I., 3, (London: Damon, 
Longman and Todd, 1967), pp. 29-30. 
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study. It is a personal/existential notion. For the Logos to become 
man means that he acquires a new personal mode of existence. He comes to 
be man, comes to exist as man. Thus, as before, 'become' does not threaten 
or destroy either the immutable divinity through change and mutation or 
the complete and true humanity. 
Rahner himself echoes the main points of this study concerning the 
unity and diversity in Christ in relation to the incarnational act. The 
distinction of natures or modes of existence must not be made prior to 
the union (either temporally or logically) for any subsequent ontological 
union would destroy either or both the humanity or divinity. Rather 
the distinction must be made within the one reality of Christ precisely 
because the very act which establishes the ontological oneness is the same 
act which establishes and guarantees the distinction. For Rahner 'the 
ground by which the diverse term is constituted 
[humanity] and the ground 
by which the unity with the diverse term is constituted must as such be 
strictly the same. ' 
1 
With the above in mind reference must now be made to Rahner's footnote 
accompanying the last passage concerning God's immutability and true 
existence as man for it is here that problems arise. He writes: 
'.... the assertion of God's "immutability, " of the lack of any 
real relation between God and the world, is in a true sense a 
dialectical statement. One may and indeed must say this, without 
for that reason being Hegelian. ' 
[Since it is a dogma of faith 
that] 'God himself has become man, ' [then one must] 'grant that 
while God remains immutable "in himself, " he can come to be "in 
the other, " and that both assertions must really and truly be 
made of the same God as God. ' 2 
At first sight this statement may seem to be in complete contradiction to 
the above exposition of I3ahner's notion of 'become. ' The footnote seems 
to imply, due to the word 'dialectical, ' that the phrase while 'God 
remains immutable in himself, he can come to be 
"in the other"' means 
that somehow God remains immutable and yet changes in the incärnational 
act, that dialectically God does not change and does change in becoming 
man. This, as will be seen, is the common interpretation among theologians. 
1, 'Current Problems in Christology, ' T. I., 1, p. 181. Cf. pp. 
180-182. 
2. Ibid., p. 181, fn. 3. 
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In a later article Rahner expands his statement. Granting that 
the immutability of God is a dogma of faith, 
It is the question of how to understand the truth that the 
immutability of God may not distort our view of the fact that 
what happened to Jesus on earth is precisely the history of 
the Word of God himself, and a process which he underwent. 
If we face squarely the fact of the incaration,.... we 
must simply say: God can become something, he who is un- 
changeable in himself can himself become subjectto change 
in something else. ' 1 
This statement seems to concern itself not so much with God somehow 
remaining immutable and yet changing in becoming maxi, but rather since 
God actually is man, then as man all that pertains to such an existence 
can rightly be predicated of God himself. It is a statement concerning 
the communication of idioms. The human history of Jesus is the human 
history of God since God actually is man. While God as God cannot change, 
he actually is the subject of change as man ('in something else') since 
that is his manner of existence. 
However, in a footnote to this passage Rahner again states that it 
is actually God himself who becomes man. While one does not wish to 
predicate change in God, 
'If we do call it a change, then since God is unchangeable, we 
must say that God who is unchan geable in himself can change in 
another (can in fact become man). But this "change in another" 
must neither be taken as denying the immutability of God in himself 
nor simply be reduced to a changement of the other.... We must 
maintain methodologically the immutability of God, and yet it would 
be basically a denial of the Incarnation if we used it alone to 
determine what this mystery could be.... The mystery of the Incarnation 
must lie in God himself: in the fact that he, though unchangeable 
"in himself, " can become something "in another. " The immutability 
of God is a dialectical truth like the unity of. -God. 
[From 
revelation one leans that God is a Trinity without loosing his 
oneness. ] In the same way we learn from the Incarnation that 
immutability (which is not eliminated) is not simply and uniquely 
a characteristic of God, but that in and in spite of his immutability 
he can truly become something. He himself, he, in time. And this possi- 
bility is not a sign of deficiency, but the height of his perfection, 
which would be less if in addition to being infinite, he could not 
become less than he (always) is. ' 2 
1. 'On the Theology of the 
Cf, p. 112. 
2. Ibid., pp. 113-114, fn. 
Incarnation, ' T. I., 4, p. 113. 
3e 
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Again this footnote in some ways seems to be in opposition to the previous 
text. At times it seems Rahner is saying that the height of God's per- 
fection is äbility to change and not change in becoming man. Again the 
term 'dialectical' seems to imply that Rahner sees the 'immutability' 
and the 'becoming' as contrary concepts which nevertheless must in some 
way be held together in their contrariness. 
What is one to make of all of this? What is Rahner trying to get 
at? 
Schoonenberg believes that Rahner is saying, contrary to the traditional 
Thomistic notion, that God has real relations with creatures and thus is 
changed by them. The Incarnation is the supreme example of this. Such is 
Schoonenberg's interpretation of Rahner's 'God changes in the other. 
" 
Donceel believes that Rahner is saying both that God is immutable 
and yet changes in becoming man. 'When God became man, he himself changed. 
The changement did not simply occur in the human nature of Christ. God 
himself changed. ' Donceel stresses Rahner's use of the word 'dialectical, ' 
and maintains that one must say both that 'God is immutable and yet he 
changes. ' Accordingly, 'Rahner seems to distinguish two aspects in God: 
God as he is in himself and God as he is in the otherness of world history. 
He is immutable in the first aspect, he really changes in the other one. '2 
Trethowan is the most consistent commentator and critic of Mahner. 
As the above two he also concludes that Rahner is asking one 'to accept 
a God who is partly mutable and partly immutable.... ' However, he 
1. Schoonenberg, The Christ, pp. 83-86, fn. 16. Also Man and Sin, 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), p. 50- 
2. Joseph Donceel, 'Second Thoughts on the Nature of God, ' Thought, 46, 
(1971), p. 351" Donceel's article is surprising in many ways. His 
main concern is to try to show how God really loves, cares, and is 
concerned with the world. He gives a very unsympathetic and in many 
ways facile rendition of the Scholastic 
(Thomistic) understanding of 
the God/man relationship, and concludes that it is impossible to see 
how God can really love the world if he is not affected and changed 
by it. God's immutability and love are mutually exclusive and such 
a contradiction can no longer be accepted. He seems to opt for a 
mitigated form of Process Theology. 'According to this modified form 
of theism God is Pure Act, yet he contains potency. He is Being 
itself, yet he becomes; he is immutable, although he changes. He 
is eternal, but in time; he is omniscent, but he finds out from man 
what man freely decides. ' 
(p. 365. ) If God's love and immutability 
are mutually exclusive, one wonders what Donceel's answer is? 
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concludes that Rahner's notion of the Incarnation is 'indefensible, ' 
'unthinkable, ' and 'unintelligible. '1 
If Rahner means what the above theologians say, one would have to 
agree with Trethowan that Rahner has strayed from traditional theism 
and Chalcedonian Christology. However, if they understand Rahner correctly, 
then he must also be contradicting himself if he also maintains the 
Christology as first outlined and explained above. 
If one looks back at the previous quotations, one finds that most 
of the quotations from the body of the article are in context where the 
main concern is the communication of idioms. 
2 
Rahner wishes to say that 
the Logos is the true subject of all that pertains to the humanity. 
'What happened to Jesus on earth is precisely the history of the Word 
himself, and a process which he underwent. ' It is within this context 
that one must understand Rahner's contention that 'He who is unchangeable 
in himself can himself become subject to change in something else. ' This 
is not a statement concerning the incarnational act itself. Rahner is 
not saying that the Logos changes in becoming man. Nor is he saying that 
God in his divinity undergoes change. Rahner is trying to emphasize 
and radically bring home the full import of the Incarnation, that because 
God became man, he (God himself) as man is in history and time. The 
human history of Jesus is the human history of God. That this is the case 
can clearly be seen in the discussion following the original delivery of 
'On the Theology of the Incarnation. ' When asked what he meant by God 
being mutable in the other, he said: 'Let us take an example: Jesus Christ 
sat here, then there. I can affirm that of 
God himself: before God was 
here, now he is there .... This is what I mean by mutability. '3 All that 
Rahner is pointing out is that Jesus is God actually existing as man, 
1. Illtyd Trethowan, 'A Changing God, ' Downside Review, 
84, (1966), p. 258. 
Cf. p. 247-261. 'Antimetaphysical Theology, ' Downside Review, 80, 
(1962), p. 329, fn. 12. The Absolute and the Atonement, London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1971)t pp. 152-166. Mysticism and Theolo : 
An Essay in Christian Metaphysics, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975). 
pp. 62-69. 
Wolhart Pannenberg also interprets Rahner in the same fashion as 
the above three theologians. Cf. Jesus: God and Man, (London: 
scM, 1968), p. 320. 
2. Cf. 'Current Problems in Christology, ' T. I., 1, pp. 176-181. Also 
'On the Theology of the Incarnation, ' T. I., 4, pp. 112-113. 
3. This lecture was first given in French as 'Considerations Generales 
sur la Christologie, ' and was published in Problemes Actuels de 
Christ olo ie, ed. H. Bouesse et J. -J. Latour Desclee de Brouwer, 
1965 , pp. 15-33. 
Quotation from subsequent discussion on p. 408. Cf. 
pp. 401-409. Trans. Trethowan, The Absolute and The Atonement, p. 157. 
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and when Jesus moves God moves. While Nestorius would bristle at the 
thought, the Fathers of Ephesus would applaud. 
1 
Thus there is really nothing ultimately new here other than Rahner's 
emphasis and wording. The only criticism that could be made is that it 
may be better to say God is subject to change 'as something else' rather 
than 'in something else, ' since God is not existing in man as if man were 
a container in which God dwelt, but God actually exists as man -- God is 
man. 
It is at this point that the footnotes enter in, and with some 
confusion and ambiguity. Rahner realizes that in order to maintain that 
it is actually the Logos who is the subject of the human experiences, 
then it must be the Logos who actually and truly becomes and is in reality 
man. It is mainly in the footnotes that Rahner takes up the incarnational 
question. 
2 If one does not realize that Rahner has moved from a discussion 
concerning the communication of idioms to a discussion concerning the 
Incarnation itself confusion is bound to arise for one could easily end 
up thinking that because Rahner says that it is actually God who changes 
as man that he also is saying that God changes in becoming man or vice 
versa. It is because Rahner does not explicitly state that the questions 
have changed that the answers he gives at one time in the text and 
another time in the footnotes seem to be fused and confused. 
1. Trethowan is critical of Rahner even on this point. He believes 
Rahner means that God suffers as divine. Rahner does wish to say, 
as Ephesus demands, that it is actually God who suffers, not as 
divine, but as man. Trethowan's arguments against Rahner are 
basically those of Nestorius, and like Nestorius he does not grasp 
that for God to become man terminates with the fact that God is man. 
Trethowan proposes a Christology where the will of the man Jesus 
is completely under the control of the Logos. Thus he is the true 
'owner' and 'appropriator' of the human actions. Such an under- 
standing imples only a moral union and that the Logos himself is not 
actually acting as man. The actions of the man Jesus are not literally 
the actions of the Logos, but only the external acting out of the 
Logos' wishes. The man Jesus loses then his human freedom and 
becomes a puppet of the Logos. In traditional Christology it is the 
Logos himself who has real human freedom, since he is man. It should 
be noted that while Trethowan misunderstands Rahner, his criticisms 
of Shoonenberg are valid. See the above cited articles. 
2. Cf. 'Current Problems in Christology, ' T. I., 1, p. 181, fn. 3. 
Also 'on the Theology of the Incarnation, ' T. I., 4, pp. 113-114, 
fn. 3. 
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Concerning the incarnational act then Rahner wishes to say that 
God himself actually and truly became man in the fullness of his immutable 
transcendence. In the finite world of change and history the transcen- 
dent God exists as a man. This is what Rahner is getting at when he 
states that even though God's immutability demands that God be the logical 
term of the incarnational relation, he must nevertheless be really and 
truly man in reality. This is what Rahner believes must be held dia- 
lectically. This is also what Rahner means when he says that 'the mystery 
of the Incarnation must lie in God himself. ' The mystery is that God 
remaining immutable is also in reality actually man. 
The reason Rahner sees the above as dialectical is because he thinks 
that God's actual existence in reality as man is something different from 
his being the logical term of the incarnational relationship, as if in 
spite of God being the logical term, he must yet actually in reality be 
man. He is misreading Aquinas' notion of a mixed relation as if for God 
to be the logical term means that in reality he is not actually related. 
For Aquinas (though ambiguously as seen) God in the fullness of his divinity 
actually in reality is man precisely because the humanity is really related 
to him as he is in his esse personale. God himself actually in reality 
exists as man, not in spite of his being a logical term, but precisely 
because of it. 
1 
It is because Rahner wishes to emphasize that it is God himself who 
is actually in reality man that he rather ambiguously says that to call 
the Incarnation 'a change' does not really matter: It is a reality (namely, 
that God himself has become flesh.... ), even though one fights shy of 
the term 'change. ' The point he is making is not that God changes, but 
rather it is God's new mode of existence that is a change in reality. The 
term 'change' does not refer to a change in God, but to God's new manner 
of existence. What is new, what has changed is not God, but the fact 
that he himself now exists as a man and previously did not. That God is 
man is 'a reality, ' 'a change' in reality, something new in reality. It 
is a new event that as Rahner says concerns God himself, but not by way 
of change in him, but rather reality has changed because God unchangeable 
1. Cf. supra, pp. 131-I33. Again Trethowan misses Rahner's point here. In 
claiming that God in reality is man, Trethowan thinks Rahner is pre- 
dicating change in God. He is interpreting the word 'real' here to 
mean a 'real relation' involving change, but that is not what Rahner 
means by real. He is-saying that while God is the logical term and 
does not change he nevertheless is actually man in reality. Cf. The 
Absolute and The Atonement, pp. 156-157. 
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in himself has in reality actually come to exist now and newly as man. 
The reason Rahner fights shy of the word 'change' is precisely because 
he does not wish to predicate change in God, and yet does want to say 
that there is a change, something new -- God exists as man. What he fails 
to clearly see is that while the change involves God himself, it does not 
involve a change in God. He sees this distinction as dialectical due 
to his understanding (misunderstanding) of God being the logical term, 
and yet being in reality actually man. 
Thus to maintain that Rahner sees God remaining immutable in the 
transcendence of his full divinity and yet somehow changing in the act of 
becoming man, as if the God in heaven is different from the God on earth, 
or that there are two aspects or parts of God as Donceel and Trethowan 
think he holds is to completely miss Rahner's whole point. For Rahner 
the greatness of the Incarnation, as it is for all Chalcedonian Christians, 
is the fact that God as God, in all that entails, has actually entered 
time and history in the very immutable transcendence of his divinity, and 
has actually come to be man. Rahner uses the term 'dialectical' not to 
say that God as God at one and the same time is unchangeable and changable 
in becoming man, but rather that God actually does become man and does 
not change in so becoming. The two truths for Rahner that must be dia- 
lectically upheld are that God remains immutable in becoming man, and 
yet actually comes to be man, and not that he remains immutable and 
changes in becoming man. 
When Rahner states 'that while God remains immutable "in himself, " 
he can come to be "in the other, " and both assertions must really and 
truly be said of the same God as God, ' he is not saying that part of God 
remains immutable 
(the 'himself' part) and part of God changes (the part 
that becomes 'other'), but rather that he who remains immutable in himself 
is precisely the same one who is actually man: God as God. 
Likewise, when Rahner says that 'we learn from the incarnation that 
immutability (which is not eliminated) is not simply and uniquely a 
characteristic of God, but that in spite of 
his immutability he can truly 
become something. He himself, he, in time, ' he is not saying that 'in 
spite of his immutability' God changes in becoming man; but rather that 
in spite of the fact that God's immutability is not eliminated he can 
actually become man. The whole emphasis on 'He himself, he, in time' 
stresses that the immutable 
God himself is in time. 
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This is most clearly seen in a text not previously quoted where 
Rahner states: 'The basic element, according to our faith, is the self- 
emptying, the coming to be, the kenosis and genesis of God himself, who 
can come to be by becoming another thing.... without having to change in 
his own proper reality which is the unoriginated origin. '1 The kenosis 
and genesis is not God giving up some apsect of his divinity or changing 
in becoming man, rather the real kenosis is that God in his full and un- 
changed unoriginated originality can exist as man. The humility of God 
is not that he gives up or changes his divinity, but rather the humility 
lies in the fact that God in the glorious fullness of his being actually 
exists as a lowly man. For Rahner, to deny God his full immutable divinity 
when he truly exists as man is to deny the real humility of God. 
All of this complexity, confusion, and misunderstanding could easily 
be eliminated if Rahner had realized^ God's actual existence as man is 
not dialectically opposed to his immutability, and his being a logical 
term in the incarnational relation. While he states that God's immutability 
must be dialectically held without becoming Hegelian, he fails to realize 
with Hegel that there is no dialectic involved in the first place. God 
himself as he is in himself can actually become man in reality without 
change, not in spite of his immutability, but precisely because of it. 
Because he is immutable he is able to relate the manhood to himself as he 
is so as to subsist in it and be man. God's immutability is the pre- 
supposition and guarantee that it is really and truly God in himself 
who actually is man and not a hindrance to it. 
Rahner himself in a later essay seems to begin to realize what has 
just been said. 
'In the doctrine of God there is no real difference between the 
Deus in se and the Deus extra se. At least since Christ .... And it 
is the paradoxical miracle of his love 
(i. e. of himself "in himself") 
that he is able to do this without becoming finite and without 
violating our creatureliness. This process of becoming identical 
.... is the real content of salvation-history, which 
is the history 
of the unchangeable God. He really can become something in this 
history, precisely because (and in the final analysis not "although") 
he is"Tinite and unchanging, the absolute power, capable of doing 
this. ' 2 
1., 'On the Theology of the Incarnation, ' T. I., 4, p. 114. 
2. 'Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics, ' T. I., 
9, p. 143. 
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For Rahner, as for Chalcedon, it is God in himself who is man. In Christ 
Deus in se it Deus extra se. What strikes one immediately now is that 
Rahner no longer sees the immutability of God as an impediment to God's 
actual existence as man. He explicitly eliminates the dialectical 
'although' and states instead that God in reality can become man precisely 
because 'he is infinite and unchanging.... ' 
C. Jean Galot 
To date Jean Galot is not a very well known theologian in English 
speaking circles, and one wonders if he is appreciated even on the Continent. 
Nevertheless, his Christology and Soteriology is one of the most refreshing 
and clearly rendered statements of the Catholic tradition. His is not just 
a restatement of the past, but an attempt to truly develop the untapped 
potential of traditional belief. 
While Galot has written three books in Christology, this section will 
mainly treat Vers une Nouvelle Christologie with closing reference to 
La Personne du Christ. 
1 
For Galot Chalcedon is the legitimate culmination of Patristic 
Christology. Even though Chalcedon's definition is couched in Greek terms, 
what it proclaimed has little to do with Greek Philosophy. Greek philsophy 
did not distinguish between person and nature. 'C'est la theölogie de la 
Revelation qui impose la distinction. ' 
2 
However, because Chalcedon was 
interested in stating the ontological constitution of Christ, it may appear 
to be a static affirmation: 'eile est redigee en terms d'LOtre plut'öt 
que d'evenement. '3 Nevertheless, inherent in 
Chalcedon's definition is 
an untapped dynamism that 
has not been fully developed. In proclaiming 
Christ to be the Logos existing as man Chalcedon understands that 
'L'Incarnation nest pas seulement la revelation de Dieu daps un homme: 
eile est l'engagement 
de la personne divine du verbe qui est devenue 
homme. '4 The dynamic element implicit in Chalcedonian Christology must 
1. Jean Galot, Vers Une Nouvelle ChristoloRie 
(Glembloux: Duculot- 
Lethielleux, 1971); La Personne du Christ (Glembloux: Duculot- 
Lethielleux, 1969). Galot's third book, which is undoubtedly one 
of the best scriptural and dogmatic statements of Christ's conscious- 
ness and knowledge is: La Conscience de Jesus 
(Glembloux: Duculot- 
Lethielleux, 1971)- 
2. La Personne du Christ, P. 10. Cf. Vers une Nouvelle Christologie, 
pp. 41-42. 
3. Vers une Nouvelle Christologie, p. 47- 
4- Ibid., p. 48. Cf. p. 
62. 
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likewise flow from the very truth it proclaimed. 
'Pour rendre correctement le dynamisme christologigyue, it faut y 
discerner comme principe d'unite.... la persorme divine. Car c'est 
eile qui accomplit la demarche en assumant une vie humaine. On ne 
peut apprecier la valeur de is. demarche que si on reconnait, la 
transcendance divine de la personne et l'integrite de la condition 
hurnaine dans laquelle eile s'engage.... ' 1 
What should be obvious already is that the dynamic element and greatest 
aspect of the Incarnation for Galot is the fact that the Logos in his trans- 
c endent divinity actually comes to exist and act in time and history as 
man. 'L'Incarnation est l'engagement d'une personne ei ternelle qui, avec 
i 
toute son 
eternite, entre dams be temps human. L'eternite est ainsi 
introduite dans l'existence humaine. '2 With Rahner and this study Galot 
wishes to maintain that the Logos himself actually exists in reality in a 
new manner. He likewise realizes that the value of the Logos existing as 
man lies solely and precisely in the fact that he does not change in so 
becoming but remains fully God. 'Daps l'Incarnation, celui qui devient ne 
perl pas ce qu'il est.... 
[Le Verbe] demeure identiquement le Verbe qui 
'etait' au commencement. S'il n'en etait pas ainsi, l'Incarnation n'aurait 
plus de valeur. ' However, the Logos' immutability in becoming man 
'n'empeche pas un veritable devenir. ' The immutability of God must not 
reduce the Incarnation to a moral union. 
'Devenir, c'est etre engage du plus profound de soi-meme dans 
ce que Von devient. Ce devenir signifie notamment que le Verbe 
a fait personnellement l'experience dune vie humaine, de sa 
propre vie humaine.... Le Verbe a donc connu, en un sens 
mysterieux, paradoxal, ý tine 
mode d'etre different de celui 
q'i'il avait de toute eternite. ' 4 
Galot still asks if this brings about a change in the Logos. It is 
here that Galot, like Rahner, confuses the question of the Logos changing 
in becoming man with the question of the Logos changing as man, and thus 
comes up with a somewhat ambiguous answer. 
Commenting on John's Proglue Galot states: 'I1 [John] ne dit pas 
1. _, P. 48- 
2. Ibid., P. 65. 
3. Ibid., P. 55. 
4. _, p. 56. 
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expressement que quelque chose a change dans le Verbe, mais il decrit 
la passage de l'eternite ä vie temporelle. Si le Verbe n'avait pas ete 
affect' par ce passage, on ne pourrait parler d'un engagement sincere 
et total dans 1' Incarnation. '1 The above could be interpreted that Galot 
sees a change in the Logos in becoming man and he probably does mean that 
as will be seen. However, Galot's main concern here is to uphold with 
John that with the Incarnation the Logos in reality now exists temporally 
as man and before did not. With John he wants to say that there is a 
real change, a real newness, involving the Logos himself. That the Logos 
is 'effect' par ce passage' is not so much for Galot a statement that the 
Logos loses his immutability or is changed into man, but rather that he 
is engaged 'sincere et total dans l'Incarnation. ' 
For Galot the touchstone for a true understanding of the notion of 
'become, ' due to his desire for a dynamic Christology, is whether one can 
truly say that the Logos himself is actually engaged in and experiencing 
a truly human life. 
'Nier qu'il ait ete affecte par cette vie humaine, ce serait 
etre r6du). t ä admittre qu'il ne l'a assumee que de 1'exterieur, 
sans interet veritable. ' 2 
For Galot 
'L'Incarnation est un engagement ou la personne divine du Verbe A #1 se place deliber 
ement dans une situation nouvelle, et veut glle- 
mme etre affectee par cette nouveaute et tant que sujet veritable 
et responsable de la demarche. ' 3 
What Galot is doing, and this is what causes confusion for the reader and 
Galot himself, is answering a question concerning the 'becoming' with 
an answer concerning the effects of the 'becoming. ' Instead of ontologically 
defining 'become' he gives an ontological description of its effects. The 
effect of the incarnational act, the 'becoming, ' is that the Logos is in a 
'situation nouvelle, ' and that he is affected by this new situation as 
40 
'sujet veritable. ' Because the effect of the 'becoming' places the Logos 
in a situation where as man he is the subject of change Galot tends to 
see the 'becoming' itself, the act by which the Logos comes to be the subject 
of change, as bringing about a change in the Logos' divinity as well. This 
1. I_ 
2. Ibid. 
3_ p, 6'9. 
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becomes even more clear in the following. 
As the above exemplifies, the basic problem or confusion in Galot 
is a tendency on his part to equate the actual changes in reality due 
to God's real action with an actual change in God himself. This is due 
to his desire to make it really God who is dynamically active and present 
in time and history especially in the Incarnation. However, the outcome 
of this is to conceive God in himself changing in a sequential fashion 
and not just the actual effects in which he is personally and newly 
involved. 
Galot holds that God reveals himself to be immutable through his 
action in the world as narrated in the Old and New Testaments. The 
immutability revealed is not just a moral faithfulness to his promises, 
but a metaphysical immutability. This is especially true in the Incarnation. 
'C'est identiquement ce Werbe 
eternal.... 
qui entre daps le devenir sans 
cesser d'6tre ce qu'il est. I1 ya ici une immutabilite qui ne pourrait 
se ramener ä une fidelite; c'est une persistence daps 11 order de 11 etre. 
This immutability has been sanctioned by Nicea's homoousion doctrine. 
Galot's next move is most important. For Galot God truly acts in 
time and history and it is truly God who acts. Because of God's action 
very great changes in reality take place--creation, Incarnation, and 
these changes reveal God to be immutably all-powerful. However, because 
he reveals his immutable and all-powerful being through the different 
and diverse changes in reality Galot concludes that: 
'1'Ecrit nous attests que cette imm ýtabilite n'exclut pas 
une certaine mutabilite ou variabilite. On na pas ledroit 
de supprimer celle-ci comme si eile portait detriment a'* celle-lea. 
Bien plus, d'apres le temoignage scripturaire, c'est l'immutabilite 
elle-meme qui se revele comme teile Bans, la mu`abilit e: si Dieu 
prend successivement des attitudes differentes a l'egard de l'homme, 
c'est parce qu'il est toujours le meine, que son dessein essential 
ne change pas, et qu'il veut en adapter la realisation aux 
comportements humains, fort variables. ' 2 
Galot is not saying that God changes because he is imperfect, but 
rather that the changes show God to be immutable. Being immutable he can 
i 
become creator, man, saviour, etc. 'Alors que la mutabilite de la creature 
presente des aspects negatifs et implique des deficiencies, la mutabilite 
1. Ibid., p. 79" Cf. pp. 75-81. 
2. -Ibid., p. 82. 
217 
n'exprime en Dieu qu'un dynamisme dont toute la valeur est positive. 
' 
For Galot the mutable and changing expressions of God's immutable power 
in time and history demand corresponding mutable and changing expressions 
of God's immutable power within himself. Why? Because otherwise God 
would not be really and truly Creator, nor would he really come to be 
man. The mutations of God's immutability establish and guarantee that 
it is really God in reality who is acting, who is Creator, who is man. 
One would not quarrel with Galot over the fact that God reveals 
himself to be all-powerful and immutable through the actions he performs 
and the changes he brings about in reality. Nor would one quarrel over 
the fact that it is really God acting. He is personally involved. He 
really is a Creator. He really is man. What one would quarrel with is 
Galot's thought that God changes himself in such a way as to become 
Creator, or that he changes himself so as to become man, as if God as God 
changes when he becomes God as Creator, or that God as God changes when 
he wishes to become man. For Galot God not only uses his immutable power 
in different ways at different times, but also in the use of this immutable 
power God himself changes or changes himself in different ways at different 
times. Galot predicates, what might be called, sequential mutations in 
God himself. He sequentially changes himself into God the Creator and 
God who has become man. 
While Galot proposes that God mutably uses his immutability in order 
to guarantee that it is truly God who is actually acting in time and 
history, what he has done is to throw into question what he wishes to 
hold. One can question whether God as Creator is really now God as God, 
or whether God who exists as man is really God as he is in himself. In 
proposing creation as God mutably using 
his immutable power, what man knows 
is not the immutable God in himself, but the immutable God as manifested 
in one mutable expression. Likewise with the Incarnation, man does not 
come to know and meet God himself, but only the mutable expression of himself 
as man. The immutable God in se is no longer the immutable God pro me. 
Galot makes two mistakes, one with regard to God in himself, and 
one with regard to God's relation 
to and action in the world. 
Firstly, to say that God changes the mode of his immutable and almighty 
power in the actions he performs is to see God's immutability and almighty 
power as accidents of God and not part and parcel of what he truly is in 
1. _, P. 83. 
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himself. God has no need to change the expression of his immutable nature 
to be active in time and history precisely because his immutable nature 
enables him to do so without change. God does not have to form or mould 
the pure act that he is into a Creator type of pure act when he creates, 
nor does he have to form his divinity into a type of divinity that wishes 
to'and can become man. The immutable pure act that God is, his very 
divinity in itself, is ipso facto potentially creative and incarnational. 
If God creates or becomes man he does so by the very act that he is and 
not by a mutation of it. 
Secondly, Galot does not understand how God, remaining fully immutable 
in himself, can in reality actually be related to and active in time and 
history. He wishes God to remain immutable, but he can only reconcile 
God's actual relation to the world with his immutability by proposing that 
God changes his immutable power from an in se type to a pro me type. 
However, he is unable to conceive that God in se as in se is God pro me. 
This is due to the fact that Galot falsely understands that for God to be 
logically related to the world is a relation 'qui est une vue de notre 
esprit mais n'existe pas comme teile daps la reälite '1 In order to over- 
come the non-reality of God's relation to the world in creation and the 
Incarnation Galot feels he must propose that because God is immutable he 
can change his in se immutability into a pro me immutability, that he 
can really become a God who is Creator, or who really is man. 
However, once one realizes that God is actually Creator because 
creatures in reality are really related to him as such, then God as God 
(in se) and God as Creator 
(pro me) are one and the same. Likewise, the 
Logos is actually man as he is in himself as God because the humanity in 
reality is related to him as he is in such a way that the Logos in se 
subsists as man pro me. For God to be logically related guarantees, 
specifies, and establishes that it is God himself as he is in himself 
who is actually related to man and actually is man. This is ultimately 
what Galot wishes to say and maintain all along. 
Galot would not have the above difficulty if he had fully realized 
all the implications inherent in the Christology he presented in his 
first work: La Personne du Christ. In this study Galot stresses that the 
distinguishing mark of personhood, both in God and man, is to be related. 
Persons are subsistent relations. Thus while a human person is relational 
'. Ibid., p. 89. 
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in and through his nature, the person as relational is distinct from the 
nature. Thus the Logos can be fully man without being a human person in 
that he is the centre and source of all human relations mediated through 
the human nature. Where normally a human person subsists in relation to 
others in and through his nature, in Christ the Logos subsists as man 
establishing human relations in and through his humanity. 
' 
Galot works this out very beautifully. However, if he would have 
turned the whole argument around he would have found the right solution 
to the problem which arises in his Vers une Nouvelle Christologie. In 
La Personne du Christ Galot stresses the similarity between being a divine 
person and being a human person so as to show how the person of Christ 
can be the Logos without ceasing to be fully human. If he would now stress 
the dissimilarity between a divine person and a human person, he would 
discover why the Logos could truly become man without changing. 
Where in man the person is relational through and in his nature which 
is distinct from his personhood, the persons of the Trinity are identical 
with the one nature of God. Thus while a human person is in potency to 
become further relational, divine persons are fully relational, fully 
actualized relations, fully personal since they relationally are the 
immutable and fully actualized nature of God as actus uurus. Human persons 
then, unlike divine persons, change in every new relation. The relations 
they establish are through changes in their natures through and in which 
they relate to others. Thus human persons are never related to one another 
as they are in themselves, but always by some changeable mediating action 
of their nature. This is easily seen in human love. A person grows in 
love and tries to express it, but he soon realizes that no expression of 
his love captures and makes real the totality of his love. This is 
because the person cannot relate himself as he is, with all his love, to 
the other person, but must use mediating and changeable actions. 
However, the divine persons, being fully actualized relations, are 
related to one another as they are, and not by mediating actions. They 
actually come to be in their very relatedness and are their relatedness. 
Because of this when God in the Trinity of Persons establishes relations 
outside himself, he is able to do so not by mediating acts which involve 
change, but by relating the other person to himself as he is. The 
J. Cf. the whole of La Personne du Christ, but especially pp. 75-97" 
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Persons of the Trinity being fully actualized relations contain no potency 
which needs to be actualized or overcome through new actions in order to 
establish new relations. What needs to be changed and overcome is man's 
potential to be related. This is done by God relating man to himself as 
he is in different ways. No intermediating action then lies between or 
establishes the relation between God and the other. God the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit love man and express their love for man not by an action 
different from the love that they have for one another, nor by an action 
that simply expresses the love that they have, but by uniting man to 
themselves as they are, by uniting man to the very Trinity of their love. 
The same is the case in the Incarnation. The Logos being a fully 
actualized subsistent relation does not have to overcome some potential 
in order to become man and subsist as man. He does not, as Galot proposes, 
have to change his immutable being or newly express it as incarnational. 
The Logos being a fully actualized subsistent relation has no relational 
potency and thus has no need of new mediating actions on his part in order 
for him to establish an incarnational relation. The potency lies solely 
in the humanity. It must be related and united to the Logos in such a 
way that the effect in the humanity is nothing other than the Logos 
subsisting in it as man. 
The above is but an amplification of what has been said many times 
before. The immutability of God as expressed in the Person of the Logos 
as a fully actualized subsistent relation is the prologomenon to and 
presupposition for the Incarnation and not a stumbling block. 
Before closing it should be noted, with little surprise, that 
Trethowan finds Galot's Christology unacceptable. His disagreement however 
is not so much over the point discussed above, but over Galot's contention 
that it is truly the Logos who is the real subject of Christ's human life. 
Commenting on an article by Galot, Trethowan finds it unthinkable that 
a divine person should suffer, die, etc., that the Logos 'had personally 
the experience of human life, of his own human life. '1 Trethowan's 
problem here is the same as the one he had with Rahner. Again what 
Trethowan fails to see, and what Galot glories in, is the reality of the 
Incarnation. If the Logos in reality actually is man, than as man he 
1. Trethowan, Mysticism and Theology, pp. 160-161. Galot's article is 
'Dynamisme de l'Incarnation, ' Nouvelle Revue Theolopigue, 93, 
(1971), pp. 226-244. 
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must be the subject of all the human experiences. 
In closing it should be emphasized that this study of Galot hardly 
does him justice and in many ways does him an injustice for it harps on 
his one fault. This could not be avoided since the fault bears directly 
on the subject of this study. In reparation it can only be stressed 
that Galot's Christology is one of the most theologically exciting to 
appear in recent years. 
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After reading this study, one may be surprised to what extent the immut- 
ability of God influenced Christology through the centuries. However, 
what may be most surprising is not so much that it has influenced 
Christology, but the ways it has influenced Christology. 
In Patristic Christology the immutability of God was seen, for the 
most part, as a stumbling block to the Incarnation. This was the case 
both for orthodox and heterodox theologians. The Docetists denied the 
real humanity for the sake of God's immutability and impassibility. 
Arius denied the true divinity of the Logos because he believed a real 
incarnation implied change and thus impossible for a divine being. 
Nestorius could not conceive of an ontological notion of 'become' which 
would preserve both the true immutable divinity and the full humanity, 
and thus had to settle, in the last analysis, for a moral union. On the 
orthodox side theologians, especially men like Tertullian, Origen, and 
Athanasius, knew that for God to become man did not mean that he was 
changed into man, yet they also knew that they must say that Christ was 
nevertheless ontologically one, that God and man existed in the one 
reality of Christ. Yet, even they could not fully formulate how that 
could be. 
What interestingly arose at the time of the Nestorian controversy 
is the realization that God's immutability must be maintained not only 
for theological reasons, i. e. in order to protect God as God; but also 
for incarnatior°1reasons, i. e. God must remain immutable in becoming man 
if it is really and truly to be God who is man. It was at this point 
that the immutability began to be seen, however slightly, not purely as 
a stumbling-block, but also as something positively demanded by the 
Incarnation. Nestorius realized very well that if God changed in 
becoming man it is no longer God who is man, but that which 'he' changed 
into. Cyril likewise was aware of this. Moreover both realised that 
a change in the Logos in becoming man demanded a corresponding change 
in the manhood, and thus the true humanity itself was destroyed. 
Apollinarianism and Monophysitism exemplify this tendency very well. 
The problem came down to specifying what 'become' really meant 
incarnationally. It must be such that God remains God, if it is to be 
God who is man, and the humanity must remain full and real, if it is to 
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be man that he is. Moreover it must be ontological, if God is to be man. 
Nestorius and Theodoret of Cyrus could not conceive of such a notion 
which would preserve all the required prerequisites. This was due to the 
fact that they conceived the divinity and humanity as distinct and separate 
to begin with. They rightly knew that any subsequent ontological union 
would demand change and mutation. What the Monophysites did they knew 
could not be done. Cyril, however, in upholding Ephesus, gained the in- 
sight that the incarnational act and union is not an essentialistic or a 
compositional union of natures, but a personal/existential act and union. 
For the Logos to become man meant that he took on a new manner or mode of, 
personal existence. For the Logos to become man meant that he came to be, 
came to exist as man. Thus Cyril grasped that the distinction of natures 
is made not prior to the union, but that the act which establishes the 
union. is the very same act which establishes and guarantees the distinction. 
The act by which the Logos comes to be man is the act which establishes 
that it is as man that he exists. No longer is the ontological, union seen 
as a threat to the immutability of God or to the full humanity, but rather 
it is one and the same act which establishes the union and maintains the 
distinction. 
With this personal/existential notion of 'become' the communication 
of idioms is fully justified. If the Logos personally exists as God and 
as man then whatever pertains to each mode of existence can really and truly 
be predicated of the Logos. The communication of idioms is not a word 
game to stress how close God and man are related as Nestorius would have it, 
but specifies and articulates the fact that the Logos actually in reality 
exists as God and as man. 
It is Chalcedon which sanctions and proclaims the above. One and the 
Same Logos exists homoousion with God and man, and as such what pertains 
to each can truly be said of him. 
While Anselm fully justified and explained Chalcedon in his day, it 
was Aquinas who came up with the next insight into the relationship between 
the Incarnation and God's immutability. He was probably not fully aware 
of his insight and he presented it ambiguously, but it is nevertheless 
there. In seeing God's immutability as due to his supreme and utterly 
dynamic perfection as ipsum esse and actus gurus, Aquinas eliminated all 
negative potential in God. In so doing he did not place God in complete 
isolation from the world and man, nor in a situation in which no relation 
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was possible. Rather he gave to God the positive potential that whatever 
is related to him is related to him as he is in himself. To be a creature 
is to be related to God himself as Creator and only if God is immutably 
actus gurus can such a relation be established. That God is the logical 
term of the relation, that he is not changed by the relation, is not to 
deny that he is related, nor to say that he is only so conceived to be 
related in man's mind, but specifies that the relation is one in which 
the creature is actually related in reality to God as God actually is in 
himself. God as actus gurus has no relational potency and thus is not in 
need of mediating acts which bring about change in him in order for him to 
be related. God can relate himself as he is in himself by relating others 
to himself as he is. The real effect in the other is that he is related 
in some way to God as God is in himself. Thus the incarnational relation, 
the 'becoming, ' is nothing other than the full and real humanity coming 
to be and being related to the Logos as he is to such a degree that the 
effect of the relation in the humanity is nothing less than that the Logos 
himself as he is in himself, in his divine esse personale, comes to subsist 
as man . 
While Aquinas did not fully realize it, and neither does Rahner and 
Galot, God's immutability as actus gurus is no longer a stumbling-block, 
but the primary prologomenon for a true Incarnation. It is God's immut- 
ability as actus gurus that is God's incarnational potential. Only an 
immutably perfect God can enact a personal/existential 'becoming' which 
the Incarnation implies as grasped by Cyril and sanctioned by Chalcedon. 
only if God is immutably and unchangeably perfect can he establish a 
relation in which he, in the fullness of his self-possessed divinity, 
personally come to exist as man. 
With Luther and the Kenotic theories that flowed from him, Christology 
returned to the presuppositions abandoned by Cyril and Chalcedon and to a 
notion of 'become' that was once more essentialistic and compositional. 
Like Nestorius and the Monophysites the Kenoticists made the distinction 
of natures logically prior to the incarnation act and the union. Unlike 
Nestorius they fused the two, and unlike the Alonophysites it was the 
divinity of Jesus which this time suffered. However as classical Mono- 
physites ended up jeopardizing the divinity of Christ by fusing and con- 
fusing it with the humanity, so Kenoticism by reducing the divinity to 
a human level jeopardized the full humanity. Jesus was no longer a real 
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man with a real human intellect and will, but a shadow man functioning 
with a diminished and emptied divine intellect and will. Essentialistic 
and compositional notions of 'become' always bring forth a tertium quid 
Christ who is neither fully God nor fully man even though they always are 
enunciated in order to guarantee one or the other. 
Process Christology is an attempt to solve the problem of God's 
immutability in relation to the Incarnation by denying that God is immutable. 
In so doing the problem does disappear, but the repercussions are disastrous. 
While Process Christology wished to show how closely related God is to man 
in and through the concept of prehension and how Christ is the summit and 
chief exemplification of this, what one must conclude is that there is no 
contemporary relations in process thought and thus each being, when it is 
a being, is not related to anything at all. All relations are constitutive 
relations of past to present to future and not personal contemporary 
relations. Thus God and man are never contemporaries and never personally 
related. Likewise process thought in seeing the value of man as his 
ability to actualize God's potential has in fact taken from man all his 
inherent value and worth as a man in himself. Each human being's value is 
a monophysite value. His worth and value is totally dependent on how 
much of God's potential he actualizes. Christ in actualizing perfectly 
God's potential is the most thoroughly monophysite. As a man he has no 
value in and of himself, but is reduced to the perfect actualizer of God's 
potential, and thus allowing God to completely absorb and consume this 
value through prehension. 
Contemporary Catholic Christology has two admirable proponents in 
Rahner and Galot, but Schoonenberg adds little Christological advancement. 
Both Rahner and Galot take up the personal/existential notion of the 
Incarnation and stress its dynamic element. The human history of Jesus 
is the real human history of God. As man God himself is present in time 
and history experiencing all that it thoroughly human and establishing 
human relations with man as a man. 
Both Rahner and Galot see the immutability of God as an impediment 
to the reality of the Incarnation, but this is due to their mis-interpretation 
of what it means for God to be logically related. They believe that this 
means that God is only conceptually related and not related in reality. 
Once this misinterpretation is overcome their Christology becomes even 
more dynamic for it guarantees that it is the Logos himself as he is in 
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himself, in the fullness of his divinity, who actually exists in reality 
as man. Being immutable the Logos has no relational potency but can 
establish relations with others by uniting them to himself as he is even 
to the point of uniting to himself a real and, full human nature so as to 
subsist as man. Thus it is the Logos himself, in his unqualified divinity, 
who establishes human relations and encounters the world and man as 
a man. Paradoxically, bit nevertheless true to logic, the Logos' immut- 
ability as God guarantees that it is the Logos himself who is passible 
as man. 
As was stated in the Preface the conclusions arrived at here were 
not preconceived from the beginning, but developed with each successive 
stage of this study. Hopefully the conclusions arrived at are valid and 
hopefully they contribute to a better understanding of what role God's 
immutability plays in the Incarnation. Far from being a negative role 
it plays a highly positive one. Also while the mystery of the Incarnation 
ultimately remains in this study, it is hoped that the true glory and 
grandeur of the mystery has become clearer and with this clarity a further 
realization and appreciation of God's true and full love for man as 
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